West Covina v. Perkins

• Decision Date: 13 January 1999
• Docket Number: 971230
• Citation: 119 S.Ct. 678,142 L.Ed.2d 636,525 U.S. 234
• Parties: 113 F.3d 1004, reversed and remanded. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES1230 CITY OF WEST COVINA, PETITIONER v. LAWRENCE PERKINS et al. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT [
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

525 U.S. 234

119 S.Ct. 678

142 L.Ed.2d 636

113 F.3d 1004, reversed and remanded

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 97 1230

CITY OF WEST COVINA, PETITIONER v LAWRENCE PERKINS et al.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

[January 13, 1999]

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.

We consider in this case whether the Constitution requires a State or its local entities to give detailed and specific instructions or advice to owners who seek return of property lawfully seized but no longer needed for police investigation or criminal prosecution. Interpreting the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit imposed a series of specific notice requirements on the city responsible for the seizure. We conclude these requirements are not mandated by the Due Process Clause, and we reverse.

I

The case began when police officers of petitioner, the City of West Covina, California, acting in accordance with law and pursuant to a valid search warrant, seized personal property. The property belonged to the owner of the searched home, respondent Lawrence Perkins, and to his family. The suspect in the crime was neither Perkins nor anyone in his family, but one Marcus Marsh. Marsh had been a boarder in the Perkins' home. After leaving their home, and unknown to them, he became the subject of a homicide investigation.

During the search of respondents' home for evidence incriminating Marsh, the police seized a number of items, including photos of Marsh, an address book, a 12-gauge shotgun, a starter pistol, ammunition, and $2,629 in cash. 113 F.3d 1004, 1006 (CA9 1997). At the conclusion of the search, the officers left respondents a form entitled "Search Warrant: Notice of Service," which stated:

"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

"1. THESE PREMISES HAVE BEEN SEARCHED BY PEACE OFFICERS OF THE (name of searching agency) West Covina Police DEPARTMENT PURSUANT TO A SEARCH WARRANT ISSUED ON (date) 5 20 93, BY THE HONORABLE (name of magistrate) Dan Oki, JUDGE OF THE SUPERIOR/MUNICIPAL COURT, Citrus JUDICIAL DISTRICT.

"2. THE SEARCH WAS CONDUCTED ON (date) 5-21-93. A LIST OF THE PROPERTY SEIZED PURSUANT TO THE SEARCH WARRANT IS ATTACHED.

"3. IF YOU WISH FURTHER INFORMATION, YOU MAY CONTACT:

(name of investigator) Det. Ferrari or Det. Melnyk AT [telephone number].

"LT. SCHIMANSKI [telephone number]." App. 76 77 (italicized characters represent those portions of the original document which were handwritten on the form).

In accordance with the Notice, the officers also left respondents an itemized list of the property seized. 113 F.3d, at 1011 1012. The officers did not leave the search warrant number because the warrant was under seal to avoid compromising the ongoing investigation. Id., at 1007. In a public index maintained by the court clerk, however, the issuance of the warrant was recorded by the address of the home searched and the search warrant number. Ibid.

Not long after the search, Perkins called Ferrari, one of the detectives listed on the Notice, and inquired about return of the seized property. No. CV 93 7084 SVW (CD Cal., July 8, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. E 3. One of the detectives told Perkins he needed to obtain a court order authorizing the property's return. Ibid.

About a month after the search, Perkins went to the Citrus Municipal Court to see Judge Oki, who had issued the warrant. He learned Judge Oki was on vacation. Ibid. He tried to have another judge release his property but was told the court had nothing under Perkins' name. Ibid.

Rather than continuing to pursue a court order releasing the property by filing a written motion with the court, making other inquiries, or returning to the courthouse at some later date, ibid., respondents filed suit in United States District Court against the City and the officers who conducted the search. They alleged the officers had violated their Fourth Amendment rights by conducting a search without probable cause and exceeding the scope of the warrant. App. 7 9. They further alleged that the City had a policy of permitting unlawful searches. Id., at 10.

