Wellman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 31 March 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97APE08-1067,97APE08-1067
• Citation: 711 N.E.2d 1077,127 Ohio App.3d 169
• Parties: WELLMAN, Appellant, v. NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 169

127 Ohio App.3d 169

711 N.E.2d 1077

WELLMAN, Appellant, v. NORFOLK AND WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 97APE08-1067.

Court of Appeals of Ohio,

Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided March 31, 1998.

Blumenstiel, Huhn, Wood & Adams Co., L.P.A., and Thomas C. Wood, Jr., Columbus, for appellant.

Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Patrick J. Smith and Leslie A. Yovan, Columbus, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Plaintiff-appellant, David Wellman, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court granting the motion for directed verdict of defendant-appellee, Norfolk & Western Railway Company. Because the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion, we reverse.

Plaintiff was employed by defendant as a brakeman at the Watkins Yard in Columbus, Ohio. Watkins Yard is a railroad interchange yard consisting of sixteen yard tracks and three main line tracks running north and south. On July 27, 1995, plaintiff was working as part of a three-man crew switching cars in the rail yard in order to link the outbound trains. As a part of that task, plaintiff was required to step between the gauge of the railroad tracks to couple the air hoses from each adjoining railroad car. In so doing, plaintiff stepped on a piece of scrap metal that was lying on top of soybean meal. The soybean meal caused the metal to slip, thereby causing plaintiff to slip and fall. Plaintiff suffered alleged injuries to his right knee and lower back as a result of the fall.

On December 1, 1995, plaintiff filed a claim under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Section 51 et seq., Title 45, U.S.Code ("FELA"), alleging that defendant's negligent failure to provide a safe work environment caused his injuries. Trial of plaintiff's complaint began on June 30, 1997, and defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence. In directing a verdict in favor of defendant, the trial court found that "reasonable minds could only conclude that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving any negligence on defendant's part, or that any negligence of defendant played any part, even the slightest, in producing plaintiff's alleged injuries and damages."

Plaintiff appeals, assigning the following errors:

"I. The trial court erred in granting defendant/appellee's motion for directed verdict at the close of plaintiff/appellant's case in chief and in entering final judgment for defendant/appellee.

"II. In this action arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, Title 45, U.S.C. Sections 51, et seq., the trial court failed to apply controlling federal law in deciding on motion for directed verdict whether jury issues were presented on the liability of the railroad employer, defendant/appellee, for injury to its employee, the plaintiff/appellant.

"III. The trial court erred in holding as a matter of law that no genuine issues of material fact were presented by the evidence as to whether or not the railroad's negligence caused in whole or in part, that is, played any part, even the slightest, in producing injuries to its employee."

As plaintiff's three assignments of error are interrelated, we address them jointly. "FELA cases adjudicated in state courts are subject to state procedural rules, but the substantive law governing them is federal." Vance v. Consol. Rail Corp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 222, 227, 652 N.E.2d 776, 782, citing St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Dickerson (1985), 470 U.S. 409, 411, 105 S.Ct. 1347, 1348, 84 L.Ed.2d 303, 306. Thus, state procedural rules determine the appropriate standard for reviewing the trial court's decision to grant a directed verdict.

Civ.R. 50(A)(4) provides:

"When a motion for a directed verdict has been properly made, and the trial court, after construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is directed, finds that upon any determinative issue reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion upon the evidence submitted and that conclusion is adverse to such party, the court shall sustain the motion and direct a verdict for the moving party as to that issue."

In Ruta v. Breckenridge-Remy Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 66, 68-69, 23 O.O.3d 115, 116, 430 N.E.2d 935, 938, the Supreme Court addressed the applicable standard for ruling on a motion for directed verdict:

"When a motion for a directed verdict is entered, what is being tested is a question of law; that is, the legal sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury. This does not involve weighing the evidence or trying the credibility of witnesses[.] The evidence is granted its most favorable interpretation and is considered as establishing every material fact it tends to prove."

Within that procedural framework, the federal substantive law governing FELA claims controls. "To prevail on a FELA claim, a plaintiff must 'prove the traditional common law elements of negligence: duty, breach, foreseeability and causation.' " Adams v. CSX Transp., Inc. (C.A.6, 1990), 899 F.2d 536, 539, quoting Robert v. Consol. Rail Corp. (C.A.1, 1987), 832 F.2d 3, 6. As a railroad, defendant unquestionably owed plaintiff, its employee, a duty of care under the FELA: "A railroad has a duty to use reasonable care in furnishing its employees with a safe place to work." Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell (1987), 480 U.S. 557, 558, 107 S.Ct. 1410, 1412, 94 L.Ed.2d 563, 568. The point of contention between the parties is whether plaintiff produced enough evidence to create a jury issue on the elements of breach and causation.

The trial court first found that plaintiff failed to meet his burden of proving breach on defendant's part. Review of that determination centers on whether, by allowing the scrap metal and soybean meal to accumulate in the Watkins Yard, or in failing to clean up the accumulation, defendant created or permitted an unsafe work environment. "At common law, generally speaking, a plaintiff injured in a fall caused by a defective condition on the property of another cannot recover damages from the owner of the property without showing that the owner knew or should have known of the existence of the condition in question. This principle has not been abandoned in cases arising under the F.E.L.A. * * *." Harris v. Illinois Cent. RR. Co. (C.A.6, 1995), 58 F.3d 1140, 1143.

Initially, defendant notes testimony of its employees who stated that the spill on which plaintiff slipped was so...