Wells v. Halyard
Decision Date | 12 June 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 3191.,3191. |
Citation | 533 S.E.2d 341,341 S.C. 234 |
Parties | Barbara Jean WELLS, Appellant, v. Jeanne L. HALYARD, M.D., Debra B. Lister, M.D., and Healthcare Partners of South Carolina, Respondents. |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Glenn V. Ohanesian, of Ohanesian & Ohanesian; and O. Fayrell Furr, Jr., of Furr & Henshaw, both of Myrtle Beach, for appellant.
Stephan P. Groves, John Hamilton Smith and Stephen L. Brown, all of Young, Clement, Rivers & Tisdale, of Charleston, for respondents.
In this medical malpractice action, a jury found for defendants Debra Lister, Jeanne Halyard, and Healthcare Partners of South Carolina. Barbara Wells appeals, arguing the trial court erred in charging the jury. We affirm.
On May 12, 1992, Barbara Wells was found at home unable to walk or speak. She was transported immediately to Conway Hospital Emergency Room where Dr. Debra Lister performed a full examination and evaluation. Hospital records indicate Wells stated that she had slurred speech and that "she knew what she wanted to say but could not say it." After Wells reported to a nurse that she was experiencing a severe frontal headache, Lister diagnosed Wells's symptoms as a probable "hyperglycemic episode" and Wells returned home.1 Lister further claims she ordered a CT scan but Wells said she did not want to be admitted to the hospital and would follow up with her family physician.
The next day, still experiencing difficulty talking and ambulating, Wells went to see Dr. Jeanne Halyard, her family doctor at Healthcare Partners of South Carolina. Halyard allegedly stated that she could not find anything wrong with Wells and that Wells's problems were "in her head." In any event, Halyard ordered a refill of Wells's prescription for Ativan, an anti-anxiety drug. On May 14, Wells returned to Halyard because her symptoms remained unabated. Halyard admits her office records indicate Wells reported difficulties speaking and collecting her thoughts and occasionally missed words in her speech pattern. Halyard, however, asserts Wells left the office before Halyard examined her. The following day Wells's sister-in-law, Rhonda Moore, telephoned Halyard's office to report Wells's continued problems with speech, inability to control her right arm, and difficulty swallowing. Halyard asserts that, when Moore called, she was instructed to transport Wells to Halyard's office as soon as possible. Concerned about Wells's deteriorating condition, however, Moore immediately took her to Conway Hospital. The emergency room staff suspected a stroke and ordered a neurological evaluation. The tests revealed Wells had suffered an "acute cerebrovascular accident" or stroke. On May 28, the hospital discharged Wells with a permanent disability resulting from the stroke.
Wells filed this medical malpractice action against Halyard, Lister, and Conway Hospital on May 11, 1995, alleging the doctors failed to diagnose her impending stroke. On April 15, 1996, the trial court, with consent of the parties, dismissed Conway Hospital from the suit. Two years later, on February 24, 1998, Wells procured an order permitting amendment of her complaint to include Healthcare Partners of South Carolina, a charitable corporation employing Halyard at the time of the alleged incidents. Wells filed her amended complaint on March 11, 1998.
The case went to trial on November 30, 1998. On December 4, the jury returned a verdict for defendants. Wells immediately moved for a new trial asserting several particular errors in the jury charges. The court denied the motion and this appeal followed.
A trial court must charge the current and correct law. McCourt by and through McCourt v. Abernathy, 318 S.C. 301, 457 S.E.2d 603 (1995). When reviewing a jury charge for alleged error, an appellate court must consider the charge as a whole in light of the evidence and issues presented at trial. Keaton ex rel. Foster v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 334 S.C. 488, 514 S.E.2d 570 (1999). If the charge is reasonably free from error, isolated portions which might be misleading do not constitute reversible error. Id. at 498, 514 S.E.2d at 575. An alleged error is harmless if the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged error did not contribute to the verdict. State v. Kerr, 330 S.C. 132, 498 S.E.2d 212 (Ct.App.1998); see Waldrup v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 274 S.C. 344, 263 S.E.2d 652 (1980) ( ).
Wells first argues the trial court erred in overemphasizing the various legal immunities of health care providers, leading the jury to reach a verdict for respondents. We disagree.
The mere repetition of a correct statement of the law does not constitute per se reversible error. Young v. Warr, 252 S.C. 179, 201, 165 S.E.2d 797, 808 (1969) (); Keys v. Winnsboro Granite Co., 72 S.C. 97, 102, 51 S.E. 549, 551 (1905) ( ); see, e.g., Lewis v. Emory Univ., 235 Ga.App. 811, 509 S.E.2d 635 (1998) ( ). But see, e.g., Hunnicutt v. Griffin, 76 N.C.App. 259, 332 S.E .2d 525 (1985) ( ).
In this case, the trial court's repetitions were generally correct statements of the current state law. See McCourt,318 S.C. at 308,457 S.E.2d at 607 ( ); Delk v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 180 S.C. 436, 443, 186 S.E. 383, 386 (1936) (); Wall v. Suits, 318 S.C. 377, 382-83, 458 S.E.2d 43, 46 (Ct.App. 1995) ( ). While the trial court may have repeated certain charges, the trial court never misstated the law. Furthermore, any repetition was harmless because the jury charge as a whole was not misleading. We, therefore, conclude Wells was not prejudiced such that the jury's verdict should be reversed.
Wells also argues the trial court erred in charging the jury, thereby implying Wells's suit was frivolous. We find no merit to this argument.
While we agree that this discussion potentially could mislead the jury if taken out of context, the trial court was merely introducing the concept of burden of proof and the elements of negligence Wells was required to prove. Moreover, immediately prior to this discussion, the trial court stated:
So, Madame Forelady, if I should intimate in any way where I believe the truth to lie as between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, then you disregard it, for it's unintentional on my part. That's your providence [sic] and yours alone, and I wouldn't intentionally invade your...
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Fairchild v. S.C. Dep't of Transp.
...correctly cited this standard in its opinion. However, Palmer takes issue with one case the court cited, Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 237, 533 S.E.2d 341, 343 (Ct.App.2000), which states: “An alleged error is harmless if the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the a......
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Fairchild v. South Carolina Dep't of Transp.
...correctly cited this standard in its opinion. However, Palmer takes issue with one case the court cited, Wells v. Halyard, 341 S.C. 234, 237, 533 S.E.2d 341, 343 (Ct. App. 2000), which states: "An alleged error is harmless if the appellate court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the......
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...fee. Therefore, we discern no reversible error as to the judge's refusal to charge Hendrick's requests. See Wells v. Halyard,341 S.C. 234, 237, 533 S.E.2d 341, 343 (Ct.App.2000)(“A trial court must charge the current and correct law.”); see also Pittman v. Stevens,364 S.C. 337, 340, 613 S.E......
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