Weng v. Walsh
| Decision Date | 08 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-5264 |
| Citation | 30 F.4th 1132 |
| Parties | Karin WENG, Appellant v. Martin J. WALSH, Secretary of Labor, Appellee |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit |
Karin Weng, pro se, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Stephen M. DeGenaro, Assistant U.S. Attorney, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were R. Craig Lawrence and Jane M. Lyons, Assistant U.S. Attorneys.
Before: Srinivasan, Chief Judge, Tatel, Circuit Judge, and Edwards, Senior Circuit Judge.
From 1995 until 2012, Karin Weng ("Weng" or "Plaintiff") was employed as an Employee Benefits Law Specialist at the U.S. Department of Labor ("Department" or "Defendant"). In December 2010, after filing a number of complaints against Department officials, Weng filed a lawsuit against the Department in the District Court. See Weng v. Solis , No. 1:10-cv-02051 (D.D.C.) ("Weng I "). Her complaint alleged race, national origin, and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. The parties settled their dispute in Weng I , and the District Court dismissed the action in December 2013. The settlement agreement "provides for the full and complete satisfaction" of "all claims relating to [Weng's] employment with the Department," "[e]xcept as specifically provided " elsewhere in the release. Joint Appendix ("J.A.") 126 (emphasis added).
While Weng I was still pending, Weng was informed she would be terminated. Weng then sent an email to her superiors purporting to resign in lieu of removal; and in March 2012, she filed a Grievance through her union representative contesting her removal. In April 2015, Weng filed the present lawsuit claiming that her removal was motivated by retaliation, in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, and race, national origin, and sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII. See Weng v. Perez , No. 1:15-cv-00504 (D.D.C.) ("Weng II "). After protracted litigation on ancillary matters, the District Court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that Weng had released her removal-related claims in the settlement agreement that concluded Weng I . Weng v. Scalia , No. 1:15-cv-00504, 2020 WL 3832950, at *5-7 (D.D.C. July 8, 2020). Weng now appeals.
We reverse the District Court's judgment. We hold that the disputed settlement agreement did not release the Department from all Title VII claims. To the contrary, the settlement agreement contains an express carveout allowing Weng to pursue any claims included in the separate Grievance that she had filed against the Department complaining about the Department's failure "to conform to laws and regulations governing its treatment of Ms. Weng, including, but not limited to, ... the Civil Rights Act of 1964." J.A. 115. We remand for the District Court to consider in the first instance whether that Grievance preserved the claims Weng advances in this litigation.
Weng is an Asian woman of Taiwanese national origin. From 1995 until March 2012, she worked as an Employee Benefits Law Specialist in the Department's Employee Benefits Security Administration Office of Exemption Determinations ("Office"). According to Weng, she "never received a negative performance evaluation, nor any formal counseling or discipline, from 1995 to 2005." Second Am. Compl. ¶ 38, J.A. 169. During the timeframe at issue, Weng's union representative – the American Federation of Government Employees, Local No. 12, AFL-CIO ("Local 12") – had a collective-bargaining agreement with the Department.
Weng alleges that, from the time she joined the Office, "she, along with other minority employees, was subjected to offensive racial, ethnic, and/or sexually charged slurs, comments, and jokes by [Office] management officials." Id. ¶ 34, J.A. 168. Beginning in 2004, two of Weng's coworkers filed Equal Employment Opportunity ("EEO") complaints against Office management. Weng appeared as a witness in her coworkers’ cases, and she alleges that the harassment against her escalated after she testified in support of a colleague. Starting in 2006, Weng also filed multiple EEO complaints and union grievances about her working conditions.
In December 2010, Weng, represented by counsel, filed a lawsuit against the Department in the District Court. See Weng I . Her complaint alleged race, national origin, and sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act. The District Court dismissed the action in December 2013 after the parties reached a settlement. The settlement agreement "provides for the full and complete satisfaction" of "all claims relating to [Weng's] employment with the Department," "[e]xcept as specifically provided" elsewhere in the release . J.A. 126 (emphasis added). The scope of Weng's release of claims against the Department is the central issue before the court in this appeal. See Section II.B, infra .
