Wells v. Chicago and North Western Transp. Co.
Decision Date | 30 September 1980 |
Docket Number | No. 78-278,78-278 |
Citation | 98 Wis.2d 328,296 N.W.2d 559 |
Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Parties | Cecelia WELLS and Robert H. Wells, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners, v. CHICAGO AND NORTH WESTERN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent and Third-Party Plaintiff-Respondent, William Cotter and Clarice Cotter, Defendants-Appellants and Third-Party Defendants-Appellants, Marquette County, Third-Party Defendant. |
Daniel G. Sandell (argued) and Johnson, Swingen & Sandell, S. C., Madison, on brief, for plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners.
Clyde C. Cross (argued), Karen Mercer and Cross & Mercer, Baraboo, on brief, for defendants-appellants and third-party defendants-appellants.
The question on this review is whether the owner-occupant of land who fails to cut the brush or adequately trim the trees on certain land abutting a railroad highway grade crossing in violation of sec. 195.29(6), Stats., is subject to civil liability under the statute for damages caused to a highway traveler as a result of uncut or untrimmed brush or trees obstructing the traveler's view.
The question arises from the collision of a pickup truck driven by Robert Wells and a Chicago and North Western train at the intersection of the railroad line and Marquette County Highway F. Plaintiffs brought suit against the railroad for personal injuries and for the loss of society, companionship and consortium. The railroad answered the complaint and filed a third-party complaint against William and Clarice Cotter as owners and occupants of land abutting the intersection at which the accident occurred. The third-party complaint alleges that the Cotters failed to keep all brush cut and trees adequately trimmed in a certain triangular area of the land in violation of sec. 195.29(6), Stats. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint adding the Cotters as defendants and repeated substantially the same allegations as made against the Cotters in the third-party complaint. The theory of these pleadings is that the violation of sec. 195.29(6), Stats., renders the Cotters liable to a traveler injured as a result of the Cotters' failure to cut and trim the brush. The parties have not raised as an issue in this case whether the failure to cut and trim is negligence under the common law. The Cotters, as defendants and third-party defendants, moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' and the third party's complaints against them. The Cotters' affidavit states that the land is in a rural area and in its natural condition and that the trees, bushes and vegetation are the result of natural growth.
The circuit court refused to grant the Cotters' motion for summary judgment, concluding that sec. 195.29(6), Stats., was enacted as a safety measure to protect highway travelers, that the statute imposes a duty on abutting landowners and that the landowner who violates the statute is liable for damages caused thereby. The court of appeals reversed the circuit court, Wells v. Chicago & North Western Transp. Co., 91 Wis.2d 565, 283 N.W.2d 471 (Ct.App. 1979), holding that a landowner incurs no liability to travelers on the highway injured as a result of the landowner's failure, in violation of sec. 195.29(6), Stats., to alter the natural condition of the property. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals.
Sec. 195.29(6), Stats., requires the owner or occupant of land abutting a railroad-highway grade crossing to take affirmative action, that is, to cut and trim. The wrong which the statute seeks to correct is the owner's or occupant's failure to take these steps. The owner or occupant may be relieved of the duty by the Public Service Commission. (The Transportation Commission now has this responsibility.) The only sanction stated in sec. 195.29(6) for failure to comply with the statute is a forfeiture. Sec. 195.29(6), Stats., provides as follows:
This case, originating some ninety years after the original enactment of sec. 195.29(6), raises a question which the statute does not address, namely whether a violation of sec. 195.29(6) gives rise to a cause of action against the violator for injuries suffered. In previous cases, this court has used the guidelines set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964) in determining whether the statute introduces a new ground of liability in the civil law. 1 Kalkopf v. Donald Sales & Mfg. Co., 33 Wis.2d 247, 254, 147 N.W.2d 277 (1967). Sections 286 and 288 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964) set forth the legislative purposes which the American Law Institute views as consistent with or inconsistent with a court's adopting a legislative standard of conduct in negligence cases.
Sec. 874A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1964) which is supplementary to sections 286 and 288 provides that "When a legislative provision protects a class of persons by proscribing or requiring certain conduct but does not provide a civil remedy for the violation, the court may, if it determines that the remedy is appropriate in furtherance of the purpose of the legislation and needed to assure the effectiveness of the provision, accord to an injured member of the class a right of action, using a suitable existing tort action or a new cause of action analogous to an existing tort action." Cf. Miller v. Portland, 288 Or. 271, 604 P.2d 1261 (1980).
We turn to the history of sec. 195.29(6), Stats., to determine the legislative purpose.
Sec. 195.29(6), Stats., is derived from chapter 512, Laws of 1889, "An act for the better protection of life and property on highways intersected by railways in this state." The 1889 law required every corporation owning or operating a railroad to clear its right of way "the distance of twenty rods each way . . . at the intersection of any public highway by such railway in this state." An owner of land adjacent to the intersection of a railroad and highway was required to clear certain land of brush and to trim trees up to the height of 10 feet. The sanction for the neglect or refusal of a railroad or owner to comply with the statute was $100, one-half of which was to be paid to the town prosecuting the action. 2
In 1919 the law was amended in two respects. Municipalities were required to keep highways clear of brush and to trim trees within 330 feet of any railroad highway grade crossing, and the railroad commission was given the power to order the...
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