West Columbia Nat. Bank v. Griffith

Decision Date29 June 1995
Docket NumberNo. 01-94-00853-CV,01-94-00853-CV
PartiesWEST COLUMBIA NATIONAL BANK, Appellant, v. Star GRIFFITH, Appellee. (1st Dist.)
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

Callan M. Billingsley, Angleton, for appellant.

Gary L. McConnell, Angleton, for appellee.

Before OLIVER-PARROTT, C.J., and ANDELL and HEDGES, JJ.

OPINION

ANDELL, Justice.

This is an appeal from the trial court's decision to grant a bill of review, set aside a default judgment, and enter summary judgment in favor of appellee, Star Griffith. In nine points of error, appellant, West Columbia National Bank, complains of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of a bill of review and the failure of the trial court to file findings of fact and conclusions of law. We reverse and render judgment that the default judgment issued in cause number cause number 18,933B be reinstated.

I. FACTS

In August 1992, appellant brought suit against appellee to recover a deficiency on a promissory note. Because appellee failed to file an answer, appellant obtained a default judgment against him on October 7, 1992. These proceedings took place in cause number 18,933B. In April of 1993, in cause number 19,435B, appellee filed a petition for bill of review seeking to overturn the default judgment. On March 8, 1994, the trial court granted part of the relief requested in the bill of review and, accordingly, set aside the default judgment and reinstated cause number 18,933B.

Appellee then filed a motion for summary judgment in that suit alleging that appellant was barred as a matter of law from recovering a deficiency judgment against him because the bank failed to give him notice of the sale of the collateral securing the note as required by TEX.BUS. & COM.CODE ANN. § 9.504 (Vernon 1987). On May 17, 1994, the trial court entered an order granting appellee's motion for summary judgment and consolidating cause numbers 19,435B (the bill of review action) and 18,933B (the deficiency suit).

II. JURISDICTION

As a preliminary matter, in a motion to dismiss and in his brief, appellee asserts that this Court should dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because appellant failed to timely perfect its appeal.

In order to perfect an appeal in a civil case, a party must ordinarily file a cost bond, affidavit in lieu thereof, or a cash deposit in lieu of bond within 30 days after the judgment is signed. TEX.R.APP.P. 41(a)(1). The rule extends the filing deadline to 90 days under two circumstances: (1) if a party has timely filed a motion for new trial; or (2) if any party timely requests findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case tried without a jury. TEX.R.APP.P. 41(a)(1) (emphasis added). If these requirements are not met, the appeal is a nullity and must be dismissed. Davies v. Massey, 561 S.W.2d 799, 800 (Tex.1978).

Here, the trial court signed the order in cause number 19,435B granting the bill of review relief on March 8, 1994. Shortly thereafter, appellee filed his motion for summary judgment in cause number 18,933B, which was granted on May 17, 1994. Neither party filed a motion for new trial, but on June 3, 1994, appellant filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law. The request was filed in cause number 18,933B and referred to the order granting summary judgment signed on May 17th. When the trial court failed to file any findings, appellant filed a notice of past due findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with TEX.R.CIV.P. 296. A cash deposit in lieu of bond was filed by appellant on August 12, 1994, which was, admittedly, more than 30 days after the date the order granting summary judgment was signed. Therefore, we must determine whether appellant's request for findings of fact and conclusions of law extended the appellate timetable so as to render its cash deposit timely.

It is well-established that a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law is not proper in a summary judgment context, and the trial court does not err by failing to file them. Cotton v. Ratholes, Inc., 699 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Tex.1985); Robbins v. Warren, 782 S.W.2d 509, 511 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, no writ). The Texas Supreme Court has recently held that the language "tried without a jury" in rule 41(a)(1) does not include a summary judgment proceeding and, therefore, a request for findings and conclusions does not operate to extend the appellate timetable. Linwood v. NCNB Texas, 885 S.W.2d 102, 103 (Tex.1994). Therefore, unless a motion for new trial is filed, an appellant only has 30 days after the judgment is signed to file the appropriate instrument to perfect the appeal.

Although appellee contends that appellant erroneously filed a request for findings of fact on a summary judgment, we are not merely dealing with an appeal from a summary judgment proceeding. Here, there were two separate orders: (1) an order granting the bill of review relief; and (2) an order granting summary judgment on the underlying deficiency suit.

