Welfare of D.L., Matter of, C7-91-1173

• Decision Date: 31 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. C7-91-1173,C7-91-1173
• Citation: 479 N.W.2d 408
• Parties: In the Matter of the WELFARE of D.L.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

Page 408

479 N.W.2d 408

In the Matter of the WELFARE of D.L.

No. C7-91-1173.

Court of Appeals of Minnesota.

Dec. 31, 1991.

Review Granted Feb. 27, 1992.

Syllabus by the Court

1. By limiting mandatory placement preferences to children of minority racial or ethnic backgrounds, the Minority Adoption Act, Minn.Stat. Sec. 259.28, subd. 2, violates the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.

2. Longstanding legislative and common law preferences for placing a child in the permanent care and custody of a relative should be considered in support of a relative's petition for adoption of a child.

Shane C. Perry, Shawn M. Perry, Stewart R. Perry, Perry, Perry & Perry, Wayzata, for appellants.

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Atty., William A. Neiman, Nancy K. Jones, Asst. County Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent Hennepin County.

Robert L. Barrows, Steven L. Belton, Leonard, Street and Deinard, Minneapolis, for respondent Grandparents.

Hubert H. Humphrey, III, Atty. Gen., David P. Iverson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent Minnesota Dept. of Human Services.

Wright S. Walling, George T. Stephenson, Walling & Berg, P.A., Minneapolis, for Guardian Ad Litem.

Howard A. Knutson, Knutson, Stier, Ilstrup & Knutson, Burnsville, for amicus curiae NAACP.

Considered and decided by SCHUMACHER, P.J., and KLAPHAKE and DAVIES, JJ.

OPINION

DAVIES, Judge.

D.L.'s foster parents and maternal grandparents both sought to adopt her. The foster parents appeal the trial court's ruling granting the grandparents' petition. We affirm.

FACTS

D.L., whose birth date is July 12, 1989, was the third child born during the marriage of Debra L. and Jonathan L. D.L. has been in the care of appellants, her foster parents, since a few days after her birth. D.L., Debra, and the respondent grandparents are African-American; the foster parents and the father are not.

Debra did not give any information about her family to the agency that placed D.L. with appellants. She gave the agency a false address and failed to keep appointments with the agency social worker. Debra and Jonathan's parental rights to D.L. were terminated by the trial court's order on August 15, 1990, on the ground of abandonment.

Debra's two other daughters have lived with her parents, respondents herein, since 1988. One of the daughters is from the marriage with Jonathan and the other from a prior relationship. Respondents have legal custody of both girls, now six and eight years old. Another child of the marriage, a boy, lived with them for a time. At the request of both the boy and his father, respondents returned the boy to Jonathan.

Respondents live in rural Halifax County, Virginia. They first learned of D.L.'s existence in August of 1989 when Debra called from Minnesota and told them she had a daughter. Debra refused to give her parents any further information or a telephone number where she could be reached.

Debra visited respondents for a few days in late December 1989. They urged her to get the baby and live with them. Debra, however, returned to Minnesota and respondents had no contact with her until February of 1990, when they learned she was in jail in Minneapolis. Respondents called Debra who assured them that D.L. was with good people and she would get her back.

In June 1990, Debra called her mother to say for the first time that if she could not get out of jail, she was going to lose D.L. Promptly thereafter, respondent grandmother came to Minneapolis to look for D.L.; she was able to locate her granddaughter through the placement agency. Within a few weeks respondents notified Hennepin County's adoption unit that they wished to adopt D.L.

Initially, Hennepin County advised respondents they could assume custody and take D.L. back to Virginia with them after a short transition period. However, on October 5, appellants, D.L.'s foster parents, filed a petition to adopt D.L. By order dated October 12, the trial court granted a temporary restraining order to prevent D.L.'s immediate removal from appellants' home.

On November 5, the trial court granted respondents' motion to intervene in the adoption proceeding initiated by appellants. Then on November 14, 1990, respondents filed their own petition to adopt D.L. An evidentiary hearing was set for January 1991. Prior to trial, the court issued an order limiting the hearing to the issue of whether there was good cause not to approve respondents as D.L.'s adoptive parents under the "relative" preference of the Minority Adoption Act, Minn.Stat. Sec. 259.28, subd. 2.

