Wells v. Minneapolis Baseball and Athletic Association
| Decision Date | 03 July 1913 |
| Docket Number | 18,117 - (167) |
| Citation | 142 N.W. 706,122 Minn. 327 |
| Parties | ECHO L. WELLS v. MINNEAPOLIS BASEBALL AND ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover $5,275 for personal injury. The case was tried before Hale, J., who at the close of plaintiff's case and again at the close of the testimony denied defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and a jury which returned a verdict for $825 in favor of plaintiff. From an order denying defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, it appealed. Reversed and new trial granted.
Complaint -- allegations of negligence.
1. In this a personal injury action, the complaint contained sufficient allegations of negligence, and the objection to the reception of any testimony thereunder was rightly overruled.
Baseball game -- duty to spectators.
2. One who maintains grounds to which the public is invited to witness games of baseball is not an insurer against the dangers incident to witnessing the game, but is required to use the care and precaution of the ordinary prudent person to protect the spectators against such dangers. He is not required to anticipate the improbable.
Baseball game -- choice of seats by spectators.
3. Persons who know and appreciate the danger from thrown or batted balls assume the risk, and they cannot claim the management guilty of negligence when a choice is given between a seat in the open and one behind a screen of reasonable extent.
Question for jury.
4. It is a question for the jury what precaution and care should be taken by the management of a baseball exhibition to warn and safeguard the spectators against the dangers incident to the game.
Special damages.
5. If plaintiff prevailed, she was entitled to recover as special damages the reasonable value of the nursing necessitated on account of the injuries, notwithstanding such nursing was rendered by a member of the family without expectation of payment.
Evidence admissible.
6. Evidence that in conspicuous places in the grand stand were signs in large letters, stating that the management will not be responsible for injuries received from thrown or batted balls, was admissible as tending to prove a precaution taken to warn spectators of the perils.
Charge to jury.
7. Parts of the charge held objectionable though not perhaps sufficient to require a reversal.
Kerr Fowler, Ware & Furber, for appellant.
C. V White and D. R. Thomas, for respondent.
Appeal by the defendant from an order denying its motion in the alternative for judgment or a new trial.
The defendant maintains grounds in the city of Minneapolis to which the public is invited to witness games of baseball. An admission fee is ordinarily charged, but upon certain days ladies are admitted free. The ball grounds are on the block bounded by Blaisdell avenue on the west and Thirty-first street on the south. The old grand stand, in which plaintiff was injured, was built in the corner formed by the intersection of the streets mentioned. It was so constructed and arranged that the front seats, that is those nearest the players, and the parapet in front, were at least six feet from the ground; then passing up towards the rear, each row of seats was raised several inches above the row next in front of it. The home plate was on the line bisecting the angle formed by the streets mentioned. About 65 feet back of the home plate was the front row of a section of seats. Each row, in this section, being about 25 feet long, and perhaps increasing in length toward the rear. This section, together with the rows on either side thereof, running parallel to Thirty-first street and Blaisdell avenue, respectively, formed three sides of an octagon. The length, however, of the rows on Thirty-first street was about 90 feet and on Blaisdell avenue nearly the same. These rows were broken by aisles running from front to rear. The grand stand was covered by a roof sloping slightly to the rear. The front, of course, was open, the space from the top of the parapet in front of the front seats to the roof being about 15 feet. Posts 8 inches square supported the roof in front. These were placed along the parapet referred to and about 20 feet apart, except the two behind the home plate, which were 25 feet apart, one at each end of the center section of seats above spoken of. Foul balls and foul tips frequently pass from the home plate where the batter stands toward the grand stand. Naturally that part of the grand stand back of the home plate is the most exposed to danger from such balls and tips and, to protect the spectators, the defendant had a wire or steel screen (through which the ball could not pass) which completely covered the opening from the roof down and extended between the two center posts mentioned and thence to the next adjoining post on either side, so that in all about 65 feet of the center of the grand stand was protected by screen.
Plaintiff alleged that on July 9, 1910, she attended a game and was struck with such force by a flying ball from the players that her collar bone was fractured; that the only way of protecting spectators from the dangers incident to the game was to place and maintain screens between the players and spectators; and that "the defendant did place and maintain in such position a screen or netting for the purpose aforesaid, but that defendant negligently constructed said screen or netting of insufficient size to furnish such protection; that the plaintiff saw said screen or netting and was ignorant of the fact that it was of insufficient size and was ignorant of the fact that a batted ball might pass the same and hit the spectators in said grand stand." The answer denies negligence and avers that the injury was accidental and further that the plaintiff was injured through her own negligence and that she assumed the risk of injury from flying balls.
Plaintiff testified that she took a seat in the front row of seats on the Thirty-first street side, about 10 feet west of the easterly end of the screen. As there was an aisle and box seats in front of her, she was about 10 to 12 feet to the rear of the screen. She selected the seat. There were vacant seats more protected. She does not claim that the ball which struck her went through the screen. She thinks it curved around the end of it. Her companion, seated to her right, was of the same opinion, and also stated that she thought the screen extended to the east about 8 feet farther than where she was sitting. All the other 13 witnesses, who profess to know where the plaintiff was when she was hit, are agreed that she was seated farther east and beyond the screen.
It is not necessary to discuss each error assigned. They may be considered under the claim of appellant that the complaint does not state a cause of action; that the defendant was entitled to judgment; that the testimony of the value of the nursing rendered by plaintiff's mother should not have been received; that the testimony relating to the posting of certain notices in the grand stand was erroneously excluded; and alleged errors in the charge.
We think it sufficiently appears from the complaint that the danger of injury to spectators is incident to a game of baseball; that it is necessary for those who manage such public amusements to protect against these dangers by screens; that the defendant in the performance of this duty was negligent in not furnishing a screen of sufficient size to give protection and that plaintiff was ignorant of that fact. The complaint states a cause of action. Therefore, the court properly overruled the objection to the reception of any evidence thereunder.
The court left the jury to determine plaintiff's right to recover, either upon her own claim that she was within the screen, or, upon the defendant's, that she was outside when struck. Upon her theory, the defendant contends that the course of the ball was so unheard of that no duty rested upon defendant to protect her therefrom, and that if she was seated outside the screen, she knowingly assumed all risk from injury from foul balls. We are all agreed that, if plaintiff occupied the place she and her companion testify to, the defendant had performed its full duty for her protection, and there is no liability for the injury. It is inconceivable that a baseball, when fouled by a batter, could curve around the end of the screen in the manner this ball is said by her to have curved and reach her. No one claims that it glanced from striking any post or object after the time it touched the bat and before it struck plaintiff. The defendant was not an insurer against all perils, nor was it guilty of negligence in failing to guard against improbable dangers. Therefore, if the court had submitted the case to the jury solely upon plaintiff's claim, or if all the evidence had sustained her as to her position in the grand stand, a direction for judgment would have been unavoidable.
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