Wells v. Morton

• Decision Date: 26 March 1965
• Citation: 388 S.W.2d 607
• Parties: . WELLS, Appellant, v. William P. MORTON, Jr., Appellee. Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Court: United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

Page 607

388 S.W.2d 607

Courtney C. WELLS, Appellant, v. William P. MORTON, Jr., Appellee.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

March 26, 1965.

Harold Garland Wells, Alva A. Hollon, Hazard, for appellant.

J. W. Craft, Jr., Craft & Haynes, Reeves, Barret & Cooper, Hazard, for appellee.

MONTGOMERY, Judge.

Courtney C. Wells sued William P. Morton, Jr., for damages in the sum of $100,000 arising from newspaper and radio statements that Wells claims are libelous. Wells appeals from the order dismissing his complaint was amended for failure to state facts showing that he was entitled to relief.

In 1963 Wells sought re-election as circuit judge in the 33rd Judicial District, consisting of Perry County. He was opposed in both the primary and general elections. It is alleged that Morton published in the Hazard Herald, a newspaper, and broadcast over radio station WKIC, in the city of Hazard and Perry County, certain 'libelous and slanderous matter' set forth in detail in the complaint 'falsely and maliciously.'

The character of the allegations and injury is alleged as follows:

'The libelous statements hereinabove set out were directed at plaintiff herein and were intended and designed to expose said plaintiff to disgrace, ridicule, odium, and contempt in the estimation of his friends and acquaintances and the public generally. Said libelous statements were designed to, and in fact did, impute to plaintiff in his character as a public officer incapacity in that his decisions have been consistently reversed by the higher courts. Said libelous statements were designed to, and in fact did, charge said plaintiff in his character as a public officer with misconduct and want of integrity in that his decisions were based on bias and prejudice and were unjust by reason thereof; in that he flouted the law by entering the grand jury room; and in that he picked juries contrary to law for political favors and denied the people the right to set thereon. Further said libelous statements charged said plaintiff with being opposed to the moral interests of the community and being a champion of the lawless element thereof.'

Apparently the trial court's ruling was based on the decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412. See Annotation, 95 A.L.R.2d 1450. Appellee says that this case stands for the proposition 'that in a case of this nature it is necessary to allege that the statements were false and that they were made with actual malice, which malice is defined by the Court as being done with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.'

Appellee is correct in the statement of what the case stands for except that nowhere in the decision is it held that 'it is necessary to allege that the statements * * * were made with actual malice * * *.' The decisive portions of the opinion follow:

'The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

* * *

* * *

'We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct. Since this is such an action, the rule requiring proof of actual malice is applicable. * * * Since the trial judge did not instruct the jury to differentiate between general and punitive damages, it may be that the verdict was wholly an award of one or the other. But it is impossible to know, in view of the general verdict returned. Because of this uncertainty, the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded.'

The Supreme Court then undertook to define 'the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech which may legitimately be regulated' in anticipation of another trial. At no place in the opinion did the Court pass on the sufficiency of the pleadings in the case; hence, the statement in appellee's brief to the effect that 'actual malice' must be alleged is erroneous.

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