Wells v. Scott, 39690
| Decision Date | 08 May 1969 |
| Docket Number | No. 39690,39690 |
| Citation | 75 Wn.2d 922,454 P.2d 378 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | Jim WELLS, doing business as Jim Wells Electric Co., Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. Glenn SCOTT and his wife, Jane Doe Scott, and Robert Suess and his wife, Jane Doe Suess, doing business as Scott & Suess Builders Co., Defendants, Scott & Suess Builders Co., a Washington corporation, Appellant. |
Edmund, J. Jones, Seattle, for appellant.
Jon Marvin Jonsson, Seattle, for respondent.
Plaintiff predicated a cause of action against defendant corporation on an oral contract, alleging that he had performed the electrical work essential to the construction of two apartment buildings owned by the corporation. Although the claim was expressed in terms of compensation due for material used and time spent, plaintiff's judgment was founded on a theory of quantum meruit. Defendant corporation appeals from that judgment and plaintiff cross-appeals from a denial of his prayer to foreclose a labor and materialman's lien. Defendants Scott and Suess, and their respective wives, were dismissed as individual parties defendant, and no appeal has been taken from that order.
Plaintiff testified that he did not have a compensation agreement with the defendants at the time he commenced furnishing services and materials to the two apartment buildings, each composed of 21 units. But, he said, that was not unusual when considered in the light of his past dealings with the defendants. He said that he had been doing business with them as their electrical contractor since August, 1958, and during that period of time had completed approximately 23 projects for them. Of that number, he said that four of their dealings were based on written agreements; one-third of the remainder were based on oral agreements with a predetermined compensation figure, and all of the remaining projects were completed by him before he and the defendants ever agreed on adequate compensation.
Substantial completion of the electrical work to the buildings in question had occurred by July, 1965. On the twelfth day of that month, plaintiff submitted a statement for services to the defendants in the sum of $30,998.18, including tax. Subsequently, on July 20, 1965, according to plaintiff's testimony, he submitted a new statement to defendants in order to 'correct (the) billing of 7/12/65.' That notation appeared on the face of the new statement, which called for a total contract price of $49,858.78, including tax. The buildings were completed in early September, 1965, but plaintiff was paid nothing more on the account after submission of his July, 1965, billings.
At the trial, plaintiff reduced his prayer for damages to $45,190.88 by correcting a mathematical error and then proceeded on the basis of a claim in quantum meruit. Defendants admitted that plaintiff had completed the assignment and did not question the quality of the work, but denied the value as claimed. From plaintiff's judgment in the sum of $42,848, defendants raise two basic assignments of error: (1) was there sufficient evidence to support the findings of the trial court on the issue of time spent and material furnished by plaintiff, and (2) if so, should plaintiff have been denied all measure of profit?
Our examination of the record reveals substantial competent evidence to support the findings. Two witnesses, experts in the electrical construction business, testified for plaintiff; one quoted the value of materials and labor furnished to be $41,200, excluding tax; the other stated that $42,927.48 would be a reasonable sum, not counting the tax and not including certain underground wiring furnished to the buildings. Plaintiff, 12 years in the electrical contracting business, produced invoices, time records and the price estimate book he used in preparing the statements. He explained the procedure he followed at the time and advised that it was identical with the method he had used in prior transactions with defendants.
We said in Ormiston v. Boast, 68 Wash.2d 548, 413 P.2d 969 (1966), that '* * * we do not retry...
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