West v. Kawasaki Motors Mfg. Corp., U.S.A.

• Decision Date: 28 January 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-2359,90-2359
• Citation: 595 So.2d 92
• Parties: 17 Fla. L. Weekly D356, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P. 13,104 Kenneth E. WEST and Rita West, his wife, Appellants, v. KAWASAKI MOTORS MANUFACTURING CORP., U.S.A. and Nosa, Inc., d/b/a Palmetto Kawasaki, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 92

595 So.2d 92

17 Fla. L. Weekly D356, Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P. 13,104

Kenneth E. WEST and Rita West, his wife, Appellants, v. KAWASAKI MOTORS MANUFACTURING CORP., U.S.A. and Nosa, Inc. d/b/a Palmetto Kawasaki, Appellees.

No. 90-2359.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Third District.

Jan. 28, 1992.

Rehearing Denied April 14, 1992.

Perse & Ginsberg and Lawrence Rodgers and R. Fred Lewis, Miami, for appellants.

Roth, Edward & Smith and Larry M. Roth and Kenneth B. Gardner, Orlando, for appellees.

Before HUBBART and COPE and GODERICH, JJ.

HUBBART, Judge.

The central issue presented for review is whether a plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from bringing strict liability in tort and negligence claims against the manufacturer and retailer of an allegedly defective product--when the plaintiff, as here, has already suffered an adverse judgment in virtually the same products liability action, based on the same operative facts, brought by the plaintiff against the wholesale distributor of the subject product wherein it was determined that the product in question was not defective. For the reasons which follow, we conclude that res judicata bars the plaintiff from bringing these successive claims, and, consequently, affirm the final summary judgment entered below in favor of the manufacturer and retailer.

I

The operative facts of this case are undisputed. On January 4, 1985, the plaintiff Kenneth E. West, a motorcycle patrolman for the Metro-Dade Police Department, was involved in a traffic accident while operating his motorcycle in the course and scope of his employment. The floorboard of the motorcycle allegedly collapsed in the accident resulting in a severe injury to his foot; the plaintiff Rita West, Kenneth's wife, also suffered an alleged loss of consortium. The defendant Kawasaki Motors Manufacturing Corp. was the manufacturer of the motorcycle; the defendant Kawasaki Motors Corp. was the wholesale distributor of the motorcycle; and the defendant Nosa, Inc. d/b/a Palmetto Kawasaki was the retailer who sold the motorcycle to the Metro-Dade Police Department.

On June 18, 1986, the plaintiffs brought a products liability action in the circuit court below sounding in strict liability in tort, negligence and breach of implied warranty solely against the defendant wholesale distributor of the motorcycle. It was alleged that the floorboard of the motorcycle was defective and unreasonably dangerous in that it collapsed when the plaintiff Kenneth West applied pressure to it to avoid the traffic accident in question. On the defendant wholesale distributor's motion, the cause was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. After two years of extensive discovery, U.S. District Judge Kenneth Ryskamp entered a summary judgment for the defendant wholesale distributor on both the strict liability and negligence counts; the breach of implied warranty claim was abandoned by the plaintiffs. Judge Ryskamp concluded, in essence, in two separate summary judgment orders that, as a matter of law, there was no evidence of any defect in the design or manufacture of the motorcycle. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion. West v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 909 F.2d 1491 (11th Cir.1990).

On December 20, 1988, the same day that Judge Ryskamp entered his first summary judgment order as stated above, the plaintiffs filed a second products liability action sounding in strict liability in tort and negligence against the manufacturer and retailer of the subject motorcycle in the circuit court below. This complaint was virtually identical to the one considered in the federal action; here, as in the federal suit, the plaintiffs alleged that the floorboard of the motorcycle was defective and collapsed, causing serious injuries in the subject traffic accident. The manufacturer and retailer filed answers raising the affirmative defense of res judicata, based on the summary judgment entered in favor of the wholesale distributor in the prior federal action, and subsequently moved for a summary judgment on that ground. The trial court granted the motion specifically based on the defense of res judicata. The plaintiffs appeal contending that the defense of res judicata is unavailable in this case because the defendants were not parties to the prior federal judgment.

