Wells v. Sears
Decision Date | 04 March 1939 |
Parties | WELLS v. SEARS. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Exceptions from Superior Court, Piscataquis County.
Action by Forrest Wells against Mark L. Sears for injuries sustained in an automobile collision. On defendant's exceptions to acceptance of referee's report.
Exceptions overruled.
Argued before DUNN, C. J, and STURGIS, BARNES, THAXTER, and MANSER, JJ.
J. S. Williams, of Guilford, for plaintiff.
John P. White, of Guilford, for defendant.
On defendant's exceptions to acceptance of Referee's report. The action is one brought by a guest passenger against the operator of the automobile in which he was riding. The Referee found for the plaintiff and assessed damages in the sum of $750 with costs. The legal issues raised by the exceptions are made clear by a recital, as far as germane, of findings of the Referee:
There were ten exceptions. Three have to do with the findings of the Referee with respect to the negligence of the defendant and one as to the amount of damages. The record amply discloses that there is no merit in these exceptions.
Because of an apparent misconception of the effect of the finding by the Referee, one of this group of exceptions may be noted. It is, in substance, that the Referee held the defendant to be guilty of negligence because he was driving the automobile in excess of the speed limit although he had the car under complete control. That is not the correct interpretation of the finding. The defendant was found guilty of negligence because, although his car was under control and there was no occasion for any accident, yet he carelessly allowed a collision to occur.
The essence of the remaining exceptions is that the Referee should have ruled as a matter of law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence by reason of the fact that he was asleep at the time of the accident.
The particular case relied upon is that of Oppenheim v. Barkin, 262 Mass. 281, 159 N.E. 628. In that case, the defendant operator of the car had left New York about five P. M, reaching Springfield after one o'clock in the morning and going from there to Worcester, which was reached about four o'clock. The accident happened about two miles east of Worcester. The defendant drove the car during the entire trip. The Court found no reason for the accident unless the defendant had fallen asleep. The plaintiff also was asleep. The ruling of the Court was:
Under the facts of that case, the statement of the legal principle involved was perhaps sufficient but it fails to include the important element of causal connection.
It may be said that a passenger, who goes to sleep while riding in an automobile over the public highways, voluntarily allows a condition to exist which prevents him from using any degree of care or caution for his...
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...the damage the direct result of both the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's contributory negligence. See Wells v. Sears, 136 Me. 160, 164, 4 A.2d 680, 682 (1939). We have also stated that contributory negligence has to antedate or be concurrent with the defendant's negligence. See C......
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Piche v. Nugent, Civil No. 1:05-CV-82-MJK.
...regime, one need not constantly be on guard against all foreseeable dangers. As for contributory negligence cases, in Wells v. Sears, 136 Me. 160, 4 A.2d 680 (1939), the plaintiff fell asleep while riding as a passenger in an automobile. The defendant operator of the automobile brought an e......
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