State v. Alexander
| Decision Date | 25 March 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 48853,48853 |
| Citation | 211 So.2d 650,252 La. 564 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Russell ALEXANDER. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Marion W. Groner, New Iberia, Paul S. Daspit, Jr., Stephen Boulet, St. Martinville, for defendant-appellant.
Jack P. F. Gremillion, Atty. Gen., William P. Schuler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Knowles M. Tucker, Dist. Atty., Leon E. Roy, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
The Grand Jury of St. Martin Parish indicted Russell Alexander for the murder of Mrs. Aline Bulliard Carter. Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty and the court fixed a time for filing pleas and motions. The defendant filed motions to quash the indictment and for a change of venue, based upon the allegation that widespread prejudice existed against him in St. Martin Parish. After hearing, the trial judge took the motion to quash 'under advisement' but granted a change of venue to St. Mary Parish in the same judicial district. Several months later, acting in the St. Mary Parish proceeding, the trial judge 1 quashed the indictment.
The defendant was then reindicted by the Grand Jury of St. Mary Parish for the same offense. After trial, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The defendant filed a motion in arrest of judgment based upon the ground that the indictment returned by the St. Mary Parish Grand Jury was void. After overruling the motion, the court sentenced the defendant to death. The defendant has appealed, relying upon seven bills of exceptions reserved in the trial court.
On August 27, 1965, Mrs. Aline Bullard Carter was missing from her home at St. Martinville, Louisiana. The Sheriff and his deputies found the house in disarray with blood stains on the floor. Suspicion attached to a 24-year-old Negro, Russell Alexander, a sexual deviate of low mentality. After being interrogated by the police officers in the presence of his mother, he admitted he killed Mrs. Carter with a hammer at her home and disposed of her body. He then led the officers to the body.
The defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 1 to the introduction in evidence of his written confession. Defendant contends the confession was involuntary because of physical mistreatment, consisting of beating and denial of food, a promise by Deputy Sheriff Roy Bonvillain to 'hlep' the defendant, and an exhortation to defendant by his mother to tell the truth.
To render a confession admissible in a criminal prosecution, the burden is upon the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it was free and voluntary. State v. Ragsdale, 249 La. 420, 187 So.2d 427, cert. denied 385 U.S. 1029, 87 S.Ct. 758, 17 L.Ed.2d 676; State v. Scott, 243 La. 1, 141 So.2d 389.
The trial judge analyzed the evidence relating to the confession and concluded defendant's charges of physical mistreatment and coercion were unfounded and the state had satisfied the burden of proof. We agree with the findings of the trial judge.
It is true defendant's mother exhorted him to tell the truth prior to his confession. She was present while the Deputy Bonvillain talked to her son. The evidence, however, refutes any suggestion of intimidation or coercion. Under the circumstances, the mother's exhortation does not render the confession involuntary. See State v. McAllister, 244 La. 42, 150 So.2d 557, cert. denied 375 U.S. 260, 84 S.Ct. 362, 11 L.Ed.2d 311; and State v. Bueche, 243 La. 160, 142 So.2d 381.
In this Court, the defendant also contends the confession is inadmissible because of the officers' failure to give defendant the fourfold warning required by Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on June 13, 1966. The Bill of Exceptions makes no mention of the lack of warning. But assuming that the issue is raised by the general averments, we find the contention lacks merit.
Trial of the present case began on March 14, 1966, before the Miranda decision. Hence, since the holding is not retroactive, it is unavailable to the defendant. See Johnson v. State of New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882; State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135, cert. denied 388 U.S. 923, 87 S.Ct. 2144, 18 L.Ed.2d 1374; and State v. Evans, 249 La. 861, 192 So.2d 103, cert. denied 389 U.S. 887, 88 S.Ct. 110, 19 L.Ed.2d 187.
The evidence reflects, however, that before defendant made his written confession he was advised that he had a right to remain silent, that anything he said would be used against him, and that he was entitled to a lawyer.
We conclude the Bill of Exceptions is without merit.
Defendant reserved these four Bills to the introduction into evidence of a hammer, several articles of women's clothing, pieces of telephone wire, and two photographs of the body of the deceased. Defendant objected to this evidence on the ground it was irrelevant and tended to inflame the minds of the jurors.
During the investigation, defendant told the officers he struck the victim with a hammer and disposed of the hammer near the place he had left the body. The officers found the hammer at this location.
The garments bearing blood stains were also found near the victim's body. Garments of this type were missing from the body.
Defendant stated he cut the telephone wires at the home of the victim when she attempted to call for help. The State introduced two pieces of the wire in evidence.
The hammer, garments, and wires were relevant. The defendant allegedly used the hammer to strike the fatal blows. Each of the other objects was closely connected with the crime. This State laid a sufficient foundation for the introduction of the objects. The jury, of course, determined the weight to be accorded to them.
The photographs are also relevant. They tended to establish the death and identity of the victim. Additionally, they tended to corroborate other evidence that the killing occurred in the perpetration of of aggravated rape for application of the felony-murder doctrine, as defined in LSA-R.S. 14:30, on which the indictment was founded.
In State v. Morris, 245 La. 475, 157 So.2d 728, we summarized the law relating to the use of photographs as follows:
'(W)e have on numerous occasions stated that the mere fact that photographs are gruesome and tend to prejudice the jury does not render them inadmissible in evidence if they are otherwise admissible. See State v. Johnson, 198 La. 195, 3 So.2d 556, State v. Ross, 217 La. 837, 47 So.2d 559, State v. Solomon, 222 La. 269, 62 So.2d 481, State v. Eubanks, 240 La. 552, 124 So.2d 543, and State v. Collins, 242 La. 704, 138 So.2d 546. We think, however, that this rule is subject to the reservation noted in the vast majority of the common law jurisdictions and expressed in 23 C.J.S. 353, verbo Criminal Law § 852 (1) c:
We have examined the photographs. Although any photograph of human death is unpleasant and revolting, the present photographs are not unduly gruesome. As pointed out by the trial judge, the camera distance was such as to minimize the gruesome aspects of the scene. Applying the test laid down in the foregoing decision, we conclude the probative value of the photographs greatly outweighs any probable prejudicial effect.
The Bills of Exceptions lack merit.
The defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 6 after the trial judge ruled that defense witness Frank W. Krevanick, an unlicensed practicing psychologist, was unqualified to testify as an expert as to the sanity of the defendant at the time of the crime. The court permitted the witness to testify concerning the psychological tests he had given the defendant and to other facts within his special competence.
LSA-R.S. 15:466 provides:
'The test of the competency of an expert is his knowledge of the subject about which he is called upon to express an opinion, and before any witness can give evidence as an expert his competency so to testify must have been established to the satisfaction of the court.'
The competency of an expert is a question of fact. The trial judge has wide discretion in passing upon the qualifications of such a witness. On appeal, his ruling will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest error. State v. Smith, 231 La. 649, 92 So.2d 569; State v. Mills, 229 La. 758, 86 So.2d 895, cert. denied Vernaci v. State of Louisiana, 352 U.S. 834, 77 S.Ct. 51, 1 L.Ed.2d 53; State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So.2d 496; State v. Carter, 217 La. 547, 46 So.2d 897.
The witness possessed no qualification as a psychiatrist. Under the circumstances shown, we find no manifest error in the ruling of the trial judge.
Defendant reserved Bill of Exceptions No. 7 to the overruling of his motion in arrest of judgment based upon the nullity of the indictment by the Grand Jury of St. Mary Parish. The defendant contends that, despite the change of venue,...
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