West v. Martin

• Decision Date: 14 November 1908
• Citation: 51 Wash. 85,97 P. 1102
• Parties: WEST v. MARTIN et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

97 P. 1102

51 Wash. 85

WEST v. MARTIN et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 14, 1908

On Rehearing. Affirmed.

For former report, see 92 P. 334.

HADLEY, C.J.

A rehearing was granted in this cause, and argument was heard at the present term. A statement of the case may be found in the original opinion (47 Wash. 417, 92 P. 334), to which we here refer in order to avoid repetition. The only question determined by the former opinion was that of jurisdiction. In was held that the facts brought the case within the jurisdiction of admiralty. In view of certain discriminations which had theretofore been made in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, it was believed that that tribunal would so hold, should it be called upon to consider facts identical with those involved herein concerning the locality of the collision and the resulting injury. It now appears, however, that we erred in the entertainment of that view. Since our decision was rendered the Supreme Court of the United States has rendered two decisions directly involving collisions between vessels and bridges which span navigable waters. Cleveland Terminal & Valley R. Co. v Cleveland Steamship Co., 208 U.S. 316, 28 S.Ct. 414, 52 L.Ed. 508; The Troy, 208 U.S. 321, 28 S.Ct. 416, 52 L.Ed 512. In the case first above cited the court followed what was said in The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20, 18 L.Ed. 125 distinguished what was said in The Blackheath, 195 U.S. 361 25 S.Ct. 46, 49 L.Ed. 236, and reached the conclusion that the locality of the collision was not maritime, for the reason that the injured structure was so connected with the shore that it immediately concerned commerce upon the land. The two cases cited were companion cases in their facts although one was appealed from the Northern district of Ohio and the other from the Western district of Wisconsin. The decisions were rendered on the same day, and the decision in The Troy was based upon the opinion in the first case cited. So far as the question of locality is concerned, those decisions are binding upon this court. In our former opinion we simply endeavored to anticipate what would be the decision of the higher tribunal in such a case, and now that we find we were mistaken it becomes our duty to reverse our former holding upon this subject, unless a further feature suggested by appellants has the effect to establish the locality of this injury as a maritime one. We refer to the matter mentioned at the close of the former opinion where it was suggested that, inasmuch as the damage was largely effected by the action of the water after the bridge fell, the locality of the damage was for that reason a maritime one. We were of the view when that opinion was prepared that the federal Supreme Court was disposed to give much force to the matter of locality in determining the dividing lines between admiralty jurisdiction and that of the state courts, and that very technical distinctions had been observed in order to fix the locality as being either maritime or nonmaritime. The later decisions cited above seem, however, to give more force to the character of the structure colliding with the vessel, it being connected with the land or otherwise, as the determining factor, than to the mere matter of locality which was so much discussed in the earlier decisions. We therefore believe there are no facts in this case to distinguish it from the later decisions cited so far as the matter of locality is concerned, and that upon that question the admiralty court has not jurisdiction.

The appellants further contend that the state court has no jurisdiction, for the reason that the statute invoked by respondent and cited in the former opinion is not applicable to the facts of the case at bar, and, if, so that the statute is unconstitutional. It having been determined that admiralty has not jurisdiction, then it must follow that the subject is open for state legislation, and is within the jurisdiction of the state courts. The statute (section 5953, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. [Pierce's Code, § 6077]) provides for liens upon 'all steamers, vessels, and boats, their tackle, apparel and furniture.' It is evidently intended to reach foreign, as well as domestic, vessels, and the property injured by the vessel need not necessarily be transportable, as argued by appellants. The statute is broad enough to include damage to a permanent structure like a bridge. To give it any other construction would be extremely technical, and we do not think the Legislature intended that a restricted or narrow meaning should be given the statute. The statute expressly provides that demands for injuries by the vessel shall constitute liens upon the vessel. Such liens created by state statutes are enforceable in the state courts when the subject-matter is not...