Wentink v. Traphagen
| Decision Date | 03 May 1940 |
| Docket Number | 30756. |
| Parties | WENTINK v. TRAPHAGEN ET AL. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. One who voluntarily walks about in total darkness in a strange place must of necessity know that he faces the danger of obstructions, pitfalls, accident, and injury.
2. Darkness alone calls upon a person to exercise greater caution for his own safety than is ordinarily required.
3. Where light has failed, obstructions have been encountered and there are no especial circumstances requiring a person to proceed, he who goes forward into an unfamiliar dark space does so at his own risk, and if accident and injury follow he is guilty of negligence, as a matter of law, which bars recovery.
Appeal from District Court, Lancaster County; Polk, Judge.
Action by John Wentink against Ruth Farnham Traphagen, trustee, and others, to recover for personal injuries. From an adverse judgment, the plaintiff appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Where light has failed, obstructions have been encountered, and there are no special circumstances requiring a person to proceed, he who goes forward into an unfamiliar dark space does so at his own risk and, if accident and injury follow, he is guilty of negligence, as a matter of law, which bars recovery.
Lloyd E. Chapman, of Lincoln, for appellant.
Baylor, TouVelle & Healey and Peterson & Devoe, all of Lincoln, and J. J. O'Dowd, of Omaha, for appellees.
Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and ROSE, EBERLY, PAINE, CARTER, and MESSMORE, JJ.
This is an action wherein plaintiff seeks to recover for personal injuries. The plaintiff was an employee of the Hardy Furniture Company. The employer is made a defendant because it is paying workmen's compensation to the plaintiff and is subrogated to, and interested in, plaintiff's cause of action. The defendants Traphagen and Farnham own the premises where the accident occurred. The defendants Mason are tenants of a part of the premises.
The plaintiff alleged the facts recited herein. The defendants landlord and tenant, answering separately, denied generally, and alleged that, if plaintiff suffered damage, it was proximately caused, and contributed to, by his own negligence, and that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury. After plaintiff had rested his case, the trial court dismissed the action as to the tenants. At the close of all testimony, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant landlords. Plaintiff appeals.
The building where the accident occurred is a three-story structure with a basement. The defendant tenants occupied the second and third floors. An automatic gas water heater in the basement, owned by the defendant tenants, served the two upper floors of the building. A first-floor tenant used the basement for storage.
The basement was 80 feet long, 16 feet wide, and 7 feet high. The floor was of dirt. The entry to the basement was through the trap-door in the sidewalk. A stairway led down into a small room under the sidewalk, and a door opened from this antechamber into the basement proper. Gas meters, serving the tenants, were in the south end of the basement. A small window opened from the antechamber into the basement. On the day of the accident it was dirty. The only natural light into the basement was through the openings above described. Fifteen feet from the south end, there was an electric light which turned on at the bulb; beyond that a few feet were racks from which clothing was hanging. At the north end of the basement was a pit 10 feet wide, 16 feet long, and 5 feet 2 inches deep in which the furnace and gas water heater were placed. On either side of the pit, there was a strip of basement floor 4 feet in width, running north and south. The top of the pit wall was even with the floor, except that, along the south side and for a short distance along the west side from the southwest corner, the dirt floor was 2 or 3 inches below the top of the pit walls. There were no guard rails around the pit wall. The hot water heater was in the northwest corner of the pit, and pipes lead from it up to the ceiling.
Because of defendants' motions and the rulings thereon, plaintiff is entitled to have every controverted fact resolved in his favor, and to have the benefit of every inference that can reasonably be deduced from the evidence. Moncrief v. Interstate Transit Lines, 129 Neb. 168, 261 N.W. 163.
On the morning of the accident, plaintiff delivered two gas ranges to the building for the tenant to be exchanged for other stoves then in use. It was customary for the merchant to connect the new stoves with the gas line if the purchaser so requested. The plaintiff was requested by the tenant to make the necessary connections, and he agreed to " change the stoves." It was customary to first shut off the gas at the water heater and then at the meter before an old stove was disconnected and a new one connected to the gas line. It is not shown that the defendants knew of this custom. The plaintiff asked the location of the gas valve and the valves of the hot water tank. The defendant told him they were in the basement and to go into the basement through the steel door on the outside of the building. Plaintiff said, " all right." Nothing else was said.
Plaintiff had never been in the basement before. He entered the basement and found the meter without difficulty. He saw and turned on the drop light, went back to the door, looked for a light switch and found none. At that point, he " couldn't see very good." He then started north along the center of the basement, came to and went around the clothes on the west side, and beyond them, walked back to the east, looked around for lights and could not see any. He felt in his pocket for matches, found two and lit those, one at a time, and " flared around to see where the tank was." He saw the top of the tank and the pipes and heard the noise of the tank, which indicated to him where the burner was located. He walked northwest 6 or 8 steps while the matches were burning. At the point where his last match went out, he was 4 to 7 feet from the pit. Although he saw the top of the burner across the pit, from the light of the matches, he did not " necessarily" know that the burner was installed below the surface of the basement floor. He saw nothing to indicate a pit. He was looking for pipes, did not look down at the floor, although, had he looked down at that point, he supposes he " would have" seen the pit--" maybe not." If there was a reflection from the burning gas at the base of the heater, he did not see it because he was " looking at the top." When his last match went out, he did not turn back for more matches or other light, but figuring he " could make it," in the darkness, walking slowly, feeling with his feet, he took 2 or 3 more steps forward, and fell into the pit at the southwest corner.
There was no emergency or peril requiring plaintiff to go forward, or need for speed in making the connection. The plaintiff was not led into a false sense of security. On the contrary, his testimony shows that he realized there was possible danger ahead. That the pit was dangerous to one walking about in the dark is apparent. It is likewise apparent that it was not dangerous to any one properly going about the basement when ordinary means of artificial lighting were used.
Plaintiff contends that he was an invitee and that the defendants were negligent in maintaining the pit unlighted and unguarded, and without warning the plaintiff of the unsafe and dangerous condition of the premises.
Defendants, by their motions, presented, among others, the propositions that the evidence shows that the plaintiff's negligence was the proximate cause of his injuries, and also that, under the comparative negligence statute, plaintiff was barred from recovery.
That plaintiff was seriously injured is not questioned.
" Negligence is not actionable unless it be the proximate cause of the injury to the complaining party." Wagner v Watson Bros. Transfer Co., 128 Neb. 535, 259 N.W. 373." Proximate cause, as used in the law of negligence, is that cause which in a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred. An efficient intervening cause is a new and independent force which breaks the causal connection between the original wrong and the injury." Anderson v. Byrd, 133 Neb. 483, 275 N.W. 825, 826.See, also, St. Joseph & G. I. R. Co. v. Hedge, 44 Neb. 448, 62 N.W. 887." Two acts of independent source are not concurrent in causing an injury, if one of them merely furnishes a condition by which such injury is made possible, and later such injury occurs through the efficient, self-acting, and independent operation of the other. In such case the latter and not the former is the proximate cause of such injury." Johnson v. Mallory, ...
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