Westchester County v. Koch

• Decision Date: 29 April 1981
• Citation: 108 Misc.2d 764,438 N.Y.S.2d 951
• Parties: COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, Alfred B. Del Bello, as County Executive of the County of Westchester; and Leonard N. Spano, as County Legislator of the County of Westchester, Plaintiffs, v. Edward I. KOCH, as Mayor of the City of New York; the City of New York; the New York City Transit Authority; the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority; and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 951

438 N.Y.S.2d 951

108 Misc.2d 764

COUNTY OF WESTCHESTER, Alfred B. Del Bello, as County Executive of the County of Westchester; and Leonard N. Spano, as County Legislator of the County of Westchester, Plaintiffs, v. Edward I. KOCH, as Mayor of the City of New York; the City of New York; the New York City Transit Authority; the Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, Defendants.

Supreme Court, Special Term,

New York County, Part I.

April 29, 1981.

Samuel S. Yasgur, Westchester County Atty., White Plains, for plaintiffs.

Allen G. Schwartz, Corp. Counsel, New York City, for defendants City of New York and Mayor Koch.

Joan Offner, Brooklyn, for defendants New York City Transit Authority, Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority and Metropolitan Transportation Authority.

ARNOLD GUY FRAIMAN, Justice:

Motions number 85 and 86 on the calendar of February 4, 1981 are consolidated for disposition. This action for declaratory judgment and permanent injunction concerns New York City's policy of limiting half-fair privileges on its mass transit system during non-peak hours to the elderly who are residents of the City. Defendants are the New York City Transit Authority, Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority and Metropolitan Transportation Authority ("the Authorities"), and Mayor Koch and the City of New York. Plaintiffs, County of Westchester, Alfred Del Bello, County Executive, and Leonard Spano, a county legislator, seek a declaration that this policy is unlawful in that it denies similar benefits to elderly residents of Westchester County.

By motion number 86 the City and Mayor Koch move to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(3) and (7). By motion number 85 the Authorities move for summary judgment pursuant to CPLR 3212. Plaintiffs cross-move for summary judgment.

The half-fare policy for elderly New York City residents was instituted on July 1, 1969 pursuant to section 1203-a, subdivision 7, and section 1205, subdivision 2, of the Public Authorities Law. These authorize the Authorities, upon the request of the Mayor, to permit reduced fares for one or more classes of users, provided the City agrees to assume the resulting differential in revenues. The policy has continued since 1969, and in calendar year 1980 the City paid the Authorities $13.8 million to subsidize the program.

Plaintiffs contend that the restriction of half-fare benefits to New York City residents violates the Urban Mass Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq., and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

As a threshold issue, defendant contend that plaintiffs lack standing to commence the action because they have failed to show that they are aggrieved by the challenged policy. This contention is without merit. Plaintiffs premise their capacity to sue on section 109 of the Public Service Law, which provides that "municipal corporation shall have the right to appear as a party before ... any court in any action or proceeding involving rates, service or other matters affecting the municipal corporation or any of its residents." Section 109 was enacted in 1933 when the Public Service Commission possessed jurisdiction over rates and services of all transit systems within the state. Although the Authorities, created pursuant to the Public Authorities Law, now have jurisdiction and supervision over New York City's mass transit facilities, it has been held that the provisions of the Public Authorities Law which divest the Public Service Commission of jurisdiction do not abolish the right of a municipal corporation pursuant to section 109 to appear before a court in an action involving rates affecting its residents. Matter of County of Nassau v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 57 Misc.2d 1025, 293 N.Y.S.2d 1017 (Sup.Ct., Nassau Co. 1968), aff'd., 32 A.D.2d 647, 301 N.Y.S.2d 432 (2nd Dept. 1969); County of Rens. v. Capitol Dist. Transp., 71 Misc.2d 428, 336 N.Y.S.2d 382 (Sup.Ct., Rensselaer Co. 1972), rev. on other grds. 42 A.D.2d 445, 349 N.Y.S.2d 20 (3rd Dept. 1973).

Nor is there any basis to limit a municipality's standing pursuant to section 109, as defendants urge, to actions involving transit facilities operating within the municipality itself. The language of section 109 is expansive, granting standing before "any court in any action", the only operative limitation being that the matter at issue must affect either the municipal corporation or "any of its residents". While the court has no statistics at hand, the number of Westchester County residents who use the City's mass transit facilities is obviously significant. Thus, the rates charged by the Authorities clearly affect that county's residents, and plaintiffs accordingly have standing pursuant to section 109 to maintain the instant action.

Defendants' contention that the issues raised in the complaint are nonjusticiable is also without merit. While courts refrain from judicial inquiry where questions of "broad legislative and administrative policy beyond the scope of judicial correction" are presented Jones v. Beame, 45 N.Y.2d 402, 408, 408 N.Y.S.2d 449, 380 N.E.2d 277 (1978), the instant challenge, asserting as it does that the policy of the Authorities violates both federal statute and plaintiffs' equal protection rights, presents issues appropriate for judicial determination and relief. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 929 (2d Cir. 1968).

We turn now to the issues raised by plaintiffs' contention that denial of half-fare benefits on the City's mass transit facilities to otherwise eligible Westchester County residents violates the provisions of the Urban Mass Transportation Act ("the Act") and regulations promulgated thereunder. Section 5 of the Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 1604) authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to issue grants to local mass transit agencies to finance the acquisition and improvement of transit facilities and equipment and the payment of operating expenses. Subdivision (m) of that section provides that the Secretary shall not approve any project thereunder, "unless the applicant agrees and gives satisfactory assurances, in such manner and form as may be required by the Secretary and in accordance with such terms and conditions as the Secretary may prescribe", that the fares charged elderly and handicapped riders during non-peak hours will not be more than half the normal peak-hour fares.

Plaintiffs allege that pursuant to subdivision (m) the Secretary has promulgated guidelines which provide that place of residence cannot be used as a basis to determine which elderly riders are entitled to half-fare rates, and that the Authorities, by restricting half-fare eligibility to residents of New York City, are acting in derogation of these guidelines. Defendants, while denying that they are violating the Secretary's guidelines, contend that plaintiffs do not have a private right of action to enforce the terms of Section 5 of the Act or any guidelines promulgated thereunder.

Section 1608(e) of the Act authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to initiate an action to require compliance with assurances made to it by a recipient of federal funds in connection with its grant application. However, neither the Act itself nor applicable regulations under section 5...