West v. Town of Winnsboro
| Decision Date | 06 November 1967 |
| Docket Number | No. 48584,48584 |
| Citation | 211 So.2d 665,252 La. 605 |
| Parties | Ed WEST, d/b/a Globe Foods, v. TOWN OF WINNSBORO, Louisiana. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
E. Rudolph McIntyre, Winnsboro, R. Gordon Kean, Jr., of Sanders, Miller, Downing & Kean, Baton Rouge, for defendant-appellant.
Robert B. Guerriero, Monroe, for plaintiff-appellee.
On December 19, 1966, the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the town of Winnsboro adopted an ordinance prohibiting the sale of food on Sundays in retail grocery stores having more than 1,600 square feet of enclosed space. The ordinance further provided that only those stores meeting the above restriction, which were owner-operated and employed no more than one employee, could open within the town on Sunday. Violators of the ordinance were, by its terms, to be fined not less than twenty-five dollars nor more than two hundred fifty dollars, or imprisoned for not less than ten days nor more than thirty days or both, for each offense. It was the expressed intent of the ordinance that only what it termed 'neighborhood groceries' should be allowed to open on Sundays.
After the ordinance was enacted, the Mayor advised plaintiff Ed West, the owner and operator of a large grocery store in Winnsboro, that the ordinance would be enforced, and all persons found violating the same would be arrested and punished in accordance with its provisions.
Therefore, on December 29, 1966 plaintiff, Ed West d/b/a Globe Foods, instituted suit in the District Court against the town of Winnsboro, its Mayor and Marshal for an injunction to restrain and enjoin the enforcement of the ordinance. He alleged that he was the owner and operator of a retail grocery store of more than 1,600 square feet of enclosed space and more than one employee, which had remained open on Sundays and every day of each week since it started business. The ordinance, plaintiff alleged, would compel him to either close and lose the $500 profit ordinarily earned on Sundays, or remain open and suffer arrest, fine and imprisonment.
Plaintiff based his suit for injunction on the proposition that the ordinance would cause him irreparable injury and would deprive him of the right to conduct his business on Sundays, and Sunday opening was essential to the life of the business. Plaintiff set forth, moreover, that no justification or public necessity existed for the restrictions imposed by the ordinance; that this unwarranted restriction on the use and enjoyment of his property is a deprivation of petitioner's property without due process of law contrary to the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Section 2 of [252 La. 611] Article I of the Constitution of the State of Louisiana. He alleged, moreover, that the classification established by the ordinance was arbitrary and discriminatory and, in fact, punitive in nature in that it is directed at large grocery stores like petitioner's while favoring smaller stores; that no public purpose is served by the classification and hence it is an abuse of legislative authority.
Defendants excepted, denying the jurisdiction of the court and plaintiff's right to enjoin the enforcement of a regulatory ordinance of a municipality or that plaintiff had a property right which was impaired by the ordinance. In its answer to plaintiff's petition defendants alleged the constitutionality of the ordinance and the classifications established by it because the classifications are related to the different effects large and small grocery stores have on the peace and quiet of the community on an established day of rest.
An affidavit of the Mayor and Town Marshal was attached to the answer setting forth that the ordinance was adopted for the purpose of regulating traffic and 'other activity' on Sundays. Closing large grocery stores on Sundays, they thought, would avoid the necessity for providing 'municipal services' and police protection which would not otherwise be required. The smaller stores were excluded from the Sunday closing, defendants say, because they did not cause traffic problems, and permitting small groceries to remain open would afford the residents of Winnsboro a means for obtaining necessary food on Sunday.
The judge of the District Court, in effect, declared the ordinance unconstitutional by enjoining its enforcement. The defendants have appealed.
On this appeal plaintiff does not question the right of the town of Winnsboro to enact a Sunday Closing Law; his position in justification of the District Court judgment is that such an ordinance cannot be enacted containing an unreasonable classification, which has no bearing upon public order, public morals or the public welfare and which is, in reality, an effort to eliminate competition and confer a preference on his competitors.
The assailed ordinance is a regulatory measure, enforceable by a penalty provision including fine and imprisonment. It is, therefore, criminal in nature. Thus the equity arm of civil courts have no jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of such ordinances by injunction. Le Blanc v. City of New Orleans, 138 La. 243, 70 So. 212 (1915). The enforcement of criminal laws belongs within the exclusive province of those tribunals created for that purpose. In this instance, the municipal court of Winnsboro would be the proper tribunal in the first instance to enforce or refuse to enforce the town's regulatory ordinances with criminal penalties.
