Wendle v. Farrow

Decision Date23 August 1984
Docket NumberNo. 50452-1,50452-1
Citation686 P.2d 480,102 Wn.2d 380
PartiesJan WENDLE, a single man, Appellant, v. Gloria FARROW, a married woman, Respondent.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Huppin, Ewing, Anderson & Hergert, P.S., Ronald Morrison, Spokane, for appellant.

Layman, Loft, Smythe & Arpin, Gregory J. Arpin, Spokane, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

This case is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing an action for contribution. The trial court held that the action was barred by the parental immunity doctrine and by RCW 4.22.060(2). We affirm, but on a different ground; this action is barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel.

On July 27, 1981, Gloria Farrow and her 2 1/2 year-old son, Michael, went to the residence of Mr. & Mrs. Jan Wendle to pick berries, at the invitation of the Wendles. After picking berries for a few minutes, Gloria noticed that her son had disappeared, and started looking for him. Michael was found, unconscious, in the Wendles' swimming pool. Efforts to revive him failed; he died.

The Wendles' outdoor, above-ground swimming pool could be reached only by going into and through their house. Apparently, Michael gained access to the house through an unlocked door, went through the house, and found the pool.

The Wendles carried homeowner's insurance with United Pacific Insurance Company (United Pacific). Immediately after the drowning, United Pacific contacted the Farrows and offered to pay funeral expenses and a $1,000 lump sum. About one week later, United Pacific called the Farrows again. Claiming that Gloria Farrow was partly responsible for Michael's death, United Pacific explained that it would pay the Farrows $1,000, but would not pay funeral expenses. The Farrows, upset, referred the matter to their attorney.

In subsequent negotiations with the Farrows' attorney, United Pacific contended that Michael's death was due in large part to Gloria's negligence in failing to properly supervise him. The Farrows vigorously resisted this contention throughout the negotiations. On October 29, 1981, the Farrows, acting for themselves and the estate of Michael Farrow, settled their claim against the Wendles for $50,000, the limit of United Pacific's coverage. The Farrows executed a document entitled "release," in which they released and forever discharged from liability the Wendles, their family members, United Pacific, and all other persons.

On November 16, 1981, United Pacific wrote a letter to Gloria Farrow, asserting that her negligence was a major factor in the drowning and informing her that it would be requesting contribution from her as a joint tortfeasor. These assertions were repeated in a second letter dated December 21, 1981. Once again, the Farrows referred the matter to their attorney.

On December 16, 1982, United Pacific, being subrogated to its insured's position through Jan Wendle, sued Gloria for contribution. Gloria responded with a motion for summary judgment of dismissal. Her motion was based on two arguments: first, that the parental immunity doctrine shielded her from liability for Michael's death, and therefore barred United Pacific's contribution action; and second, that under RCW 4.22.060(2), the release she and her husband had signed on October 29, 1981, discharged her from any liability for contribution. The trial court agreed with both arguments, and granted the summary judgment of dismissal. We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals.

We may sustain the trial court's judgment upon any theory established by the pleadings and supported by the proof. Gross v. Lynnwood, 90 Wash.2d 395, 401, 583 P.2d 1197 (1978). We need not decide whether the parental immunity doctrine or RCW 4.22.060(2) precludes this contribution action. Our review of the uncontroverted evidence in the record persuades us that the doctrine of equitable estoppel provides the most appropriate ground for affirming the dismissal of this contribution action.

In order to establish equitable estoppel, it must be shown that the party to be estopped made an admission, statement or act which was inconsistent with his later claim; that the other party relied thereon; and that the other party would suffer injury if the party to be estopped were allowed to contradict or repudiate his earlier admission, statement or act. See Johnson v. Central Vly. Sch. Dist. 356, 97 Wash.2d 419, 432-33, 645 P.2d 1088 (1982). Thus, in order for the doctrine of equitable estoppel to bar this contribution action, it must be shown that United Pacific made an admission, statement or act which was inconsistent with the later action for contribution; that the Farrows relied thereon; and finally, that the Farrows would be injured if United Pacific was allowed to pursue the contribution action in contradiction of its...

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    ...v. Butler, 112 Wash.2d 193, 201, 770 P.2d 1027, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 61, 107 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989); Wendle v. Farrow, 102 Wash.2d 380, 383, 686 P.2d 480 (1984).6 This court has previously relied on the official comments to section 2-719. In Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86......
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    ...damages. A trial court can be affirmed on any grounds established by the pleadings and supported by the proof. Wendle v. Farrow, 102 Wash.2d 380, 686 P.2d 480 (1984). CR 15(b) provides in If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the plea......
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    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1991
    ... ... Accordingly, we construe facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party in reviewing a motion for summary judgment. Wendle v. Farrow, 102 Wash.2d 380, 383, 686 P.2d 480 (1984) ...         In this case, most of the facts are undisputed. However, the ... ...
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  • Chapter §42.6 Analysis
    • United States
    • Washington State Bar Association Washington Civil Procedure Deskbook (WSBA) Chapter 42 Rule 42.Consolidation; Separate Trials
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