Wendt v. State
Decision Date | 02 September 2009 |
Docket Number | No. 3D08-942.,3D08-942. |
Citation | 19 So.3d 1024 |
Parties | Tracey WENDT, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Robert Godfrey and Shannon McKenna, Assistant Public Defenders, for appellant.
Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Nicholas Merlin, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and GERSTEN and ROTHENBERG, JJ.
Tracey Wendt appeals from the summary denial of her motions to withdraw her plea admitting to violating her probation, and to appoint "conflict-free" counsel. We affirm.
On November 27, 2007, Wendt, who was represented by Assistant Public Defender Matthew Matteliano, pled guilty to driving under the influence ("DUI") and driving while license suspended ("DWLS") in exchange for a sentence of thirty-six months of drug offender probation, credit for the time she served in the county jail, and other conditions.
Less than two months later, an affidavit was filed alleging that Wendt violated her probation by testing positive for cocaine. Wendt, who was again represented by Matteliano, admitted to the violation, and was sentenced to twenty-four months of drug offender community control followed by twenty-four months of drug offender probation, with the special condition that she serve 364 days in the county jail and complete the jail drug treatment program, with early termination of her jail sentence upon completion of the jail drug treatment program.
Several weeks later, Matteliano filed two motions in Wendt's behalf: (1) a timely motion to withdraw Wendt's plea under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.170(l), wherein Matteliano alleged that Wendt's admission to violating her probation was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made because she was under the erroneous impression that she would not receive a sentence in excess of the sentence she had received under the original plea agreement; and (2) a motion to appoint conflict-free counsel to assist her in litigating her motion to withdraw her plea. Following a non-evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied both motions.
Wendt argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying her motion to appoint conflict-free counsel and for failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Because Wendt's motion to withdraw her plea fails to allege any conflict between her and her attorney, and the record conclusively refutes Wendt's claim that her plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Wendt's motion to appoint conflict-free counsel or in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Rule 3.170(l) permits a defendant to file a motion to withdraw his/her plea within thirty days after rendition of the sentence. It is well-settled in Florida that a motion to withdraw a plea filed pursuant to rule 3.170(l) within this thirty-day window is a critical stage in the proceeding, and an indigent defendant has the right to the appointment of counsel to advise and assist him. Searcy v. State, 971 So.2d 1008, 1011 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Schriber v. State, 959 So.2d 1254, 1256 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Grainger v. State, 906 So.2d 380, 382 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). Here, the record reflects that Wendt was represented by court-appointed counsel and that her counsel assisted Wendt in the preparation and filing of her motions.
With regard to rule 3.170(l) motions, it is also well-settled that where a conflict exists between an indigent defendant and his court-appointed counsel, and the allegations warrant an evidentiary hearing, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the defendant's motion to appoint conflict-free counsel. See Searcy, 971 So.2d at 1012 ( ); Grainger, 906 So.2d at 382 ( ); Lingenfelser v. State, 734 So.2d 472, 472-73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ( ).
The need for appointment of conflict-free counsel does not arise, however, unless the defendant has alleged in his rule 3.170(l) motion facts constituting a conflict with the attorney who represented him at the time he entered the plea. Allegations of misadvice or coercion by counsel may require the appointment of conflict-free counsel. However, where a defendant is represented by counsel and the defendant's motion to withdraw his plea is not based upon a claim of coercion, misrepresentation or another ground creating a conflict between him and his attorney, then new counsel need not be appointed because the defendant is already being represented by conflict-free counsel. See Sheppard v. State, 17 So.3d 275, 287 (Fla. 2009) ( )(footnote omitted); Gonzalez-Castro v. State, ___ So.3d ___, ___, 2009 WL 1940515 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (); Williams v. State, 919 So.2d 645, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ( ). See also Cunningham v. State, 677 So.2d 929, 930-31 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) ( ).
In the instant case, Wendt was represented by counsel, and the motion to withdraw her plea was based upon her allegation that "she was under the impression that she would not receive a sentence longer in time than the sentence she originally received pursuant to a negotiated plea" and "if not for this misunderstanding, she would not have entered her admission to violation of [her] probation." Wendt does not allege any coercion or misrepresentation by her counsel or assert that her counsel was the source of her "misunderstanding" or erroneous "impression." Because Wendt's motions fail to allege a facially valid claim reflecting a conflict with her counsel, we conclude that the trial court properly denied her motion to appoint conflict-free counsel.
The defendant also challenges the trial court's summary denial of her motion to withdraw her plea. As the record before us conclusively refutes Wendt's claim and Wendt has failed to demonstrate that a manifest injustice has occurred, we affirm. See Wallace v. State, 939 So.2d 1123, 1124 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) ( ).
The record reflects that before the trial court accepted Wendt's original plea of guilt to the felony DUI and DWLS, Wendt executed a written plea agreement...
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