Wellner v. Eckstein

• Decision Date: 25 September 1908
• Citation: 117 N.W. 830,105 Minn. 444
• Parties: WELLNER et al. v. ECKSTEIN et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

105 Minn. 444

117 N.W. 830

WELLNER et al.

v.ECKSTEIN et al.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Sept. 25, 1908.

Appeal from District Court, Nicollet County; I. M. Olsen, Judge.

Action by Rose Wellner and Hilda Wellner, by Jacob Klossner, Jr., their guardian, against Joseph A. Eckstein and others. A demurrer to the complaint was sustained, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Elliott and Jaggard, JJ., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

Whether a widow, who has murdered her husband for the purpose of acquiring the real property of the intestate, may inherit under the statute of descent is not decided; the court not being able to agree. But a majority of the court are agreed that the order appealed from should be affirmed, on the ground that the decree of the probate court assigning to the widow her statutory interest in the real estate of her deceased husband is final. Hoidale & Somsen, for appellants.

Eckstein & Flor and Somerville & Hauser, for respondents.

LEWIS, J.

On January 6, 1899, and for some years prior thereto, John Wellner and Emelie Wellner were husband and wife and residents of the county of Nicollet. On the day named he died intestate, the owner of a farm, of which 80 acres was their homestead, leaving him serviving his widow, Emelie Wellner, and two minor children, the plaintiffs herein. Thereafter such proceedings were duly had and taken in the probate court of the county of Nicollet that a final decree was duly made and entered by and in such court on Nobember 11, 1899, whereby the homestead was duly assigned to the widow for her life, with an undivided one-third of the remainder of the real estate in fee, and the balance thereof to the two children. The deceased was murdered by his wife and hired man that they might marry each other and enjoy his property, and they were married on June 26, 1900, and on July 5, 1902, they executed for a valuable consideration a quitclaim deed of the land, so decreed to Emelie Wellner by the probate court, to the defendant Joseph A. Eckstein, who then had full notice and knowledge of the facts herein stated. Thereafter each of the grantors in the quitclaim deed were duly convicted of the crime of murdering John Wellner, and sentenced to life imprisonment. On April 6, 1907, the minor children, by their guardian, brought this action in the district court of the county of Nicollet, alleging in their complaint the foregoing facts, to secure a decree adjudging that the defendants hold the legal title to such interest in the lands as was decreed by the probate court to Emelie Wellner as trustee ex maleficio for the benefit of the plaintiffs, and that they are the owners thereof. The defendants demurred to the complaint, and the trial court made its order, from which the plaintiffs appealed, sustaining the demurrer on the ground that the facts stated in the complaint were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action.

Upon the facts admitted by the demurrer, the defendant Joseph A. Eckstein acquired only such rights, if any, in the land in question as his grantor, Emelie Tanke, formerly Wellner, had at the time the quitclaim deed was executed. In the examination of this case I have had the benefit of the exhaustive discussion of the subject by Justice ELLIOTT, whose views are concurred in by Justice JAGGARD, and I have had before me also the views of the Chief Justice, concurred in by Justice BROWN.

Two principle questions are presented by the appeal: (1) What is the proper construction of the state statutes with reference to the descent and distribution of the real property of an intestate, the surviving widow having murdered her husband for the purpose of acquiring the property? (2) The probate court having exercised its jurisdiction in administering the estate, and having made its final decree assigning the property to the widow and children, has the district court jurisdiction as a court of equity to set aside or modify the judgment of the probate court, whether the statute be strictly construed or be read with the implied exception that it has no application to one who has murdered the ancester for the purpose of benefiting thereby?

