Wescott v. Middlesex Hospital

• Decision Date: 10 August 2018
• Docket Number: MMXCV186020250
• Parties: Ashley WESCOTT v. MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court

Ashley WESCOTT v. MIDDLESEX HOSPITAL

No. MMXCV186020250

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Middlesex, Middletown

August 10, 2018

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

Aurigemma, J.

The defendant, Middlesex Hospital, has moved to dismiss count one of the complaint filed on March 1, 2018, as well as several of the prayers for relief seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, on the ground that count one and the prayers for relief are not justiciable because there is no actual controversy between the plaintiff, Ashley Wescott, and the defendant.

In count one, the plaintiff alleges that General Statutes § 17a-543(d)^[1] violates her due process rights provided in the constitution of Connecticut, article first, § 8.^[2] In cases involving declaratory judgments, there must be a justiciable controversy. See Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 625, 822 A.2d 196 (2003). A declaratory judgment procedure "may be employed in a justiciable controversy where the interests are adverse, where there is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement, and where all persons having an interest in the subject matter of the complaint are parties to the action or have reasonable notice thereof ... Finally, the determination of the controversy must be capable of resulting in practical relief to the complainant." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 626.

In the present case, the court agrees with the defendant that there is no justiciable controversy between the parties. First, the interests of the parties are not adverse. Although the plaintiff argues that it has an interest in having § 17a-543(d) declared unconstitutional, the defendant, on the other hand, contends that it does not have an interest in defending the constitutionality of the statute. Our Supreme Court made clear that "the attorney general adequately represents the interests of potential defendants in an action challenging the constitutionality of state law." Batte-Holmgren v. Commissioner of Public Health, 281 Conn. 277, 290, 914 A.2d 996 (2007). Second, there appears to be no substantial dispute between the parties because it was the state- through the enactment of § 17a-543(d)- that allegedly deprived the plaintiff of her due process rights not the defendant. See McAnerney v. McAnerney, 165 Conn. 277, 283, 334 A.2d 437 (1973) (holding that substantial dispute typically requires "an assertion in the pleadings by one party of a legal relation or status or right in which he has a definite interest, together with an assertion of the denial of it by the other party" [internal quotation marks omitted] ); see also Wallingford Staffordshire Commons Assn., Inc. v Staffordshire Associates, 42 Conn.Supp. 241, 246, 615 A.2d 188 (1992) [6 Conn.L.Rptr. 304] ("[t]he requirements of procedural due process are triggered only if there has been a taking or a deprivation of a protected interest by the state"). Section 17a-543(d) simply authorized the defendant to establish internal procedures concerning involuntary medication treatment. Finally, a declaratory judgment holding § 17a-543(d) unconstitutional will not afford the plaintiff with practical relief because she has already been involuntarily medicated. See We The People of Connecticut, Inc. v. Malloy, 150 Conn.App 576, 581, 92 A.3d 961 (2014) (noting that mootness "imposes a duty on the [trial] court to dismiss a case if the court can no longer grant practical relief to the parties" [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Additionally, there is no guarantee, nor is it...