At the seven-day trial, respondents provided a detailed description of their background, marriage, and family life. Respondent grandfather was age 51 and respondent grandmother was age 48 at the time of trial. They have been married since 1962. Both are in good health and are normally employed full time. The grandmother testified that she took a leave of absence from her job to pursue D.L.'s adoption and that she planned to stay at home to care for D.L. if the petition was granted.

Sandra Lawson, a Hennepin County social worker, testified pertaining to her favorable study of respondents' home. Lawson's testimony regarding the positive relationship between respondents and their children and grandchildren was confirmed by D.L.'s guardian ad litem, Jane Moore, who also visited respondents in Virginia.

We turn now to the appellants. They testified they have been married since 1966. Except for a teenage son, appellants' children are married and living away from home. Appellants testified they have a profound love for D.L. and that D.L. is deeply attached to them. A primary issue at trial was the consequences to D.L. of breaking the emotional bond between her and appellants.

Appellants presented the testimony of clinical psychologists, Drs. Winifred Scott and Clifford Moore; a pediatrician, Dr. Jeffrey Alexander; and a professor of child psychology at the University of Minnesota, Dr. Byron Egeland. These experts testified that removing a child of D.L.'s age from caretakers to whom the child is securely attached will cause permanent harm to the child which may result later in depressive or conduct disorders. All the experts agreed that a child D.L.'s age would experience short-term pain if the attachment with the primary caretaker was disrupted.

Respondents' primary expert was Kenneth Watson, a licensed clinical social worker and the Assistant Director of the Chicago Child Care Society. Watson testified he has been involved in thousands of adoptions involving toddler-aged children in his 37 years of experience. He stated that although children feel great pain if removed from caretakers to whom they are securely attached, the likelihood that the child will suffer any significant emotional problems is extremely small, given a loving recipient family. Watson testified about the advantages to the child of placement within the biological family. He also testified that African-American parents have a unique ability to pass along to their children the coping skills needed for a minority person to manage in this society.

Respondents also called Dr. Lawrence Kutner, a clinical psychologist, as a rebuttal witness. Kutner testified that although attachment is important, the impact of early separation can fade away with the opportunity to form new positive attachments.

The trial court granted respondents' adoption petition, making extensive findings of fact. The court upheld the constitutionality of the Minority Adoption Act and found there was no good cause not to follow the relative placement preference of the Act. The court also made a separate finding that it was in D.L.'s best interest that respondents become her adoptive parents.

This appeal followed. Pursuant to orders of this court, D.L. has remained in appellants' home during the pendency of the appeal.

ISSUES

1. Does the Minority Adoption Act, Minn.Stat. Sec. 259.28, subd. 2, violate the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause by limiting mandatory placement preferences to children of minority racial or ethnic backgrounds?

2. Did the trial court abuse its broad discretion in concluding that the child's best interests were served by placing her for adoption with her maternal grandparents?

ANALYSIS

The trial court's authority to grant an adoption petition is governed by Minn.Stat. Sec. 259.28 (1990). The statute provides that a decree of adoption shall be made if the court finds that it is in "the best interests of the child." Minn.Stat. Sec. 259.28, subd 1(a).

I.

The Minority Adoption Act, codified at Minn.Stat. Sec. 259.28, subd. 2, requires the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to follow certain placement preferences in the adoption of a child of "minority racial or minority ethnic heritage." Id. In determining adoptive placement of such children, the court "shall" give preference first to a relative of the child, or, if that would be "detrimental" to the child or a relative is not available, to a family with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child. Id. If such a placement is not "feasible," the court shall give preference to a family of different racial or ethnic heritage from the child that is "knowledgeable and appreciative" of the child's racial or ethnic heritage. Id.

Appellants contend that Minn.Stat. Sec. 259.28, subd. 2, impermissibly classifies adoptive children based upon their race, thereby violating the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Appellants are joined in this argument by D.L.'s guardian ad litem and amicus curiae Suburban NAACP. Respondents grandparents and Hennepin County contend that appellants lack standing to challenge the statute and further argue that the statute withstands equal protection strict scrutiny analysis.

To invoke the jurisdiction of the court, when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged, the litigant bringing the challenge must be able to show that the statute has been or is about to be...