West v. State

Decision Date02 April 1946
Docket Number15415.
Citation37 S.E.2d 799,200 Ga. 566
PartiesWEST v. STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. In a trial for murder, where the State has introduced an admission by the accused of a wilful and intentional killing unaccompanied with any justification or mitigation, it is his right, by cross-examination, to elicit a previous conversation with the same witness in which the admission of the homicide was accompanied by a statement giving the reason therefor.

2. The admission of testimony as to experiments rests largely in the discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of this discretion will not be controlled unless manifestly abused. The weight of such testimony is for the jury, and varies according to the circumstances of similarity which they may find to exist between the experiments and the actual occurrence under investigation.

3. Under the ruling in Blocker v. State, 185 Ga 322(2), 195 S.E. 207, where, as here, the defendant in his statement to the jury admitted the homicide, but claimed justification, the present case is not one depending wholly upon circumstantial evidence, so as to require a charge on the law of such evidence, in the absence of a proper request therefor. Moreover, evidence of the admission of a homicide is to be taken as direct and not as mere circumstantial evidence, and for this additional reason the court did not err in omitting to charge on the law of circumstantial evidence. See Bowen v. State, 181 Ga 427(4), 182 S.E. 510.

Mark West was convicted of the murder of David Leland Hendrix, and recommended to mercy. The killing took place at the home of the accused and there were no eyewitnesses. The State sought to establish its case by proof of the corpus delicti admissions made by the accused, by disproving the facts contained in the admission and in the defendant's statement to the jury, and by other circumstances. Certain portions of the evidence will br related in detail in the opinion. To the overruling of his motion for new trial, which contained three special grounds, exceptions were filed to this court.

A. M. Deal and W. G. Neville, both of Statesboro, for plaintiff in error.

Fred T. Lanier, Sol. Gen., and B. H. Ramsey, both of Statesboro, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., and C. E. Gregory, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.

ATKINSON, Justice (after stating the foregoing facts).

1. By the first special ground of the amended motion, error on the part of the trial court is alleged in not permitting the accused to cross-examine sheriff Deal as to what was said by the accused to him in a previous admission after the sheriff had testified as to an inculpatory admission made by the accused. For a complete understanding of the question presented, all the testimony of the sheriff relating to the admissions follows.

Direct examination: 'As to whether or not since he has been in jail he has made any statement as to who did the shooting, well, yes, sir, he has. He said he did the shooting. He said he was standing in the door to the house at the time he shot. He said that, if Hendrix had taken one more step, he would have been on the porch. * * * He said the double-barrel gun that was lying under the bed with the empty shell in it was the gun he used.'

Cross-examination: 'As to whether or not at the time I had the conversation with the defendant in the jail he also told me why he shot Mr. Hendrix, well, yes, sir, he told me why. As to whether or not that was in the same conversation in which he told me about having shot him, well, I would not swear that it was at exactly the same time I was talking to him then, or whether it was at another time when I was talking to him about some people, but he has told me why he did it.'

Redirect examination: 'As to whether or not at the time he told me he had shot Mr. Hendrix anything was said about why he shot him, well, no sir, I don't think so.'

Recross-examination: 'As to whether or not I can tell you when he did tell me why he shot him, well--[Objection interposed.] After I went back up there that night--[Objection interposed.] The first time he told me why he did was at his house while sitting on the porch.' 'As to whether or not I did have a conversation with the defendant on the night of the killing and he told me why he did, well, yes sir. That was at the scene of the offense and before I brought him to town and put him in jail. As to why he said he shot him, well--[Objection interposed.] At the time he told me where he was standing when he shot Mr. Hendrix in that conversation, he did not tell me why he did it. The other time he did tell me.' 'Later on in the jail in a different conversation he did tell me why he did it, yes sir.'

An analytical summary of the foregoing testimony discloses three different conversations between sheriff Deal and the accused wherein admissions were made, which, taken in their chronological order, were as follows: The first conversation was at the scene of the crime before the accused was brought to jail, at which time, in discussing the homicide, he told the sheriff why he had killed the deceased. The second conversation took place in the jail, and on this occasion the accused related the position of the two men at the time of the homicide and identified the shotgun he used, but did not state why he had shot the deceased. The third statement was also made in the jail. No details of this conversation appear except that they were talking 'about same people,' but sheriff Deal said that at this time the accused also told him why he had shot the deceased.

The question here presented is whether, after the State has introduced an admission by the accused of a wilful and intentional killing without any negation of malice, the accused can, by cross- examination, show another and previous conversation with the same witness in which the admission of the homicide was accompanied by 'an exculpatory explanation of justification, excuse, or mitigation.'

'In a trial for murder, if the accused has admitted a wilful and intentional killing without any negation of malice, a presumption of malice will ordinarily arise; but this is not the case, and no presumption of malice arises where he adds an exculpatory explanation of justification, excuse, or mitigation.' Myrick v. State, 199 Ga. 244(1), 34 S.E.2d 36, 39.

'When an admission shall be given in evidence, it shall be the...

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24 cases
  • Minor v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • October 29, 1999
    ...of the demonstration and the actual occurrence affects the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. See West v. State, 200 Ga. 566, 571, 37 S.E.2d 799 (1946); Stephens, ". . . . "We note that we have considered the holding in U.S. v. Gaskell, 985 F.2d 1056 (11th Cir.1993), in w......
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • February 8, 1999
    ...meaning of what was said on the previous occasion. [Cit.]" Smalls v. State, 105 Ga. 669, 671, 31 S.E. 571 (1898). See West v. State, 200 Ga. 566(1), 37 S.E.2d 799 (1946). The majority holds that the trial court did not err by editing out of Brown's statement to the police everything Brown s......
  • Morales v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 29, 2016
    ...is introduced, all that is said in the same conversation which is relevant to the issue should be admitted .” West v. State , 200 Ga. 566, 569, 37 S.E.2d 799 (1946).Westbrook v. State , 291 Ga. 60, 62, 727 S.E.2d 473 (2012) (emphasis supplied); see also Fitzgerald v. State , 201 Ga.App. 361......
  • Tuzman v. State, 55088
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • April 5, 1978
    ...were admissible within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we find no abuse of that discretion here. West v. State, 200 Ga. 566(2), 37 S.E.2d 799 (1946). 8. Finally, there is no merit in the contention that the trial court erred in failing to charge on the effect of testimony conce......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Evidence
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 64-1, September 2012
    • Invalid date
    ...60, 62, 727 S.E.2d 473, 476 (2012) (quoting Smalls v. State, 105 Ga. 669, 671, 31 S.E. 571, 572 (1898)).83. Id. (quoting West v. State, 200 Ga. 566, 569, 37 S.E.2d 799, 801 (1946)).84. Id. at 61-62, 727 S.E.2d at 476-77. 85. Id. at 61-62, 727 S.E. 2d at 476.86. Id. at 62, 727 S.E. 2d at 476......

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