Wenatchee Produce Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 18 March 1921 |
| Docket Number | 3382. |
| Citation | 271 F. 784 |
| Parties | WENATCHEE PRODUCE CO. v.. GREAT NORTHERN RY. CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Washington |
Barrows & Hanna, of Wenatchee, Wash., for plaintiff.
Charles S. Albert and Ernest E. Sargeant, both of Spokane, Wash., for defendant.
This is an action against an interstate carrier to recover damages for failure to furnish cars for the shipment of apples. A demurrer has been interposed to the complaint, on the ground that the action was not commenced within the time limited by law. It is conceded on the part of the plaintiff that the claim in suit is barred by the state statute of limitations independent of the following provision found in the Transportation Act of 1920 (41 Stat. 462, c. 91, tit. 2, Sec 206(f)):
'The period of federal control shall not be computed as a part of the periods of limitation in actions against carriers or in claims for reparation to the Commission for causes of action arising prior to federal control.'
On the other hand, it is conceded on the part of the defendant that the claim is not barred if the above provision is constitutional. The right of a state to repeal a statute of limitations, or extend the period within which actions may be brought, even after the bar of the statute has become complete, is well settled. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 Sup.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483. The rule is, of course, subject to the limitation that the Legislature may not, by repeal or extension, divest property rights, as where the title to property passes from one person to another by adverse possession or by mere lapse of time. There may be other exceptions, but with these we are not now concerned.
It is equally well settled that Congress may, as a war measure extend the period of limitation fixed by the laws of the several states. Such was the decision of the Supreme Court in Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 20 L.Ed. 176, based on the Act of June 11, 1864 (13 Stat. 123, c. 118), which provided that the time during which certain persons were beyond the reach of judicial process should not be taken as any part of the time limited by law for the commencement of actions. True, that act was limited to the zone of hostilities; but, when the existence of the power is once conceded, its limits cannot be circumscribed by the courts. As said by the court in that case:
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4115,4116,| United States ex rel. Miller v. Clausen
... ... 486; Garvan v ... $20,000 Bonds (C.C.A.) 265 F. 477; Wenatchee Produce ... Co. v. Great Northern Railway (D.C.) 271 F. 784; ... Central ... ...
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United States v. Alberts
...actions as fixed by the laws of the several states. Stewart v. Kahn, 11 Wall. 493, 78 U.S. 493, 20 L. Ed. 176; Wenatchee Produce Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., D.C., 271 F. 784. That being true, the power of the Congress to extend the period of redemption cannot be questioned. When the Cong......
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...ex rel. Cement Co. v. I. C. C., 246 U. S. 638, 38 S. Ct. 408, 62 L. Ed. 914, and a dictum of Judge Rudkin in Wenatchee Produce Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co. (D. C.) 271 F. 784, 785. It is not seriously urged that section 206, clause (f), does not or was not intended by Congress to apply to ......