An exception to the rule that the equity arm of a civil tribunal cannot be invoked to enjoin the enforcement of a criminal law is made where three conditions concur, to wit: (1) the invasion of a property right must be clearly shown, (2) the unconstitutionality or illegality of the ordinance must be manifest, and (3) the judge must be satisfied that the applicant is threatened with irreparable injury, against which the law, as administered in the courts vested with jurisdiction of the prosecution, affords no adequate remedy. If either of these conditions is lacking, the civil district court should not issue the writ. There is a long line of cases in this state to that effect. Olan Mills Inc., of Tennessee v. City of Bogalusa, 225 La. 648, 73 So.2d 791 (1954); Godfrey v. Ray, 169 La. 77, 124 So. 151 (1929); Osborne v. City of Shreveport, 143 La. 932, 79 So. 542, 3 A.L.R. 955 (1918); Le Blanc v. City of New Orleans, 138 La. 243, 70 So. 212 (1915); Louisiana Oyster & Fish Co. v. Police Jury, 126 La. 522, 52 So. 685 (1910); Mathews v. Town of Farmerville, 121 La. 313, 46 So. 339 (1908); Bonin v. Town of Jennings, 107 La. 410, 31 So. 866 (1901); State v. Crozier, 50 La.Ann. 245, 23 So. 288 (1898); LeCourt v. Gaster, 49 La.Ann. 487, 21 So. 646 (1897); Hottinger v. City of New Orleans, 42 La.Ann. 629, 8 So. 575 (1890); City of New Orleans v. Becker, 31 La.Ann. 644 (1879); Levy & Company v. City of Shreveport, 27 La.Ann. 620 (1875); Devron v. First Municipality, 4 La.Ann. 11 (1849); Baton Rouge Fireworks Co. v. Police Jury, 127 So.2d 54 (La.App.1961).
It is unnecessary to consider either the alleged unconstitutionality of the ordinance or whether its threatened enforcement results in the invasion of a property right. At the threshold of the case we are confronted with the proposition that an injunction should not issue to restrain the enforcement of a criminal law, unless the judge is satisfied that the applicant is threatened with irreparable injury, against which the law, as administered in the courts vested with jurisdiction of the prosecution, affords no adequate remedy.
As we have noted, the tribunal established by law to try violations of the municipal ordinances of Winnsboro is the municipal court of Winnsboro. La.R.S. 33:441. The issue here is not whether the contested ordinance is constitutional or not, the issue is whether the District Court should oust the municipal court of the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law to hear and determine the constitutionality of the ordinance in the first instance, when the District Court has no supervisory jurisdiction over the municipal court.
It cannot be assumed that the municipal court will fail to declare the ordinance unconstitutional if it is, in fact, unconstitutional. And plaintiff's remedy, instead of seeking an injunction in the District Court, is to file a motion to quash the affidavit filed against him and raise the constitutional issue when an attempt is made to prosecute him. If plaintiff's position is sound, and the ordinance is held unconstitutional, there is an end to the matter. However, in the event of an adverse judgment in the municipal court, resort can then be had to appellate remedies, if any, 1 and thereafter application to the Supreme Court for writs with stay orders, until a final decision is had on the constitutionality of the ordinance. 2 This remedy, we think, is adequate in the absence of extraordinary circumstances which would require that equity intercede. Those circumstances are not present here.
For the reasons assigned, the injunction is dissolved and the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside; plaintiff's suit is dismissed at his cost.
Because of the importance of this case to the administration of equitable remedies in Louisiana courts, we granted a rehearing to reconsider our holding that the district court could not enjoin the enforcement of a municipal Sunday Closing Ordinance imposing penalties for violation.
The facts may be restated briefly: On December 19, 1966, the Mayor and Board of Aldermen of the Town of Winnsboro adopted an ordinance prohibiting the sale of food on Sunday by retail groceries having more than 1600 square feet of sales space. The ordinance authorized small owner-operated groceries employing no more than one person to remain open. The ordinance imposed a penalty of a fine and/or imprisonment for each violation. 1
Plaintiff, Ed West, d/b/a...
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