Wentworth v. Henry C. Becker Custom Bldg. Ltd.

• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Citation: 947 N.E.2d 571,459 Mass. 768
• Docket Number: SJC–10806.
• Parties: Cheryl D. WENTWORTH, administratrix 1 and guardian,2v.HENRY C. BECKER CUSTOM BUILDING LTD.
• Decision Date: 23 May 2011

459 Mass. 768
947 N.E.2d 571

Cheryl D. WENTWORTH, administratrix 1 and guardian,2
v.
HENRY C. BECKER CUSTOM BUILDING LTD.

SJC–10806.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

Submitted April 5, 2011.Decided May 23, 2011.

[947 N.E.2d 572]

Edward F. Whitesell, Jr., Boston, for the defendant.John C. Fraser, Andover, for the plaintiff.Kimberly E. Winter, Weston, Thomas M. Bond, Boston, Thomas R. Murphy, Salem, J. Michael Conley, Braintree, & John J. Morrissey, Boston, for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys, amicus curiae, submitted a brief.Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, & GANTS, JJ.IRELAND, C.J.

[459 Mass. 769] We granted the defendant's application for further appellate review in order to determine whether, pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 23, a general contractor that pays workers' compensation benefits to an employee of an uninsured subcontractor, is immune from liability for common-law claims the employee may have against that general contractor. A Superior Court judge concluded that § 23 provided the defendant such immunity from wrongful death and negligence claims commenced by the plaintiff against it, and allowed the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Appeals Court concluded that the allowance of the motion was error. Wentworth v. Henry C. Becker Custom Bldg. Ltd., 76 Mass.App.Ct. 507, 512, 923 N.E.2d 1073 (2010). Because we conclude that § 23 applies only where the employee is directly employed by the insured, we vacate the entry of summary judgment for the defendant and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Overview of statutory scheme. We begin with a review of the relevant sections of the workers' compensation act.

Employers are required by law to provide workers' compensation insurance, and suffer penalties for failing to do so. G.L. c. 152, §§ 25A & 25C. An “[i]nsured” is defined, in relevant part, as “an employer who has provided insurance for payment to his employees by an insurer of [workers'] compensation” (emphasis added). G.L. c. 152, § 1(6). An “[e]mployee” is defined, with exceptions not relevant here, as “every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written.” G.L. c. 152, § 1(4).

Under G.L. c. 152, § 23, “[i]f an employee accepts payment of compensation under this chapter on account of personal injury ... such action shall constitute a release to the insured of all claims or demands at common law, if any, arising from the injury.”

[947 N.E.2d 573]

Where an injured worker is an employee of an uninsured subcontractor, the insurance carrier of the general contractor that entered into a contract with that subcontractor is required to [459 Mass. 770] pay the workers' compensation. G.L. c. 152, § 18.³ “[T]he oft-declared purpose of § 18 ... is ‘to prevent ... [an insured entity such as a general contractor] from escaping the obligation of the compensation act by letting out part of [its] work to irresponsible subcontractors or independent contractors.’ ” Tindall v. Denholm & McKay Co., 347 Mass. 100, 105, 196 N.E.2d 631 (1964), quoting Cannon v. Crowley, 318 Mass. 373, 375, 61 N.E.2d 662 (1945).

Also relevant is G.L. c. 152, § 15, under which employees have the right to sue liable third parties for their injuries. Until 1971, under the so-called “common employment” doctrine, a general contractor was immune from third-party suits filed by employees of subcontractors for personal injuries sustained on the job. See Searcy v. Paul, 20 Mass.App.Ct. 134, 138–139, 478 N.E.2d 1275 (1985). In 1971, § 15 was amended by St.1971, c. 941, § 1, to limit immunity from suit only to situations where “(1) the employer [is] an insured person liable for the payment of compensation, and (2) the employer [is] the direct employer of the employee” (emphasis added). Lang v. Edward J. Lamothe Co., 20 Mass.App.Ct. 231, 232, 479 N.E.2d 208 (1985).⁴ “Contemporary comment ... shows that the [1971 amendment to] the statute was [459 Mass. 771] taken by text and periodical writers as broadly abolishing the ... ‘common employment’ doctrine and permitting third-party actions by, or in behalf of, an injured employee against all but his immediate insured employer.” Searcy v. Paul, supra, and authorities cited. In 1983, this court concluded that the amendment to § 15, as well as provisions enacted in 1971 and 1980 that expanded the right of an employee to recover against third parties, “indicate[d] the Legislature's intention that the injured employee be fully compensated for his injuries.” Correia v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 388 Mass. 342, 351 & n. 9, 446 N.E.2d 1033 (1983), citing St.1971, c. 888, § 1; St.1971, c. 941, § 1; and St.1980, c. 488.

Facts and background. We present the essential undisputed facts.

In 2005, the defendant was the general contractor at a residential construction site in Newburyport. It hired a subcontractor, Great Green Barrier Co. (Great Green), to perform waterproofing work on the residence. An explosion at the site resulted in

[947 N.E.2d 574]

the death of Timothy B. Wentworth and serious injuries to Timothy's son, Ezekiel, both of whom were Great Green employees.

Great Green did not carry workers' compensation insurance. In 2007, pursuant to G.L. c. 152, § 18, the defendant's insurer agreed to lump-sum settlements of Timothy and Ezekiel's workers' compensation claims.⁵ In 2006, the plaintiff had filed a complaint alleging that the defendant's “negligence, gross negligence and/or willful, wanton, or reckless conduct” resulted in Timothy's death and Ezekiel's injuries.

In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argued that, under G.L. c. 152, § 23, by the acceptance of the lump-sum settlements on behalf of Timothy and Ezekiel, the plaintiff was barred from filing her lawsuit for common-law claims. The judge agreed and, citing Kniskern v. Melkonian, 68 Mass.App.Ct. 461, 862 N.E.2d 450 (2007), and Russell v. Donnell, 60 Mass.App.Ct. 1126, 806 N.E.2d 128 (2004), an unpublished memorandum and order of the Appeals Court, allowed the defendant's motion. The plaintiff appealed.

[459 Mass. 772] Discussion. “The standard...