West Cent. Producers Co-Operative Ass'n v. Comm'r Of Agriculture
| Decision Date | 24 February 1942 |
| Docket Number | (No. 9313) |
| Citation | 124 W.Va. 81 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | WEST CENTRAL Producers Co-Operative Association v. Commissioner of Agriculture and Ritchie CountyLivestock Sales Co. |
1. Constitutional Law
Where by reason of the mandatory provisions of an act of the Legislature, and in order to avoid the penalties attached to any failure to comply therewith, one seeking to engage in a business covered thereby is compelled to apply to an administrative board or official for a permit to operate thereunder, and his application is denied, he is not thereby estopped from thereafter attacking the validity of the act, in a court possessing judicial powers, and from asserting his right, independently of the act in question, to carry on the business for which such permit was sought.
2. Agriculture
An act of the Legislature which declares the business of operating a public market for the sale of agricultural products at auction to be affected with a public interest, and subject to regulation by the State, is a valid exercise of legislative authority under the police power of the State.
3. Constitutional Law
The delegation of powers by a legislative body must, generally, be accompanied by a statement of the policy sought to be effected thereby, and reasonable standards set up for its exercise; but this general rule should not be applied, to the extent of holding an act unconstitutional by reason of noncompliance therewith, where important public interests are involved, and on account of the inherent nature of the power delegated, standards applicable generally throughout the State can not be set up.
4. Officers
An act of the Legislature vesting in the Commissioner of Agriculture, after a hearing, discretionary power to grant or to refuse to grant permits for the operation of a public market for the sale of agricultural products at auction, on the basis of the interest of the public, or public need therefor, is, by reason of the inherent nature of the subject matter, a constitutional delegation of legislative power.
Appeal from Commissioner of Agriculture.
Proceeding on an application by the West Central Producers Co-Operative Association, filed with the Commissioner of Agriculture for a permit to operate a public market, wherein the Ritchie County Livestock Sales Company filed a protest. From an order of the Commissioner of Agriculture denying the application, the West Central Producers Co-Operative Association appeals.
Affirmed.
Harry E. Moats and Max DeBerry, for appellant.
Clarence W. Meadows, Attorney General, Ira J. Partlow, Assistant Attorney General, Haymond Maxwell, and S. A. Powell, for appellees.
Fox, President:
The West Central Producers Co-Operative Association, hereinafter called "West Central," prosecutes this appeal from an order of the Commissioner of Agriculture, hereinafter called "Commissioner," entered on the 14th day of August, 1941, refusing to grant to it a permit to operate a public market at Lamberton, in Ritchie County. The action taken by the Commissioner was based upon an application for such permit filed by West Central, a protest on the part of the Ritchie County Livestock Sales Company, operating a public market at the same point, and hereinafter called "protestant," and a hearing held upon the issue raised thereby.
West Central was organized under the provisions of article 4, chapter 19 of the Code, and its powers, as defined by said section, include the right to "engage in any activities in connection with the marketing, selling * * * of any agricultural products produced or delivered to it by the members or purchased or received by consignment from other persons., * * *." It contends that under this grant of power, it has the right to conduct a public market independently of the Public Marketing Act, Chapter 2, Acts of the Legislature of 1939, and explains its action in applying for a permit under said last mentioned act by its desire to avoid the risks and penalties involved in the violation thereof by operating such a market without such permit.
On the other hand, the protestant contends that a public market can only be operated under the provisions of the 1939 act, section 4 of which reads as follows:
It is also contended by the protestant that Code, 19-4-4, applying to cooperative associations, does not cover the operation of a public market, and that under the section quoted above, the Commissioner was vested with full power to pass upon the granting or refusal of a permit, so long as such power was not exercised in an improper, arbitrary or capricious manner. To these contentions, the applicant replies that the grant of the power to the Commissioner, even if intended by the Legislature, was an unconstitutional exercise of its authority in that it made an unlawful delegation of legislative powers to the executive department of the state government. The fact that the Commissioner is a constitutional executive officer is urged as differentiating him from the appointive officials of the State, to whom administrative powers are frequently granted by the Legislature, as in instances affecting the Tax Commissioner, the Public Service Commission and other administrative boards and officials.
Any question of fact as to the public interest involved, or the need for the additional public market at Lamberton, is foreclosed here by the finding of the Commissioner. This Court, in analogous cases, has many times held that findings of fact by an administrative board or official will not be disturbed on appeal to this Court. We do not interfere with orders of such boards or officials, following a hearing, except where, they have gone beyond their statutory powers, exercised unconstitutional powers, or based their action on a mistake of law. United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 73 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E. 931; Pittsburgh & West Virginia Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 101 W. Va. 63, 132 S. E. 497; City of Huntington v. Public Service Commission, 101 W. Va. 378, 133 S. E. 144; Anchor Coal Co. v. Public Service Commission, 123 W. Va. 439, 15 S. E. 2d 406. Therefore, if the Commissioner had constitutional right to exercise the powers attempted to be vested in him by the act of 1939, and such powers were exclusive as to the right of citizens, associations and corporations who operate public markets, then his holding must be upheld. On the contrary, if West Central had the right to operate a public market under Code, 19-4-4, and that right was not affected or destroyed by Chapter 2, Acts 1939, then the action of the Commissioner, so far as it affected the right of West Central to operate a public market, must be reversed.
We do not think the cooperative association statute, Code, 19-4, was intended to cover or authorize the operation of public markets. True, the language of section 4 of article 4 of said statute is broad in that it covers "any activities in connection with the marketing * * * of any agricultural products," but Code, 19-2, in effect prior to the enactment of Chapter 2, Acts 1939, covers markets, and in section 3 thereof provides for auction markets, and the Commissioner is given power to regulate them, and authorized to license auctioneers to conduct sales at such markets. It is quite evident that this statute was intended to provide for the public sale of agricultural pro- ducts, and on this premise, it may be argued that the Legislature did not intend that public auction markets should be authorized under another article of the same chapter. In the session of 1939, chapter 2, the Legislature enacted a comprehensive statute on the subject of public markets, which we understand was intended to supersede article 2, chapter 19 of the Code. Section 3 of Chapter 2 of the Act provides: "No public market shall hereafter be operated in this state by any person, partnership, firm, association, or corporation except in accordance with the provisions of this act." Section 5 of the act impliedly recognizes the existence of public markets. It provides: "All public markets in bona fide operation during the year one thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight, shall, on application and proof of such operation, be granted such permit by the Commissioner." Therefore, existing public markets, however established, could, under these sections, continue to operate only by obtaining a permit as provided therein. The act of 1939 expressly repeals all acts and parts of acts inconsistent therewith, and so it is that whatever rights may have existed to operate a public market either under article 2 and 4 of chapter 19 of the Code, or otherwise, were merged in Chapter 2, Acts 1939, and were protected by that act. As we see the matter, West Central must stand or fall under the act of 1939, if the same be constitutional, because its claim to establish a public market was asserted after the passage of that act, and in view of the actual findings of the Commissioner against it, it is not in any event entitled to a permit, and is not entitled to operate under Code, 19-4. This brings us to the decisive question in the case, which is the constitutionality of Chapter 2, Acts 1939, and particularly section 4 thereof.
West Central raises the question of the constitutionality of the act for the first time in this Court, and protestant contends that it cannot do so on two grounds: (1)...
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