West Tennessee Agape, Inc. v. Lipe
| Decision Date | 17 June 1974 |
| Citation | 515 S.W.2d 648 |
| Parties | WEST TENNESSEE AGAPE, INC., Appellee, v. Karon D. LIPE, Sr., et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Tennessee Court of Appeals |
Thomas J. Griffin, Memphis, for appellants.
Larry D. Austin, Memphis, for appellee.
The Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County decreed that the three minor children of Karon and Donna Lipe had been abandoned within the meaning of T.C.A. §§ 37--202, 37--203 and forever terminated the parental rights of the natural parents. That decision was appealed to the Circuit Court of Shelby County where the matter was heard De novo, T.C.A. § 37--258. The Circuit Court affirmed the order of the Juvenile Court and the matter has been appealed to this Court for review De novo. T.C.A. § 27--303.
The controlling Assignment of Error is as follows:
'The Court erred in finding that the Appellants had wilfully failed to visit and or support their children or make payments toward their support during the four month period preceding March 1, 1973.'
It should first be noted that this is not an adoption proceeding. This is a proceeding in a Court of special jurisdiction, the Juvenile Court, to terminate parental rights under the 1970 Public Acts (Adj.S.) ch. 600, as amended and now codified as T.C.A. §§ 37--201 to 37--281. This distinction must be borne in mind as the term 'abandonment' as used in adoption proceedings is subject to a different order of proof from that when used in a hearing in the Juvenile Court on a petition to have a child declared abandoned and terminate parental rights pursuant to T.C.A. § 37--201 et seq. This distinction has been noted in Ex parte Wolfenden (1959 M.S.) 49 Tenn.App. 1, 349 S.W.2d 713. Also, the Legislature has recognized the distinction between abandonment as defined in T.C.A. § 37--202 governing proceedings in the Juvenile Court and when used in adoption proceedings in the Chancery and Circuit Court. Section 37--203(2) governing matters in the Trial Court provides:
'All cases to terminate parental rights when a child is found to have been abandoned for four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding institution of an action or proceeding to declare the child to be an abandoned child, except that this does not deprive circuit and chancery courts of the right to adjudicate an abandonment where abandonment has been alleged in a petition to adopt as is provided in chapter 1 of title 36.'
We conclude that the Juvenile Court, since it is a statutory Court of special or limited jurisdiction, is limited in its determination of abandonment by the words of the statutes giving it such jurisdiction. It may not determine an abandonment on the broader principles involved in an adoption proceeding.
Section 37--202 contains the definition of terms as used in Juvenile Court proceedings. Subsection (7) defines an abandoned child as:
"Abandoned child' means a child whose parents or other persons lawfully charged with his care and custody willfully fail to visit or willfully fail to support or make payments toward his support for a period of four (4) consecutive months.'
Section 37--203(2) grants jurisdiction to the Juvenile Court in 'All cases to terminate parental rights when a child is found to have been abandoned for four (4) consecutive months immediately preceding institution of an action or proceeding to declare the child to be an abandoned child' etc.
Section 37--208 T.C.A. defines the commencement of proceedings and provides that actions of the sort now under consideration are commenced 'by the filing of a petition'.
Facts which are undisputed in this case are:
(a) The children of the defendant parents were in the temporary custody of West Tennessee Agape Inc. at the time the petition to terminate parental rights was filed.
(b) The parents were woefully in arrears in making payments to the Juvenile Court for the support of the children. (The reasons therefor pro and con, need not here be expressed.)
(c) On February 22, 1973, the parents paid to the Juvenile Court the sum of $36.00 as support for the children representing four weekly payments of.$9.00 each. (It had been almost nine months since a previous payment was made and the $36.00 payment was most probably motivated by the parents becoming aware of the petitioner's intent to attempt to terminate parental rights). 1
(d) In December, 1972 the parents attempted to have their children visit in their home, but permission was refused by petitioner on the grounds that Christmas arrangements...
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White v. State
...of statute, and thus their subject matter jurisdiction is circumscribed by the statutes creating them. West Tennessee Agape, Inc. v. Lipe, 515 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1974). Unlike circuit or chancery courts, juvenile courts have special and limited jurisdiction, Stambaugh v. Price,......
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