West v. Phillips

• Decision Date: 26 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. IP 93-945.,IP 93-945.
• Citation: 883 F. Supp. 308
• Parties: Deborah G. WEST, Plaintiff, v. Michael K. PHILLIPS, in his individual capacity, and Baron Hill, in his individual capacity, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

883 F. Supp. 308

Deborah G. WEST, Plaintiff, v. Michael K. PHILLIPS, in his individual capacity, and Baron Hill, in his individual capacity, Defendants.

No. IP 93-945.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

August 26, 1994.

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David T. Hasbrook, Ruckelhaus Roland Hasbrook & O'Connor, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiff.

John E. Taylor, Ann Carr Mackey, Sommer & Barnard, Indianapolis, IN, for defendants.

ENTRY

BARKER, Chief Judge.

Michael Phillips, the Speaker of the Indiana House of Representatives and his assistant, Baron Hill, (collectively "Defendants") employed Deborah G. West ("West") as a legislative assistant for the Democratic Caucus of the Indiana House of Representatives ("the Caucus"). On May 19, 1993, the Defendants fired her. West contends the Defendants terminated her in retaliation for her informing a public interest group and newspaper about the allegedly unethical conduct of Representative Vernon Smith, a member of the Caucus. She has filed a two-count complaint against the Defendants in their individual capacities seeking compensatory and punitive damages, reasonable attorney fees, and costs. The Defendants present the Court with a motion for judgment on the pleadings. For reasons explained below, the Court grants the motion in part and denies it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

From approximately May 1990 to May 14, 1993, West was employed as a legislative assistant for the Caucus and worked under the supervision of the Defendants. During this period, the Defendants assigned her to assist several Democratic Representatives, including Vernon Smith. The exact nature of her duties is unclear from the amended complaint.

When West was working for Representative Smith, he apparently required her to perform assorted clerical tasks. He also allegedly requested that she prepare and mail letters on Indiana House of Representative letterhead to various private organizations for what appeared to be private causes. West believed such actions were unethical, and in the summer of 1990, she reported her concerns to the staff director of the Caucus, Ann Latscha. West sought clarification from Latscha as to whether Representative Smith's conduct was illegal. When the Caucus failed or refused to address her concerns, West requested that her efforts be documented in her personnel file. During the course of her employment, at least two members of the Indiana House of Representatives informed West that Representative Smith had acted inappropriately. According to West, Smith's expenditure of public funds for private fundraising efforts continued through her termination in 1993.

During the Winter of 1991, Common Cause of Indiana, a non-profit, non-partisan public interest group, investigated Representative Smith's use of State letterhead and postage for private purposes. See Plaintiff's Exhibit A. The Indiana Legislative Insight, a legislative paper, also questioned the propriety of Representative Smith's actions in December 1991. See Plaintiff's Exhibit B. In approximately April 1993, West contacted Common Cause of Indiana regarding Representative Smith's misuse of State letterhead and postage. Shortly thereafter, the Indianapolis News approached West concerning Representative Smith's conduct. On April 28, 1993, based on the information supplied by West, the Indianapolis News published a story about Representative Smith's allegedly unethical actions. See Plaintiff's Exhibit C. Following the publication of the article, Baron Hill, who was working for Michael Phillips, terminated West's employment as a legislative assistant for the Caucus.

West filed a two-count complaint with the Court on December 30, 1993: Count I states that the Defendants unlawfully terminated West's employment in retaliation for her conversations with Common Cause of Indiana and the Indianapolis News in violation of rights guaranteed to her under the First and Fifth Amendments of United States Constitution; Count II states that the Defendants' termination of West's employment violated Article I, § 9 of the Indiana Constitution which prohibits the passage of any law restraining a person's speech. West seeks compensatory and punitive damages, attorney fees, and costs.