II

It is settled, as a general rule in Florida, that in order to invoke the defense of res judicata or collateral estoppel so as to bar a pending action based on a final judgment entered in a prior action, it must be established that there is (1) an identity in the thing sued for in both actions, (2) an identity of the cause of action in both actions, (3) an identity of parties in both actions, and (4) an identity of the capacity of the parties in both actions. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Industrial Contracting Co., 260 So.2d 860, 862 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972); Matthews v. Matthews, 133 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961) and cases collected. As stated by the Florida Supreme Court in Gordon v. Gordon, 59 So.2d 40, 43 (Fla.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 878, 73 S.Ct. 165, 97 L.Ed. 680 (1952):

"We have held as a general proposition that when a final decree or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction becomes absolute it puts at rest and entombs in eternal quiescence every justiciable, as well as every actually adjudicated, issue. This pronouncement is considered by us as controlling only when res adjudicata is the proper test. By this we mean it is not controlling except in an instance wherein the second suit is between the same parties and is predicated upon the same cause of action as was the first."

Id. at 43.

Florida courts, however, have not strictly adhered to the identity of parties requirement in all cases when invoking the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. To begin with, the term "parties" has been broadly interpreted to include more than just record parties--so that, for example, a person in privity with a record party, as well as a person who controls for his own interest a record party, may invoke the doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel. See, e.g., Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 260 So.2d at 283.

Beyond that, Florida courts have on occasion recognized exceptions to the identity of parties requirement under the res judicata or collateral estoppel doctrines where special fairness or policy considerations appear to compel it. In Zeidwig v. Ward, 548 So.2d 209 (Fla.1989), the Florida Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant was barred from suing his former lawyer for legal malpractice allegedly committed in a prior criminal case where (a) the defendant had previously moved to set aside his criminal conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel grounds and (b) had received an adverse judicial determination thereon that he had received effective assistance of counsel in the said criminal case. The defendant lawyer in the malpractice suit was allowed to assert the defense of collateral estoppel based on the prior criminal judgment although he was not a party to the post-judgment criminal proceeding. The court articulated its rationale for abandoning the identity of parties requirement under the doctrine of collateral estoppel as follows:

"We conclude that, where a defendant in a criminal case has had a full and fair opportunity to present his claim in a prior criminal proceeding, and a judicial determination is made that he has received the effective assistance of counsel, then the defendant/attorney in a subsequent civil malpractice action brought by the criminal defendant may defensively assert collateral estoppel.

If we were to allow a claim in this instance, we would be approving a policy that would approve the imprisonment of a defendant for a criminal offense after a judicial determination that the defendant has failed in attacking his conviction on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel but which would allow the same defendant to collect from his counsel damages in a civil suit for ineffective representation because he was improperly imprisoned. To fail to allow the use of collateral estoppel in these circumstances is neither logical nor reasonable.

The public policy justification for the application of collateral estoppel in this type of circumstance was well stated by the court in Johnson v. Raban, 702 S.W.2d 134 (Mo.Ct.App.1985), where it stated:

'[P]ublic policy dictates that a person convicted of a crime who has failed in his attack upon his conviction both directly and collaterally should not be permitted to recover against his attorney in a civil malpractice action for damages allegedly arising out of the attorney's handling of his defense. It would undermine the effective administration of the judicial system to ignore completely a prior decision of a court of competent jurisdiction in this state on the same issue which plaintiff seeks to relitigate in a subsequent action. Id. at 138.' "

548 So.2d at 214.

In Phillips v. Hall, 297 So.2d 136 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974), the court held that a plaintiff was barred by res judicata from suing an employee of a supermarket in a negligence action for injuries caused by the employee's negligent operation of a hand-powered merchandise cart. The plaintiff had previously sued the employee's employer [the supermarket] and had recovered a judgment for the same injuries arising out of the same accident. Although the employee was not a party to the prior negligence action against his employer, he was nonetheless allowed to raise the defense of res judicata based on the judgment entered in the prior action. The court adopted the rationale of a New Hampshire case which reached the same result upon the theory that in master/servant vicarious liability cases, the master and servant are not joint tortfeasors, and, consequently, a plaintiff who elects to sue only one of these two...