Having come to the conclusion that the case should be affirmed upon the ground that the probate court possessed exclusive jurisdiction of the subject-matter, I accept, upon that point, the views expressed by the Chief Justice. The probate court is not endowed by the Constitution with general equity powers, but is endowed with all powers, legal and equitable, necessary to the complete administration of the estates of decedents. The cases cited fully sustain this proposition. See, also, State ex rel. v. Probate Court, 103 Minn. 325, 115 N. W. 173. While the statute of descent defines who shall take the title upon the death of the ancestor, and the title passes by virtue of that statute, yet the construction of the statute and the determination of the heirs were incidental to and essential to the complete exercise of that court's jurisdiction. This result does not amount, in my opinion, to conferring upon the probate court the power to change the law of descent, as intimated by Justice ELLIOTT. It is no more than the exercise by that court of its constitutional powers to determine what the law is and to give it effect by a final judgment.

As to the first question discussed in the respective opinions, I am not prepared to accept the view that the statute should be construed strictly, giving effect only to the language used, and that, if the Legislature had intended to excluded murderers from its benefits, that intention would have been expressly inserted. I am unable to believe that it was ever contemplated by the legislators, who framed and enacted the statute of descent, that any person should be permitted to realize the benefits of those statutes, by committing the most atrocious of all crimes. Laws are passed for the preservation and enforcement of the common rights of all, and that no one may in such manner strike at the very foundations of society, for the purpose of securing personal benefit, is the underlying law upon which all statutes are founded. The fact that such a principle was not expressly written in the statute of descent indicates to my mind that it never occurred to any one that the construction suggested would ever be urged. If such an idea had occurred to the legislative body, is there any doubt that sufficient words would have been used to exclude the possibility of such an interpretation? I agree with the New York Court of Appeals on this question, and believe the cases to the contrary to be unsound in principle. Such being my view of the statute, I am of the opinion that the widow never inherited any estate whatever. In the probate court proceedings the facts were unknown, and the widow was permitted to receive the benefit of the statute. She thereby acquired an apparent title to real estate which in fact belonged to her children. What the procedure and what the remedy may be in such cases we cannot now determine.

A majority of the court are of the opinion that the entire matter is within the jurisdiction of the probate court, and the order appealed from is affirmed upon that ground.

START, C. J.

I concur in the conclusion that the order appealed from must be affirmed solely for the reasons following:

The precise question presented by the record is: Did any beneficial interest in the land of her deceased husband ever vest in Emelie Wellner, by reason of the fact that she was his wife and that he died intestate, having been feloniously murdered by her, leaving her his surviving widow? A determination of the question involves a construction of the statutes of the state relating to the descent and distribution of the property of intestates, the effect of the final decree of the probate court assigning to the widow the use of the homestead and one-third of the balance of the land of which her husband died seised, and the claim that in any event she took no beneficial interest in the land, but held the legal title as trustee ex maleficio for the plaintiffs.

1. The descent and distribution of the property of a decedent is a matter within the exclusive control of the Legislature, which may give or withhold the right to inherit upon such conditions as it deems just, and if the legislative intention as to such matter is expressed in clear and unambiguous language there is no room for construction, and effect must be given to the statute as it reads. The provisions of our statute relating to descent and distribution, so far as here relevant, are, and were at the time of Wellner's death, substantially as follows: Whenever any person dies seised of any lands or interest therein, not having lawfully devised the same, the homestead of the decedent shall descend to the surviving spouse, free from any testamentary or other disposition thereof not consented to in writing, for life if there be any children or issue of a deceased child. The surviving spouse shall also inherit an undivided one-third of all other lands of which the decedent was seised at any time during coverture, to the disposition of which by will or otherwise the survivor shall not have consented in writing. Rev. Laws 1905, §§ 3646-3648. It is to be noted that the statute is specific and clear, and has prescribed the exact conditions upon which the surviving spouse shall be entitled to share in the land of a decedent. If it had been the intention of the Legislature to impose on such right a further condition or exception to the effect that no one should, by virtue of the statute, take or inherit property from a decedent whom he had murdered, it would have been a very easy matter to have expressly provided for such a contingency.

It is, however, urged that to permit one to inherit from an ancestor or spouse whom he has murdered would be so abhorrent and repugnant to natural law and justice that it must have been the intention of the Legislature to make such...