Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. Crume

Citation223 Ky. 707
PartiesWestchester Fire Insurance Company v. Crume.
Decision Date23 March 1928
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (Kentucky)

4. Appeal and Error. — Where there is no avowal as to what answer witness would make if he had been permitted to answer question, alleged error in sustaining objection to question cannot be reviewed.

Appeal from Nelson Circuit Court.

FRANK M. DRAKE and FULTON & FULTON for appellant.

OSSO W. STANLEY for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE WILLIS.

Affirming.

W.E. Crume sued the Westchester Fire Insurance Company upon a fire insurance policy to recover $800 for the loss of the insured property. The insurance Company interposed as a defense the violation of a condition subsequent contained in the policy to the effect that it should be void if the building be vacant or unoccupied for a period of ten days. Plaintiff denied any breach of the condition. A trial by jury resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff for the sum claimed. There is no complaint of the instructions. The only questions raised upon this appeal by the company are whether the court should have instructed the jury to find for the defendant, and whether the court should have permitted plaintiff to answer certain questions propounded to him upon cross-examination.

The validity of the condition respecting the vacancy of the property for a period of ten days is admitted (Thomas v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 56 S.W. 264 21 Ky. Law Rep. 1139); but it is insisted it was not violated in this instance.

The defendant asked and was awarded the burden of proof. It introduced only two witnesses, one of whom lived about a half mile from the insured property, but not in sight of it. He had not seen the property for a year before the fire, and did not know whether it was occupied or vacant. In answer to a direct question whether any one lived at the place at the time of the fire he answered that he did not know, because he had not been around there. He knew a man named Hinton and another named Shoemaker, both of whom had lived in the house that was destroyed by fire. He had heard of the fire, but had no occasion to go about the property or near it in passing to or from his home.

The other witness lived about the same distance from the property destroyed by fire and could see it in the winter when the leaves were off the trees, but in the summer, when the fire occurred, the dwelling could not be seen from where she resided. She stated that at the time of the fire she did not know whether or not any one was living in the house. She stated that Hinton and Shoemaker had formerly lived there. The road to her house does not go near the house that was burned, and she had not observed whether anybody lived in it or not. In response to the inquiry whether anybody had lived in that house within six months before the fire, she stated that she did not know, but thought so. This is all the testimony for the defendant. It is clear that such testimony wholly failed to establish that the house was vacant or unoccupied when it was destroyed by the fire.

The plaintiff is a practicing physician, 79 years old, residing in Bardstown, and for many years had owned a farm of 59 acres, on which the insured house was situated. It was located in a remote part of Nelson county, and he had...

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