"An appeal may be prosecuted only from a final judgment which disposes of all issues and parties in the case. The final judgment in a bill of review action should either deny any relief to the petitioner or grant the bill of review and set aside the former judgment, insofar as it is attacked, and substitute a new judgment which properly adjudicates the entire controversy." Shahbaz v. Feizy Import & Export Co., 827 S.W.2d 63, 64 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (citations omitted). Here, the order granting the bill of review relief merely set aside the default judgment and reinstated cause number 18,933B; it did not dispose of the merits of the deficiency suit, but rather set the case for trial at a later date. Because it did not dispose of the underlying case on the merits, the order granting the bill of review was interlocutory and not subject to appeal at that time. See, e.g., Tesoro Petroleum v. Smith, 796 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.1990); Shahbaz, 827 S.W.2d at 64.

Since all parties and issues were not disposed of until the order granting summary judgment on the deficiency suit was signed on May 17, 1994, the bill of review was not final until that date. In fact, the May 17th order specifically incorporated by reference and made final the order granting the bill of review in cause number 19,435B. Unlike the situation in Linwood, an evidentiary hearing was held on the bill of review portion of this case and it was "tried without a jury" within the meaning of TEX.R.APP.P. 41(a)(1). Therefore, appellant was entitled to file a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law on the bill of review.

Appellee has cited no authority, and we can find none, that indicates that a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to an interlocutory bill of review must be filed prior to the rendition of a final judgment in order to be timely. Had appellant prevailed on the merits of the deficiency suit, there would have been no need for it to file a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the bill of review. Therefore, we hold that a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in regard to a bill of review need not be filed until there is a final, appealable judgment disposing of all parties and issues.

Appellee alleges that if appellant was indeed requesting findings of fact and conclusions of law regarding the bill of review, this should have been clearly stated in its request. Instead, the request was filed in cause number 18,933B and only referred to the order granting summary judgment signed on May 17, 1994. Appellee ignores, however, that the May 17th order consolidated the bill of review action into cause number 18,933B and specifically made the bill of review order final. Although the better practice may have been for appellant to specifically apprise the trial court that it was requesting findings only on the bill of review, since the order specifically consolidated both cases under the cause number in which the request was filed, we hold that the request was sufficient to extend the time in which appellant had to file its cash deposit to 90 days after the May 17, 1994, order. Since appellant did, in fact, accomplish this, we have jurisdiction over this appeal.

Appellee's motion to dismiss is denied.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE BILL OF REVIEW

A bill of review is an equitable proceeding to set aside a final judgment that is no longer appealable or subject to a motion for new trial. Transworld Fin. Serv. v. Briscoe, 722 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.1987). To be entitled to relief, a plaintiff in a bill of review action is ordinarily required to prove three elements: (1) a meritorious claim or defense; (2) which he was prevented from asserting by the fraud, accident or mistake of the opposite party or a mistake by court personnel in the execution of official duties; (3) unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own. Transworld, 722 S.W.2d at 408.

Service of Process

The bill of review requirements are quite different, however, where a bill of review plaintiff seeks to set aside a default judgment on the basis that he was improperly served with process. Under those circumstances, the plaintiff need not show the fraud, accident or mistake of the other party. See, e.g., Winrock Houston Assocs. Ltd. v. Bergstrom, 879 S.W.2d 144, 149 (Tex.App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ). Nor does he have to prove a meritorious defense. Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 84, 108 S.Ct. 896, 899, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988); Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex.1988). As indicated above, appellee contended that he was entitled to bill of review relief because he was not served with process as required by law. Appellant maintains, however, in point of error six, that appellee presented no evidence to show that he was improperly served with citation.

Appellee argues that the default...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • Mowbray v. Avery
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 11, 2002
    ...Id. 33. Vogel v. Vogel, 405 S.W.2d 87, 90 (Tex.Civ. App.-San Antonio 1966, no writ). 34. West Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Griffith, 902 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). 35. Nichols v. Jack Eckerd Corp., 908 S.W.2d 5, 8 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no 36. T......
  • Min v. Avila
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • May 6, 1999
    ...untainted by any negligence on the petitioner's part. Caldwell, 975 S.W.2d at 537; West Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Griffith, 902 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). When a petitioner for bill of review claims the judgment is void for lack of proper service, and th......
  • Garza v. Attorney General
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • June 9, 2005
    ...verity, and was sufficient to authorize the rendition of judgment upon default."); see also West Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Griffith, 902 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied). Recitations in the return of service carry so much weight that they cannot be rebutted by t......
  • Knie v. Piskun
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • April 25, 2000
    ...rely on Nguyen v. Kim; Allstate Insurance Co. v. King, 444 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1969); West Columbia Nat'l Bank v. Griffith, 902 S.W.2d 201, 207-08 (Tex.App.-- Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, writ denied); and Furr v. Furr, 721 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1986, no writ). Appellees also a......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT