Wells v. A.D. Transp. Express, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 15-cv-11324,15-cv-11324 |
| Parties | CODY WELLS, Plaintiff, v. A.D. TRANSPORT EXPRESS, INC., and MATTHEW PERCY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
Hon. Gerald E. Rosen
OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENTAt a session of said Court, held in the U.S. Courthouse, Detroit, Michigan on June 10, 2016.
PRESENT: Honorable Gerald E. Rosen United States District Judge
Plaintiff Cody Wells filed this action claiming that he was denied overtime pay in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (the "FLSA"). The matter is presently before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed by Defendants A.D. Transport Express, Inc. ("A.D. Transport") and Matthew Percy. Plaintiff Cody Wells has responded and Defendants have replied. Having reviewed and considered the parties' briefs and supporting exhibits, and the entire record of this matter, the Court has determined that oral argument is not necessary. Therefore, pursuant to Eastern District of Michigan Local Rule 7.1(f)(2), this matter will be decided on the briefs. This Opinion and Order sets forth the Court's ruling.
Plaintiff Cody Wells is a former employee of Defendant A.D. Transport, a Canton, Michigan-based trucking company engaged in short and long-haul shipping throughout the continental United States. Wells was hired by A.D. Transport on September 8, 2012 as a "Breakdown Associate." His regularly assigned shift was Sunday through Wednesday.
As a Breakdown Associate, Wells was responsible for ensuring the safe operation of trucks. He received calls from drivers regarding problems with the trucks and trailers while on the road, and it was Wells' responsibility to assess the problem and, with the approval of A.D. Transport's president or maintenance director, to arrange for any needed repairs. He scheduled repairs, paid the bills and invoices, and maintained the files of documents relating to the repairs. Wells' duties also included conducting road tests with new drivers and approving or disapproving them for safe operation of trucks and trailers.
Desiring to take on additional work within the company, on February 20, 2013, Wells applied for a driver position. To qualify for the driver's position, Wells was first required to complete driver training, be road-tested, and obtain certification that he wastrained on and was aware of various regulations and safety driving-related policies. He was eventually hired as a part-time driver on August 7, 2013. He maintained his responsibilities as a Breakdown Associate and continued to work in that capacity Sunday through Wednesday, and worked as a driver on his regularly scheduled days off.
When a driver makes a shipment for A.D. Transport, he or she must document in a driver's log the time he or she spent driving, off-duty, on-duty (not driving) and sleeping during any given shipment, and sign the log. A.D. Transport also maintains a separate driver's history for each driver documenting where the driver drove and when. The bills of lading for each shipment further show the starting and final destination of the goods being shipped.
After his hire as a driver, as evidenced by bills of lading, driver's logs and driver's histories, Wells performed both interstate and intrastate shipments for A.D. Transport.1 While he sometimes drove interstate shipments, he also would sometimes drive to complete intrastate legs of interstate trips by bringing the interstate shipments to their final destination within Michigan.
Wells also recovered trucks and trailers from other states and returned them to Michigan or picked them up from elsewhere in Michigan and returned them to A.D.Transport's Canton, Michigan facility. These recovery trips occurred both during his Sunday through Wednesday shift as well as on his off days.
Wells claims that he frequently worked more than 40 hours per week in both his Breakdown Associate and driver positions. He was sometimes paid straight time for the time he spent driving. Other times, he was paid based on a mileage rate or an hourly rate based on distance. It is undisputed that Wells did not receive any overtime pay.
On January 21, 2015, Wells demanded a pay raise. He was informed, however, that the company was unable to accommodate a raise at that time. Wells then informed his employer that he "would seek alternative employment" elsewhere and resigned.
On April 10, 2015, Wells filed a one-count Complaint for violation of the FLSA seeking to recover from A.D. Transport and its company president, President, Mathew Percy, the unpaid amount of overtime pay he claims is owing to him, plus liquidated damages and attorneys' fees.
Defendants now move for partial summary judgment claiming that Plaintiff was exempt from the overtime mandates of the FLSA under the Act's motor carrier exemption, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1), from August 13, 2013 until his resignation on January 21, 2015.2
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). As the Supreme Court has explained, "the plain language of Rule 56[] mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986).
In deciding a motion brought under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 2006). Yet, the nonmoving party may not rely on mere allegations or denials, but must "cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the record" as establishing that one or more material facts are "genuinely disputed." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Moreover, any supporting or opposing affidavits or declarations "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). Finally, "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence that supports the nonmoving party's claims is insufficient to defeat summary judgment." Pack, 434 F.3d at 814 (). The Court will apply the foregoing standards in deciding Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment in this case.
The FLSA requires that an employer pay employees at 1 ½ times the hourly rate for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1); Baird v. Wagoner Transp. Co., 425 F.2d 407, 409, (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 829 (1970); Tumpkin v. Andrews Delivery Servs., 2014 WL 2863180 at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 24, 2014). Section 13(b)(1) of the Act, however, exempts from overtime compensation "any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of section 31502 of Title 49." 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(1). This statutory exemption to the FLSA's overtime provisions, colloquially referred to as the "motor carrier exemption," is to be narrowly construed against the employer seeking to assert it, and the employer bears the burden of proof as to the applicability of the exemption. See Martin v. Indiana Michigan Power Co., 381 F.3d 574, 578 (6th Cir.2004).
"The exemption of an employee from the hours provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act under section 13(b)(1) depends both on the class to which his employer belongs and on the class of work involved in the employee's job." 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(a). The exemption only applies to employees who:
Plaintiff does not dispute that A.D. Transport is a carrier that is subject to the Secretary of Transportation's jurisdiction. However, he disputes that he sufficiently engaged in activities that are covered by the exemption.
The question whether an employee's particular activities excluded him from the overtime benefits of the FLSA is a question of law for the court to decide. Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 105 S. Ct.1527, 1530 (1986); Ale v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 269 F.3d 680, 691 (6th Cir. 2001).
As provided in the regulations, the FLSA's motor carrier exemption only applies to employees who work, wholly or in part, as drivers, driver's helpers, loaders or mechanics, and whose duties "affect[] the safety of operation of motor vehicles on the public highways in transportation in interstate or foreign commerce." 29 C.F.R. § 782(b)(2); United States v. American Trucking Assns.,, 301 U.S. 534, 553, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1069 (1940); Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U.S. 649; 67 S.Ct. 931 (1947); Thompson v. K.R. Drenth Trucking, Inc., 2011 WL 2446282 at *2-3 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 2011). Neither the name given to an employee's position nor that given to the work hedoes is controlling; instead it is the character of the activities involved in the performance of his job that controls. 29 C.F.R. § 782.2(b)(2); Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U.S. 695, 707, 97 S.Ct. 954, 960 (1947); Allen v. Coil...
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