Weldon v. Wal-Mart Stores Tex., L.L.C.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:15-CV-62 |
| Parties | JULIE WELDON, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES TEXAS, L.L.C., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the court is Defendant Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C.'s ("Wal-Mart") Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment (#28), in which Wal-Mart seeks summary judgment on all claims asserted by Plaintiff Julie Weldon ("Weldon"). Having considered the pending motion, the submissions of the parties, the pleadings, and the applicable law, the court is of the opinion that summary judgment is warranted.
On February 7, 2013, Weldon visited the Wal-Mart store in Vidor, Texas. As she walked in through the side door, another customer, Amanda Henry ("Henry"), was leaving the store.1 Henry was headed toward the same door through which Weldon was entering the store. Lying in front of this door, in the vestibule area (lobby) of the store, was a mat, which a Wal-Martemployee had placed on the floor.2 Neither Weldon nor Henry noticed anything unusual about the mat as they walked toward it.
As Henry was walking, her boot kicked the edge of the mat, causing it to flip over onto Weldon's feet. Weldon then tripped and lurched forward, eventually falling to the floor. According to Weldon, the mat thrown over her feet caused her to fall, and she suffered severe injuries. Weldon alleges that this mat posed a number of dangerous conditions of which Wal-Mart had actual or constructive knowledge. Specifically, Weldon claims that the mat contained a ripple, which was a tripping hazard, and that it should have been taped or otherwise secured to the floor.
On January 9, 2015, Weldon filed her original petition in the 260th Judicial District Court of Orange County, Texas. Weldon asserts a claim of premises liability under a negligent activities theory and, alternatively, a premises defect theory against Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart removed the action to this court on February 10, 2015, on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Thereafter, on June 10, 2016, Wal-Mart filed the instant motion, asserting that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether: (1) the floor mat posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (2) Wal-Mart had knowledge that the floor mat posed an unreasonable risk of harm; (3) the condition of the floor mat was the proximate cause of Weldon's injuries; and (4) Weldon's injuries were a result of Wal-Mart's contemporaneous activity.
As an initial matter, Wal-Mart objects to several portions of Weldon's summary judgment evidence. Evidence offered for or against summary judgment is subject to the same standards and rules that govern the admissibility of evidence at trial. Okpala v. City of Houston, 397 F. App'x 50, 55 n.15 (5th Cir. 2010); Paz v. Brush Engineered Materials, Inc., 555 F.3d 383, 387-88 (5th Cir. 2009); Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 285 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Resolution Tr. Corp. v. Starkey, 41 F.3d 1018, 1024 (5th Cir. 1995)). Although a court must view summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "a judge may discount evidence which is unspecific or immaterial." Godeaux v. Dynamic Indus., Inc., 864 F. Supp. 614, 619 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (citing Leonard v. Dixie Well Serv. & Supply, Inc., 828 F.2d 291, 295 (5th Cir. 1987)).
First, Wal-Mart objects to Weldon's offer of Henry's lay opinion about mats in other businesses as immaterial and irrelevant. Relevant evidence is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401. During her deposition, Henry testified that she had seen mats at other businesses slip and move around. Henry stated that she had witnessed people kick these mats up, although she had never seen anyone injured by this. Weldon argues that these statements are relevant and material because they go to the defect in the mat at issue in this case.3 Henry's observations, however, allrelate to mats at businesses other than the Vidor Wal-Mart where Weldon fell. Henry readily admitted that she had never seen this happen at the Vidor Wal-Mart. Further, Henry acknowledged that she is not an expert on mats and would be unable to say whether the mat in question was of the same kind and quality as the mats at the other stores. The events witnessed by Henry in other businesses, involving mats made of unknown materials, do not make it more probable that the mat at issue posed an unreasonable risk of harm.4 Thus, this testimony is irrelevant. Accordingly, Wal-Mart's objection to this portion of Henry's deposition is sustained, and the court will not consider it.
Second, Wal-Mart objects to Henry's statement that all mats used in businesses should be secured to the floor. Wal-Mart objects on the basis of hearsay, relevance, and improper foundation.5 In response, Weldon maintains that Henry is entitled to express a lay opinion on this topic. To be admissible, a lay opinion must be based on personal perception and must be helpful to the jury. FED. R. EVID. 701; United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 137 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Riddle, 103 F.3d 423, 428 (5th Cir. 1997)). Lay testimony is helpful to the jury when it describes "something that the jurors could not otherwise experience for themselves . . . ." United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713, 733 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 595 (6th Cir. 2013)). Thus, testimony on a topic that the jury is fully capable ofdetermining for itself is not helpful to the jury and inadmissible under Rule 701. Haines, 803 F.3d 713. Jurors are certainly capable of determining for themselves whether floor mats should be secured to the floor. Henry's personal opinion regarding the securing of mats, a topic on which she disclaimed any expertise, therefore, invades the province of the jury and must be excluded. Thus, Wal-Mart's objection to Henry's opinion that all mats should be secured is sustained.
Finally, Wal-Mart objects that evidence of a small, missing piece on the lip of the mat is immaterial. Weldon responds that this piece of evidence is material because it shows that Wal-Mart was willing to, and did in fact, allow the mat to remain on the floor in a defective condition and did nothing to warn or make safe that condition. Weldon, however, does not claim that this missing piece caused or played any role in her fall or that it would have made it easier for the mat to become rippled. Because Weldon does not argue that the missing material had any effect on her fall, this evidence is immaterial and irrelevant. Accordingly, Wal-Mart's objection sustained.
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); accord Hefren v. McDermott, Inc., 820 F.3d 767, 771 (5th Cir. 2016). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Davis v. Fort Bend Cty., 765 F.3d 480, 484(5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2804 (2015); Tech. Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 407 (5th Cir. 2012).
"A fact issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action." Hemphill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 805 F.3d 535, 538 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1715 (2016); Tiblier v. Dlabal, 743 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2014); accord Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2012); Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Farese, 423 F.3d 446, 454 (5th Cir. 2005). "Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Tiblier, 743 F.3d at 1007 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). "An issue is 'genuine' if it is real and substantial, as opposed to merely formal, pretended, or a sham." Hudspeth v. City of Shreveport, 270 F. App'x 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bazan ex rel. Bazan v. Hidalgo Cty., 246 F.3d 481, 489 (5th Cir. 2001)). Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Hefren, 820 F.3d at 771 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248); Tiblier, 743 F.3d at 1007; accord Haverda v. Hays Cty., 723 F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir. 2013).
Once a proper motion has been made, the nonmoving party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials in the pleadings but must present affirmative evidence, setting forth specific facts, to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322 n.3; see Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)); Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013). The court must "review the record 'taken as a whole.'" Black v. Pan Am. Labs., LLC, 646 F.3d 254, 273 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986))); see Cityof Alexandria v. Brown, 740 F.3d 339, 350 (5th Cir. 2014). The evidence is construed "in favor of the nonmoving party, but only where there is an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Spring St. Partners-IV, L.P. v. Lam, 730 F.3d 427, 435 (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc., ...
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