WEST DAUPHIN LTD. PARTNERSHIP v. Callon Offshore Prod., Inc.
Decision Date | 04 September 1998 |
Citation | 725 So.2d 944 |
Parties | WEST DAUPHIN LIMITED PARTNERSHIP et al. v. CALLON OFFSHORE PRODUCTION, INC., et al. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
John W. Donald, Jr., and David A. Boyett III of Hamilton, Butler, Riddick, Tarlton & Sullivan, P.C., Mobile, for appellants.
Conrad P. Armbrecht, David E. Hudgens, and Duane A. Graham of Armbrecht, Jackson, DeMouy, Crowe, Holmes & Reeves, L.L.C., Mobile, for appellees Callon Offshore Production, Inc., Callon Petroleum Company, and Callon Petroleum Operating Company.
Norton Brooker, Jr., of Lyons, Pipes & Cook, P.C., Mobile, for appellee Atlantic Richfield Company.
William A. Gunter, asst. atty. gen., for appellee James D. Martin, as commissioner of the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources.
This appeal arises out of an interpleader action commenced in the Montgomery County Circuit Court to determine the right to royalties from the production of natural gas in offshore waters adjacent to Dauphin Island. The trial court entered a summary judgment, which we affirm.
This action began in February 1994, when Callon Offshore Production, Inc.; CN Resources; and Callon Consolidated Partners, Ltd. (collectively "Callon"), filed a "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and in Interpleader." The complaint named a large number of defendants, including West Dauphin Limited Partnership (hereinafter "West Dauphin" as collectively including not only that entity but all its predecessors in title) and Atlantic Richfield Company. The list of defendants also included the State of Alabama, the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, and "Charley" Grimsley, as Commissioner of Conservation and Natural Resources (collectively "the State").
Atlantic Richfield and Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc. ("Mobil") drilled producing gas wells on certain offshore tracts adjacent to Dauphin Island. The drilling operations were accomplished pursuant to oil and gas leases the State had granted Atlantic Richfield and Mobil. Subsequently, these leases were assigned to Callon, which now operates the wells on the offshore tracts.
The complaint alleged that a dispute had arisen over the proceeds of Callon's operations on the submerged lands. The dispute consisted of conflicting claims by the State and West Dauphin to ownership of submerged land lying generally along a line intersecting "portion[s] of Offshore Tracts 72, 73, and 91, and the Northeast Quadrant of Offshore Tract 90 (all as designated on [a] plat entitled `State of Alabama Chart of Submerged State Lands Oil and Gas Lease Tracts')." The disputed land, which West Dauphin and Callon have labeled the "Harbor Line Property" and the "Improvement Line Property," respectively, includes the area into which the gas-producing wells were drilled. Consequently, both the State and West Dauphin claimed the right to receive "the royalties attributable to gas production from that property." Brief of Appellants, at 1. Callon suspended disbursements of the disputed funds, depositing them, instead, with the court, which opened an interest-bearing account to receive accrued and accruing royalties.
Callon's complaint sought a judgment identifying the proper payee. The State and West Dauphin cross-claimed, each asserting ownership of the Improvement Line Property and entitlement to the royalties. Subsequently, Callon moved the court to enter a summary judgment in favor of the State. That motion was granted on August 9, 1996, and West Dauphin appealed.
West Dauphin contends that it acquired title to the Improvement Line Property pursuant to Ala.Code 1975, § 33-7-53, or, at least, pursuant to § 33-7-53 in conjunction with what it alleges was a quid pro quo dedication in 1954 to public use of West Dauphin real estate and its payment since 1954 of ad valorem taxes on the Improvement Line Property. We shall address each of these claims in the following three parts of this opinion.
Section 33-7-53 provides:
(Emphasis added.)
At the outset of its discussion of the facts and issues, West Dauphin states: "Most of the events which give rise to this dispute occurred between 1932 and 1955." Brief of Appellants, at 5. It then directs our attention to the history of 33-7-53, stating:
Brief of Appellants, at 5 (emphasis added). Because West Dauphin has thus introduced the section's connection with the Dauphin Island Bridge, and acknowledged the significance to this case of the statute's history and purpose, we shall enlarge somewhat upon those themes.
The history of the Dauphin Island Bridge and, by extension, the history of § 33-7-53, begins in the 19th century. As early as the 1880s, projects to connect Dauphin Island to the mainland by a bridge or causeway were being discussed and attempted. "Dauphin Island Bridge," The Mobile Press, October 13, 1938, at 8. By 1932, however, no such project had been accomplished. The absence of a method of funding was one of the primary obstacles proponents encountered. Newspapers from that period suggest that at least one of the objectives the proponents sought was a way to finance the project without resorting to state or county tax revenues.
In 1932, Senator John Craft, of Mobile County, introduced Senate Bill 125, which, in its final form, became Act No. 147, 1932 Ala. Acts 167, codified at Ala.Code 1975, § 33-7-53. The purpose of the bill was "to enable a private corporation to construct a bridge from the mainland of Mobile County to Dauphin Island." Letter from Gessner T. McCorvey to John H. Peach, legal advisor to the Governor, October 20, 1932. C.R. 1009-10. McCorvey further stated:
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Borden v. Malone
...held that the common law may be abrogated only if the Legislature does so expressly. See, e.g., West Dauphin Ltd. P'ship v. Callon Offshore Prod., Inc., 725 So. 2d 944, 952 (Ala. 1998) (" ‘[S]tatutes are presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared.’ " (quoting Arn......
-
Borden v. Malone
...law may be abrogated only if the Legislature does so expressly. See, e.g., West Dauphin Ltd. P'ship v. Callon Offshore Prod., Inc., 725 So. 2d 944, 952 (Ala. 1998) (" '[S]tatutes are presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared.' " (quoting Arnold v. State, 353 So.......
-
Ex parte Key
...... Such statutes are presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared.'" West Dauphin Ltd. P'ship v. Callon Offshore Prod., Inc., 725 So.2d 944, 952 (Ala.1998)(quoting Arnold v. State, 353 So.2d 524, 526 (Ala.1977)(emphasis omitted)). See, e.g., Ex parte Parish, 808 S......
-
Ex parte Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co.
......Johnny Baker. Hauling, Inc. , 545 So.2d 771, 772 (Ala. Civ. App. 1989). ... (Thomson/West 2012) ("One should assume the contextually. ... West Dauphin Ltd. P'ship v. Callon Offshore. Prod., ......
-
The year-and-a-day rule: a common law vestige that has outlived its purpose.
...are presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared.'" West Dauphin Ltd. P'ship v. Callon Offshore Prod., Inc., 725 So. 2d 944, 952 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Arnold v. State, 353 So. 2d 524, 526 (Ala. 1977) (emphasis omitted)). See, e.g., Ex parte Parish, 808 So. 2d 30, 33......