West v. State
Decision Date | 26 September 2003 |
Citation | 890 So.2d 205 |
Parties | Geoffrey Todd WEST v. STATE of Alabama. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Charles H. Pullen, Huntsville; and Hilda S. Trapp Smith, Florence, for appellant.
William H. Pryor, Jr., atty. gen., and Nathan A. Forrester, deputy atty. gen., and Jeremy W. McIntire, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Geoffrey Todd West, was convicted of robbery-murder, a violation of § 13A-5-40(a)(2), Ala.Code 1975. By a vote of 10-2, the jury recommended that the appellant be sentenced to death. The trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced the appellant to death. This court affirmed his conviction on direct appeal, see West v. State, 793 So.2d 870 (Ala.Crim.App.2000)
; the Alabama Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari review; and the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari review, see West v. Alabama, 534 U.S. 849, 122 S.Ct. 116, 151 L.Ed.2d 72 (2001). This court issued a certificate of judgment on February 23, 2001.
On September 6, 2002, the appellant filed a Rule 32 petition, challenging his conviction. In his petition, he alleged that he was entitled to post-conviction relief because:
The State filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the appellant had not timely filed his petition. Citing Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., as amended effective August 1, 2002,1 the circuit court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely filed. The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court summarily denied. This appeal followed.
The appellant argues that the Alabama Supreme Court did not intend for Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., as amended, to be applied retroactively to his case; that to do so would mean that his petition was time-barred before the amendment was announced; and that retroactive application of the rule would effectively bar certain convicted defendants from seeking collateral review of their convictions. However, in Davis v. State, 890 So.2d 193, 197 (Ala.Crim.App.2003), which is being released simultaneously with this opinion, we stated:
"Because Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., as amended, and the March and July orders do not clearly state that the rule applies prospectively only, we conclude that the Alabama Supreme Court intended for it to apply retrospectively to cases in which this court issued a certificate of judgment before August 1, 2002, and cases in which the time to file an appeal lapsed before August 1, 2002. See Watson v. Trail Pontiac, Inc., 508 So.2d 262 (Ala.1987)
.
(Footnote omitted.)
Because the appellant filed his petition on September 6, 2002, we conclude, as did the circuit court, that Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., as amended, applies retroactively to the appellant's case. See Davis, supra
(. ) However, because this court issued a certificate of judgment in this case on February 23, 2001, and because the two-year limitations period remained in effect until August 1, 2002, the appellant could have timely filed his petition as late as July 31, 2002. Likewise, other convicted defendants in whose cases this court issued a certificate of judgment or whose time to file a direct appeal lapsed between July 31, 2000, and July 31, 2001, could have timely filed their petitions as late as July 31, 2002. Therefore, retroactive application of the amendment to Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., to the appellant's case and the cases of other convicted defendants in whose cases this court issued a certificate of judgment or whose time to file a direct appeal lapsed between July 31, 2000, and July 31, 2001, does not preclude the appellant or those other convicted defendants from seeking collateral review of their convictions. Accordingly, the appellant's arguments are without merit.
The appellant also argues that, even if Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., as amended, applies retroactively to his case, "the Alabama Supreme Court's July 1, 2002, Order extended the time for filing." (Appellant's brief at p. 17.) On July 1, 2002, the Alabama Supreme Court issued the following order:
Specifically, the appellant contends that "the Alabama Supreme Court effectively extended the implementation of the new rule governing the statute of limitations by adding one year to cases whose time for filing would otherwise lapse between August 1, 2001, and August 1, 2002." (Appellant's brief at p. 18.) Therefore, he concludes that, "because [his] time for filing his postconviction petition would otherwise lapse `during the period between August 1, 2001, and August 1, 2002,' [he] had `one year from August 1, 2002, within which to file a postconviction petition.'" (Appellant's brief at p. 18.) We disagree.
It appears that the appellant has misread the July order. That order makes reference to the time for filing an appeal — i.e., a direct appeal — lapsing, not to the time for filing a Rule 32 petition lapsing, between August 1, 2001, and August 1, 2002. Also, the appellant did appeal his conviction, and this court issued a certificate of judgment in his case on February 23, 2001, well before August 1, 2001, as referenced in the July order. Therefore, the July order did not extend the time in which the appellant was required to file his Rule 32 petition.
Finally, in a footnote, the appellant argues that retroactive application of Rule 32.2(c), Ala. R.Crim. P., as amended, to his petition violates his due process and equal protection rights. In Davis, ___ So.2d at ___, we addressed a similar argument as follows:
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...Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of West's Rule 32 petition on September 26, 2003. West v. State, 890 So.2d 205 (Ala.Civ.App.2003). On November 21, 2003, the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled West's application for rehearing. (Rule 32 C.R. Vol. 17, p. 16). ......
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