Wells v. Powers
| Decision Date | 25 May 2005 |
| Citation | 2005 ME 62,873 A.2d 361 |
| Parties | Joan P. WELLS v. Arthur G. POWERS et al. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Andrew W. Sparks, Esq., Drummond & Drummond, LLP, Portland, for plaintiff.
Andrews B. Campbell, Esq., Campbell Law Offices, P.C., Waldoboro, for defendants.
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA, ALEXANDER, and LEVY, JJ.
[¶ 1] Joan P. Wells appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) determining that the boundary line between her property and the Powers' property falls generally south of the Stevens Corner Road, except for one point that touches the road. Wells asserts that the court erred by (1) basing its fact-findings on a survey that refers to two monuments rather than a survey provided by her that refers to seven monuments, and (2) determining that the boundary does not follow a straight line. Because the court's findings are supported by the record and its conclusions do not reflect an error of law, we affirm.
[¶ 2] Review of the issues in this case is guided by the following general principles that apply to resolution of boundary line location disputes. In such cases, determination of the boundary, as ascertained from a deed, is a question of law that we review de novo. Wallingford v. Kennedy, 2000 ME 112, ¶ 15, 753 A.2d 493, 497. Determination of where the boundary lies on the surface of the earth is a question of fact that we review for clear error. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when: (1) no competent evidence supporting the finding exists in the record; (2) the fact-finder clearly misapprehended the meaning of the evidence; or (3) the force and effect of the evidence, taken as a whole, rationally persuades us to a certainty that the finding is so against the great preponderance of the believable evidence that it does not represent the truth and right of the case. Estate of Deschenes, 2003 ME 35, ¶ 11, 818 A.2d 1026, 1030.
[¶ 3] In resolving boundary disputes, there is a general rule of construction that identified monuments prevail over courses and distances, where such are indicated in deeds,1 but this rule of construction is subject to fact-findings of the trial court that, if supported by the record, may support a result inconsistent with the general rule of construction. Wallingford, ¶ 18, 753 A.2d at 497-98; McGrath v. Hills, 662 A.2d 215, 218 (Me.1995). Further, a trial court is "free to depart from the rules of deed construction where following them would lead to absurd results manifestly inconsistent with the intention of the parties." Kinney v. Cent. Me. Power Co., 403 A.2d 346, 350 (Me.1979); see also Wallingford, 2000 ME 112, ¶ 18,
753 A.2d at 497-98; Proctor v. Hinkley, 462 A.2d 465, 472 (Me.1983) ().
[¶ 4] Finally, no matter how property in a deed is described, a deed may convey only property that was owned by the grantor. Calthorpe v. Abrahamson, 441 A.2d 284, 287 (Me.1982).
[¶ 5] In 1948, the Powers' property was owned by Stevens, and the Wells' property, to the south of the Powers' property in the Town of Harpswell, was owned by Benson. A 1948 plan prepared for the Bensons described the location of their property, indicating the boundary with the Stevens' property marked by the remains of a stonewall and drill holes. The boundary indicated on the plan appeared to meet the Stevens' property six-to eight-feet south of a road now known as the Stevens Corner Road. The line south of the Stevens Corner Road provides the Stevens-Powers property with a small area of direct access to water on Cards Cove.
[¶ 6] The 1948 plan includes a way leading from the Stevens Corner Road into the Benson property at a point south of the area in dispute here. This way appeared to provide access from the Benson property to the Stevens Corner Road.
[¶ 7] In 1948, the Benson property was transferred, by deed, to Skolfield. The Benson to Skolfield deed made no mention of the Stevens Corner Road. Instead it described the boundary with the Stevens' property by reference to the 1948 plan and to a line marked by an iron pin and drill holes at certain distances. The 1948 deed described the property line as crossing a road at two points that are removed from and unrelated to the line in dispute here. This road described in the 1948 deed may be the way, south of the area in dispute here, drawn on the 1948 plan. This is the only road referenced in the 1948 deed.
[¶ 8] In 1960, there was apparently some reconstruction regarding the Stevens Corner Road that may have involved some widening of the road. The documents incident to this activity refer solely to the Stevens-Powers property. They include no reference to the Benson-Skolfield property, suggesting that the road crossed the Stevens-Powers property without touching the Benson-Skolfield property.
[¶ 9] In 1999, the Benson-Skolfield property was transferred by deed to Wells. The transfer deed does not refer to the line described in the 1948 Benson-Skolfield deed that referenced the 1948 plan. Instead, it identifies the northern boundary of the transferred property as the edge of the Stevens Corner Road.
[¶ 10] After purchasing the property, Wells began using a woods road off the straight section of the Stevens Corner Road through the Powers' property to access her property. After Powers obstructed that access, Wells brought this action. Based on her deed from Skolfield and a 1999 survey, Wells claimed ownership of property to a line bordering the Stevens Corner Road.2
[¶ 11] After trial, the trial court found that the Skolfield to Wells deed could not convey to Wells more real estate than Skolfield owned, that Skolfield owned to a line as described in the 1948 Benson to Skolfield deed and that, except at one point where the parties agree that a drill hole was found bordering the Stevens Corner Road, Powers owned a narrow strip of property south of the Stevens Corner Road. The trial court observed that the boundary it found led to "a highly inequitable result, especially if it ultimately results in barring Wells from all road access to her land."
[¶ 12] Despite this observation, the court did not conclude that its findings and application of the rules of deed construction led to a result "manifestly inconsistent with the intention of the parties." See Wallingford, 2000 ME 112, ¶ 18,
753 A.2d at 498; Kinney, 403 A.2d at 350. To determine intent, the Court looked beyond the competing surveys offered by Wells and Powers and focused on the 1948 deed and survey, finding that:
The 1948 Benson deed denotes an intent to convey the "premises known as the Amasa S. Benson farm" and refers to a plan prepared in July 1948 by H.I. and E.C. Jordan Engineers, a copy of which was...
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