In April 2011, a few months after Weng filed Weng I , she was told during a mid-year review that her performance was unacceptable. The Department placed her on a performance improvement plan in the summer of 2011. In early 2012, Weng received a notice of proposed removal, which stated that she had failed to improve her performance to an acceptable level. On March 7, 2012, Weng received a decision from the Office's Acting Director sustaining the proposed removal and informing Weng that she would be terminated on March 9, 2012. On March 9, Weng sent an email to her supervisors stating that she resigned her position "in lieu of removal." Weng v. Perez , Civ. Action No. 15-504, at 4 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2015), reprinted in J.A. 150.
Weng challenged the removal decision pursuant to the negotiated grievance procedure prescribed in the collective-bargaining agreement between Local 12 and the Department. The Grievance alleged that the Department "failed to conform to laws and regulations governing its treatment of Ms. Weng, including ... the Civil Rights Act of 1964," inter alia . J.A. 115. The dispute proceeded to arbitration, where the arbitrator determined that he lacked jurisdiction over the Grievance because Weng failed to establish that her resignation was involuntary.
Weng appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), an independent adjudicator established pursuant to the Civil Service Reform Act ("Act"), 5 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq . See Kloeckner v. Solis , 568 U.S. 41, 44, 133 S.Ct. 596, 184 L.Ed.2d 433 (2012) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 1204, 7512, 7701 ). The Act provides "a framework for evaluating personnel actions taken against federal employees."
Perry v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd. , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S. Ct. 1975, 1980, 198 L.Ed.2d 527 (2017) (citation omitted). For certain serious personnel actions – including removal – "the affected employee has a right to appeal the agency's decision to the MSPB." Id. (citation omitted). The MSPB also has jurisdiction to hear "mixed" cases, which are those "in which the asserted claim (or claims) both arises under a federal employment discrimination law (such as Title VII) and also relates to or stems from an action [such as removal] that is within the [MSPB's] jurisdiction." Niskey v. Kelly , 859 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). However, "[a]n employee who voluntarily resigns ... has no right to appeal to the MSPB." Shoaf v. Dep't of Agric. , 260 F.3d 1336, 1340-11 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
In Weng's case, the MSPB adopted an administrative judge's recommendation that the appeal be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction based on Weng's supposed failure to establish that her termination was involuntary. The MSPB's order informed Weng that she had the right to request review from the Federal Circuit.
Proceeding pro se, Weng then filed the instant action, Weng II , in the District Court. This lawsuit is based solely on claims arising from her removal. Weng's complaint alleges retaliation, in violation of Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act, and race, national origin, and sex discrimination, in violation of Title VII. In 2015, the Department moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court granted the motion, reasoning that petitions for review of the MSPB's jurisdictional dismissals must be filed in the Federal Circuit, rather than in the district courts. Weng v. Perez , Civ. Action No. 15-504 (D.D.C. Oct. 15, 2015), reprinted in J.A. 147-56. Weng appealed to this court, which summarily affirmed the District Court's judgment. See Order, Weng v. Perez , No. 15-5299 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 8, 2016). The District Court then transferred the case to the Federal Circuit. However, an intervening Supreme Court decision clarified that the district courts, not the Federal Circuit, are the proper fora to hear "mixed" cases dismissed by the MSPB on jurisdictional grounds. Perry , 137 S. Ct. at 1988. This court then granted Weng's petition for rehearing and vacated its previous order. See Order, Weng v. Acosta , No. 15-5299 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 3, 2017). We remanded the matter, and the Federal Circuit transferred the case back to the District Court.
Before the District Court in Weng II , the Department filed a motion for summary judgment or, alternatively, for judgment on the pleadings. The Department argued, inter alia , that Weng's action involved some of the same claims or causes of action resolved in Weng I . The Department thus argued that, under the doctrine of res judicata , it was entitled to judgment in its favor on any claims for which Weng had already obtained relief.
The District Court granted the Department's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to the Rehabilitation Act claims and denied the motion as to the Title VII claims. Weng v....
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Weng v. Perez
...ECF No. 85. On April 8, 2022, the D.C. Circuit ruled that Ms. Weng's settlement agreement did not bar her Title VII claims. See Weng, 30 F.4th at 1137-38. The Circuit remanded to this Court to consider whether Ms. Weng's grievance “preserved the [Title VII] claims [that Plaintiff] advances ......