Welle v. Prozinski
| Decision Date | 14 October 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 46892,46892 |
| Citation | 258 N.W.2d 912 |
| Parties | Larry J. WELLE, Respondent, v. Shannon J. PROZINSKI, Respondent. William PROZINSKI, Respondent, v. Donald ASKREN, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
An individual who complies with the transfer provisions of the so-called Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act, in particular Minn.St. 168A.10, subd. 5, establishes incontrovertible evidence that ownership of the motor vehicle passed to the buyer-transferee. However, a seller-transferor who does not comply with the provisions of § 168A.10, subd. 5, is not precluded from presenting extrinsic evidence concerning the actual facts of a particular transaction in order to avoid vicarious liability as "owner" of the motor vehicle under Minn.St. 170.54.
The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict and enter judgment for the appellant.
Gordon Rosenmeier and John E. Simonett, Little Falls, for appellant.
Meagher, Geer, Markham, Anderson, Adamson, Flaskamp & Brennan and James F. Roegge, Minneapolis, for Welle.
Shannon J. Prozinski, pro se.
Rodger J. Johnson, Long Prairie, for Wm. Prozinski.
Heard before TODD, YETKA and SCOTT, JJ., and considered and decided by the court en banc.
Larry Welle suffered injuries while a passenger in an automobile operated by Shannon J. Prozinski. Shannon had purchased the vehicle from Donald Askren under a type of conditional sales agreement. Payment for the vehicle had been made, but the formalities of transferring the certificate of title to Shannon had not been completed prior to the date of the accident. The jury determined that Shannon was the owner of the vehicle at the time of the accident and exonerated Askren. On post-trial motion, the trial court found Askren vicariously liable for Welle's injuries as a matter of law, relying in part on the so-called Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act. Minn.St. 168A.10. We reverse and reinstate the jury verdict.
Donald Askren moved from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Minnesota in 1969. Askren had been engaged in the auto-body-shop business in Ohio, and in April 1971, he opened his own body shop in Little Falls, Minnesota. In the fall of 1971, Askren returned to Cincinnati and acquired a used Mercury Cougar which he brought back to Minnesota. The State of Ohio issued a certificate of title for the vehicle. Upon his return to Minnesota, Askren was able to obtain a registration card for the licensing of the vehicle but not a certificate of title. 1 He was told that "Minnesota wasn't issuing title cards yet, they were still working on the registration card situation."
In the fall of 1972, Askren secured a loan from Thorp Loan and Thrift Company in Little Falls and pledged the Cougar as collateral for the loan. Thorp perfected its security interest in the automobile, and the first certificate of title in Minnesota was issued for the Cougar on November 15, 1972. The certificate of title was forwarded to Thorp, naming Askren as the owner and Thorp as the first secured party.
On January 23, 1973, Askren sold the Cougar to 18-year-old Shannon J. Prozinski. The transfer was evidenced by a bill of sale made out to Shannon's father, William Prozinski, with the understanding that Shannon was the owner, in fact, of the automobile. The purchase price of the automobile was $400. Shannon made a $200 downpayment and took possession of the car the same day. The balance of the bill was to be "worked off" at Askren's body shop by Shannon at the rate of $25 per week.
On the next business day, Askren telephoned the manager of Thorp to request the substitution of a Dodge automobile for the Cougar as collateral on his loan. Askren testified that he informed the manager that he had "sold the car, and * * * wanted them to transfer it to the Prozinskis."
In March 1973, William Prozinski made the final payment on the Cougar for which Askren gave him a receipt which stated that it evidenced payment for "Cougar payoff and plates." On April 1, 1973, Askren took the registration card to the courthouse in Little Falls and purchased license plates for the vehicle, advising the license registration clerk that the car had been sold and the certificate of title should be transferred. Askren then gave the plates to the Prozinskis.
On May 28, 1973, Shannon, while operating the Cougar, was involved in a one-car accident in which Welle, as passenger in the vehicle, was seriously injured. Welle was hospitalized for an extended period of time, and as a result of the accident, he sustained 25-percent permanent partial disability of his back. Two months after the accident, Askren appeared at the Thorp office and executed the owner's assignment of title on the certificate of title. Thereafter, Askren, whose name appeared on the certificate as the owner of the vehicle, delivered a properly executed certificate of title to Shannon Prozinski.
Welle commenced an action for damages, alleging that Shannon operated the vehicle in a negligent manner and claiming that either William Prozinski or Askren, as the owner of the Cougar on the date of the accident, was vicariously liable for his injuries. At the close of plaintiff's case, the court dismissed the action against William Prozinski. The question of who was the owner of the vehicle on the date of the accident was submitted to a jury by special interrogatories. Over objection of plaintiff's counsel, instructions were given that the record of ownership appearing on the certificate of title was prima facie evidence of ownership of the vehicle which could be rebutted by extrinsic evidence concerning the vehicle transaction. The jury found Shannon to be the owner of the automobile and thereby also determined that Askren was not vicariously liable for Welle's injuries. 2
Welle thereafter filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, requesting the court to specifically amend the jury finding and to hold as a matter of law that Askren was the owner of the automobile on the date of the accident. Askren then made a motion for a new trial if Welle's motion was granted by the court. The trial court granted plaintiff's motion, relying in part upon Minn.St. 168A.10, 3 and concluding that Askren was the owner of the automobile on the date of the accident as a matter of law. Askren's motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court.
The primary issue presented on appeal is whether an automobile owner, who fails to comply with the provisions of § 168A.10 of the so-called Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act, may introduce evidence to prove that he is not the owner of the automobile and therefore not liable by reason of Minn.St. 170.54 of our so-called Safety Responsibility Act for damages resulting from the vehicle's operation by another individual. Askren also raises issues relating to a purported release given by Welle to Shannon and the excessiveness of the damages.
The principal issue in this case presents this court with a matter we have not previously considered. In 1971, the legislature adopted § 168A.10, which was intended to cover certificate of title problems arising when an automobile is transferred by one party to another. Section 168A.10 provides:
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...relative to the true facts of the transaction to avoid the imposition to him of vicarious tort liability. See, e.g., Welle v. Prozinski, 258 N.W.2d 912 (Minn.1977). In all our cases in which a rebuttable presumption has been applied or considered, both before and after 1971, the issue has s......
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