Wells Fargo Bank v. Aucapina

• Decision Date: 28 April 2021
• Docket Number: 2018–13892,Index No. 49395/09
• Citation: 193 A.D.3d 1106,147 N.Y.S.3d 608
• Parties: WELLS FARGO BANK, respondent, v. Blanca AUCAPINA, etc., et al., appellants, et al., defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

193 A.D.3d 1106

147 N.Y.S.3d 608

WELLS FARGO BANK, respondent,

v.Blanca AUCAPINA, etc., et al., appellants, et al., defendants.

2018–13892

Index No. 49395/09

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Submitted—February 23, 2021

April 28, 2021

Rosenberg & Pratt–Hewitt, LLP, Forest Hills, N.Y. (Lindsey A. Rosenberg of counsel), for appellants.

Roach & Lin, P.C., Syosset, N.Y. (Michael C. Manniello of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., LEONARD B. AUSTIN, BETSY BARROS, PAUL WOOTEN, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In an action to foreclose a mortgage, the defendants Blanca Aucapina, Jamie Aucapina, and Luis Aucapina appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Thomas F. Whelan, J.), dated September 17, 2018. The order, insofar as appealed from, granted the plaintiff's motion to consolidate this action with an action entitled Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Aucapina, pending in the same court under Index No. 35482/12, for leave to enter a default judgment against those defendants, and for an order of reference, and denied those defendants’ cross motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them as abandoned pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), or in the alternative, to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendant Luis Aucapina pursuant to CPLR 306–b on the ground that he was not served with process within 120 days of the commencement of the action.

ORDERED that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, the plaintiff's motion to consolidate this action with an action entitled Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Aucapina, pending in the same court under Index No. 35482/12, for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants Blanca Aucapina, Jaime Aucapina, and Luis Aucapina, and for an order of reference is denied, and that branch of those defendants’ cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them as abandoned is granted.

On January 16, 2008, the defendant Blanca Aucapina borrowed $557,000 from the plaintiff. The indebtedness was evidenced by a note executed by Blanca and secured by a mortgage on certain real property located in East Hampton. The mortgage was executed by Blanca as well as Jaime Aucapina and Luis Aucapina (hereinafter collectively the defendants). As of March 2009, Blanca failed to meet her payment obligations under the note and mortgage.

On December 18, 2009, the plaintiff commenced an action against the defendants to foreclose the mortgage (hereinafter the first action). The defendants never answered the complaint. The record demonstrates that Blanca and Jaime were served with the summons and complaint, but it does not reflect service upon Luis.

On November 21, 2012, the plaintiff commenced a separate action in the Supreme Court, Suffolk County, against Luis (hereinafter the second action). An affidavit of service indicates that in late November 2012, Luis was served with the summons and complaint pursuant to CPLR 308(2). Since the affidavit of service contained an incorrect index number, a subsequent affidavit of service was filed indicating that Luis was served pursuant to CPLR 308(4) in late July 2013. On October 24, 2014, the defendants, including Luis, filed a notice of appearance in the first action.

On March 13, 2017, the plaintiff moved to consolidate the two actions, for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants, and for an order of reference, noting the defendants’ default in answering. The defendants opposed the motion and cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them on the ground that the plaintiff failed to take proceedings for a default judgment within one year after the default. Alternatively, the defendants cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 306–b to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against Luis on the ground that the plaintiff failed to serve him within 120 days of commencing the action.

The Supreme Court granted the plaintiff's motion and denied the defendants’ cross motion, determining, inter alia, that the defendants waived their right to seek relief pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) and 306–b by filing a formal notice of appearance in the first action. The defendants appeal.

Although the Supreme Court keenly observed that the defendants had filed a notice of appearance in the first action in October 2014, it should not have, sua sponte, determined that such notice of appearance constituted a waiver of their right to seek dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3215(c), as the parties never litigated the issue of waiver. Since that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint had " ‘dispositive import’ " ( Rosenblatt v. St. George Health & Racquetball Assoc., LLC, 119 A.D.3d 45, 54, 984 N.Y.S.2d 401, quoting Tirado v. Miller, 75 A.D.3d 153, 160, 901 N.Y.S.2d 358 ), the court should have notified the parties of the waiver issue and afforded them an opportunity to be heard prior to determining the cross motion on a ground neither side argued. "The lack of notice and opportunity to be heard implicates the fundamental issue of fairness that is the cornerstone of due process" ( Rosenblatt v. St. George Health & Racquetball Assoc., LLC, 119 A.D.3d at 54, 984 N.Y.S.2d 401 ).

The Supreme Court should have denied that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants and for an order of reference and granted that branch of the defendants’ cross motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3215(c) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against them. CPLR 3215(c) provides, in pertinent part, that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to take proceedings for the entry of judgment within one year after the default, the court shall not enter judgment but shall dismiss the complaint as abandoned, without costs, upon its own initiative or on motion, unless sufficient cause is shown why the complaint should not be dismissed" (see BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Mazza, 190 A.D.3d 908, 910, 136 N.Y.S.3d 909 ). "The language of CPLR 3215(c) is not, in the first instance, discretionary, but mandatory, inasmuch as courts ‘shall’ dismiss claims ( CPLR 3215[c] ) for which default judgments are not sought within the requisite one-year period, as those claims are then deemed abandoned" ( Giglio v. NTIMP, Inc., 86 A.D.3d 301, 307–308, 926 N.Y.S.2d 546 ). " ‘Failure to take proceedings for entry of judgment may be excused, however, upon a showing of sufficient cause,’ which requires the plaintiff to ‘demonstrate that it had a reasonable excuse for the delay in taking proceedings for entry of a default judgment and that it has a potentially meritorious action’ " ( 16501 Jamaica Ave., LLC v. Hara, 185 A.D.3d 532, 533, 126 N.Y.S.3d 907, quoting Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Hiyo, 130 A.D.3d 763, 764,...