In their answer, the Defendants deny West's allegations and invoke a host of affirmative defenses. Their motion is based on the defenses of legislative immunity, qualified immunity, and a provision of the Indiana Constitution.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Judgment on the Pleadings Standards

In this case, the Defendants have advanced two Rule 12(b) defenses, failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Defendants' Amended Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Court relies only on the pleadings in deciding this motion. The standard used to evaluate the Defendants' motion is the same as that for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.¹ Accordingly, the Court views all facts in the light most favorable to West, the non-moving party. National Fidelity Life Ins. Co. v. Karaganis, 811 F.2d 357, 358 (7th Cir.1987). "The motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support her claim for relief." Thomason v. Nachtrieb, 888 F.2d 1202, 1204 (7th Cir.1989) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). The purpose of a motion to dismiss is not to decide the merits of the case but rather the sufficiency of the complaint. Gibson v. Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.1990) (citing Triad Assoc., Inc. v. Chicago Housing Authority, 892 F.2d 583, 586 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 845, 111 S.Ct. 129, 112 L.Ed.2d 97 (1990)). If the facts in the complaint or any reasonable inferences drawn therefrom support a claim for which relief can be granted, the Defendants' motion must be denied. See Bowman v. Franklin 980 F.2d 1104, 1107 (7th Cir.1992), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 2417, 124 L.Ed.2d 639 (1993).

B. West's Claims

1. Count I: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims

Count I sets forth claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Defendants in their individual capacities for violation of the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. West claims that the defendants fired her because she exercised her constitutional right to free speech in conversing with Common Cause of Indiana and the Indianapolis News.

a. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Burdens

42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:

Every person who, under the color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on which relief can be granted, a plaintiff must prove two elements: "(1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States; and (2) the person or persons who caused the alleged deprivation were acting under the color of state law." Grosz v. Indiana, 730 F.Supp. 1474, 1476-77 (S.D.Ind.1990).

In this case, West argues that the Defendants violated her constitutional rights under the First and Fifth Amendments because she was terminated for engaging in the protected activity of speaking about a matter of public concern. For the purposes of this motion, the Court assumes that West did lose her job for this reason.

Even assuming that the facts pleaded in the complaint are true, the Court finds that West fails to state a claim for a violation of the Fifth Amendment which protects against acts taken under color of federal law. Monitor v. Chicago, 653 F.Supp. 1294, 1299 (N.D.Ill.1987); see, e.g., Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443, 1446 (7th Cir.1984); Hayes v. Kingsley, 1993 WL 489738, *2, 1993 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 16436, *4 (N.D.Ill. November 16, 1993). West was not dismissed pursuant to federal law or by a federal actor, making the Fifth Amendment irrelevant to this case.² Therefore, the Defendants' motion is granted as to West's Fifth Amendment claim. Whether West's First Amendment claim is subject to the Defendants' affirmative defenses is a more complicated issue.

b. Legislative Immunity

The Defendants claim that, even if they terminated West because of her unauthorized conversations with the media and others, legislative immunity protects them from suit since firing an employee is within the scope of legitimate legislative activity. For a legislator to be absolutely immune from civil or criminal suit, he or she must have been acting in his or her legislative capacity. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376, 71 S.Ct. 783, 788, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951). Therefore, the Court must determine if the Defendants acted in their legislative capacity in firing West.

1. History of Legislative Immunity

The Speech and Debate Clause of the United States Constitution states that no Senator or Representative can be held liable "for any Speech or Debate in either House." Art. I, § 6, cl. 1. The Framers of the Constitution borrowed the doctrine of legislative immunity from the English Parliament which established the immunity in their 1689 Bill of Rights. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372, 71 S.Ct. at 786. The privilege was established to allow legislators to speak and act without fear of civil or criminal repercussions. Id. at 375, 71 S.Ct. at 787. As stated by James Wilson, a member of the Committee of Detail which was responsible for the inclusion of the Speech and Debate Clause in the Constitution,

"in order to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success, it is indispensably necessary, that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and

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