The District Court granted summary judgment for the City and its officers. App. to Pet. for Cert. B1 B11. The court, however, invited supplemental briefing on an issue respondents had not raised: whether available remedies for the return of seized property were adequate to satisfy due process. Id., at B 7. The parties submitted briefs on the issue, but the court did not rule on it. Respondents appealed the District Court's holding on their Fourth Amendment claims, but the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District Court for resolution of the due process question. No. 94 56365 (CA9, Apr. 30, 1996), App. to Pet. for Cert. D1 D3.

The District Court held on remand that the remedies provided by California law for return of the seized property satisfied due process, and it granted summary judgment for the City. No. CV 93 7084 SVW, supra, App. to Pet. for Cert. E 2. In particular, the court rejected respondents' claim that the procedure for return of their property was unavailable to them because the City did not give them adequate notice of the remedy and the information needed to invoke it. Id., at E 6.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment for the City. 113 F.3d, at 1006. As an initial matter, the court noted that, under Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), respondents were entitled only to an adequate postdeprivation remedy, and not to a predeprivation hearing prior to the seizure. 113 F.3d, at 1010. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the District Court that the postdeprivation remedies for return of property established by California statute and case law satisfied the requirements of due process. Id., at 1011.

Nevertheless, the court held, by analogy to this Court's decision in Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978), that the City was required to give respondents notice of the state procedures for return of seized property and the information necessary to invoke those procedures (including the search warrant number or a method for obtaining the number). 113 F.3d, at 1012. While acknowledging that it was not the court's place "to specify the exact phrasing of an adequate notice," the court proceeded to explicate, in some detail, the content of the required notice:

"In cases where property is taken under California law the notice should include the following: as on the present notice, the fact of the search, its date, and the searching agency; the date of the warrant, the issuing judge, and the court in which he or she serves; and the persons to be contacted for further information. In addition, the notice must inform the recipient of the procedure for contesting the seizure or retention of the property taken, along with any additional information required for initiating that procedure in the appropriate court. In circumstances such as those presented by this record, the notice must include the search warrant number or, if it is not available or the record is sealed, the means of identifying the court file. It also must explain the need for a written motion or request to the court stating why the property should be returned." 113 F.3d, at 1013.

This expansive requirement lacks support in our case law and mandates notice not now prescribed by the Federal Government or by any one of the 50 States.

II

At this stage, no one contests the right of the State to have seized the property in the first instance or its ultimate obligation to return it. So rules restricting the substantive power of the State to take property are not implicated by this case. What is at issue is the obligation of the State to provide fair procedures to ensure return of the property when the State no longer has a lawful right to retain it.

Respondents acknowledge, as they must, that the City notified them of the initial seizure and gave them an inventory of the property taken. Accordingly, we need not decide how detailed the notice of the seizure must be or when the notice must be given. They also raise no independent challenge to the Court of Appeals' conclusion that California law provides adequate remedies for return of their property, including a motion under Cal. Penal Code Ann. §1536 (West 1982) or a motion under §1540. See 113 F.3d, at 1011. Rather, they contend the City deprived them of due process by failing to provide them notice of their remedies and the factual information necessary to invoke the remedies under California law. When the police seize property for a criminal investigation, however, due process does not require them to provide the owner with notice of state law remedies.

A primary purpose of the notice required by the Due Process Clause is to ensure that the opportunity for a hearing is meaningful. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) ("Th[e] right to be heard has little reality or worth unless one is informed that the matter [affecting one's property rights] is pending and can choose for himself whether to appear or default, acquiesce or contest"). It follows that when law enforcement agents seize property pursuant to warrant, due process requires them to take reasonable steps to give notice that the property has been taken so the owner can pursue available remedies for its return. Cf. Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 214 (1962) (requiring a city to provide adequate notice of the deprivation the city's condemnation of certain water rights which created the property owner's right to pursue damages claims and triggered the statute of limitations on those claims). Individualized notice that the officers have taken the property is necessary in a case such as the one before us because the property owner would have no other reasonable means of ascertaining who was responsible for his loss.

No...