Westergren v. Hous. Pilots Ass'n
| Decision Date | 07 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-17-00046-CV,14-17-00046-CV |
| Citation | 566 S.W.3d 7 |
| Parties | Gordon WESTERGREN, Sandy Westergren, Richard Helmle, Carole Helmle, Chris Miller, Kimberly Miller, Peter Sundt, and Brian Johnson, Appellants v. HOUSTON PILOTS ASSOCIATION, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
David Earl James, Mark Freeman, Beaumont, TX, for Appellee.
Mark C. Sparks, Michael A. Downey II, Houston, TX, for Appellant.
Panel consists of Chief Justice Frost and Justices Busby and Wise.
In this appeal from a summary judgment, we address whether appellee Houston Pilots Association is entitled to immunity from liability under federal maritime law or Texas statutory law for claims arising from the collision of two vessels on the Houston Ship Channel. At the time of the collision, two members of Houston Pilots were piloting the vessels in heavy fog near Morgan’s Point. Appellants, homeowners living near the site, allege that the collision released 88,200 gallons of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), causing environmental damage to their property and sickening two of them. Appellants contend that Houston Pilots' alleged negligence was a cause of the collision because the association failed to train and supervise the pilots, and it undertook to implement navigation standards but failed to do so.
The Houston Pilots Licensing and Regulatory Act provides that a pilot is not liable, either directly or as a member of an organization of pilots, for any claim that (1) arises from an act or omission of another pilot or organization of pilots, and (2) relates directly or indirectly to pilot services. Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 66.082 (West 2011). We conclude that section 66.082, rather than federal maritime law, governs the claims asserted by appellants and provides Houston Pilots immunity from liability. We therefore affirm the trial court’s summary judgment.
The Houston Ship Channel stretches approximately 55 nautical miles from the sea buoy offshore Galveston to the turning basin at the Port of Houston. The main channel is 530 feet wide. Maneuvering vessels in and out of the ship channel requires special expertise and knowledge due to the channel’s size and the number of vessels traversing its waterways. Houston Pilots1 is an association that provides compulsory pilots to guide vessels in and out of the ship channel.2 The job of a Houston pilot is to bring the vessel from the sea to the dock, or vice versa, as safely as possible.3
On March 9, 2015, Captain Larry Evans piloted the M/T Carla Maersk outbound, while Captain George Reeser piloted the M/V Conti Peridot inbound up the ship channel. When heavy fog rolled in and reduced visibility significantly, Houston Pilots suspended pilot boardings of inbound ships. But vessels already under way, like the Carla Maersk and the Conti Peridot , continued on. As the Carla Maersk and the Conti Peridot neared each other just south of Morgan’s Point, the Conti Peridot crossed the channel into the path of the Carla Maersk and the two collided. As a result of the collision, MTBE spilled from the cargo of the Carla Maersk. Appellants (the Homeowners) contend that the spill reached their properties, requiring a significant amount of remediation and causing personal injury to two of them.
The Homeowners sued Houston Pilots and others, asserting claims under Texas law for negligence, gross negligence, negligent trespass, and private nuisance.4 With regard to Houston Pilots, the Homeowners alleged that the association was negligent in multiple respects that caused the collision, including that it negligently failed to develop and promulgate navigational standards in the ship channel and failed to train and supervise the individual pilots navigating the vessels.
Houston Pilots moved for traditional summary judgment on two grounds. First, it contended that under federal maritime law as set forth in Guy v. Donald , 203 U.S. 399, 27 S.Ct. 63, 51 L.Ed. 245 (1906) and its progeny, pilot associations are immune from vicarious liability or direct liability related to the alleged negligence of its pilots. Second, Houston Pilots argued that as an unincorporated association of independent contractor pilots, it has no legal existence separate from its individual pilots. As a result, any judgment against it for its own negligence would in effect be a judgment against the individual pilots jointly and severally, triggering the immunity the Legislature provided to pilots in section 66.082 of the Transportation Code.
The Homeowners responded to the motion, arguing that the rule set forth in Guy v. Donald and its progeny did not insulate Houston Pilots from liability for its own direct negligence. The Homeowners further argued that section 66.082 did not provide immunity because a fact issue exists regarding whether Houston Pilots is an unincorporated association or a general partnership under Texas law. Each side raised objections to the other side’s evidence, though the trial court did not rule on the objections. The trial court granted Houston Pilots' motion without stating the grounds for its decision. The trial court then severed the claims against Houston Pilots, making the summary judgment final. This appeal followed.
The Homeowners raise two issues on appeal: (1) whether Texas law provides complete immunity to pilot associations for the direct negligence of the organization itself; and (2) whether a genuine issue of material fact exists as to Houston Pilots' status as a partnership under Texas law and, if so, whether Houston Pilots may be held vicariously liable for the actions of its member pilots. We address these issues together.
We review a trial court’s order granting a traditional summary judgment de novo. Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett , 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005) ; Mayer v. Willowbrook Plaza Ltd. P’ship , 278 S.W.3d 901, 908 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). If the trial court grants summary judgment without specifying the grounds, we affirm the judgment if any of the grounds presented are meritorious. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis , 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001). We take as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving all doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. Dias v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P. , 214 S.W.3d 672, 675 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
To prevail on a traditional motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). To be entitled to traditional summary judgment, the defendant must conclusively negate at least one element of each of the plaintiff’s causes of action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Dias , 214 S.W.3d at 676. Once the defendant establishes its right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to present evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
In this case, Houston Pilots moved for summary judgment on its affirmative defense of immunity from liability. To establish its right to summary judgment on its affirmative defense, Houston Pilots bore the burden of pleading and conclusively establishing each element of its immunity defense. See Haver v. Coats , 491 S.W.3d 877, 881, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.). As noted above, in support of its motion for summary judgment, Houston Pilots cited two bases for immunity: the federal rule of Guy v. Donald , 203 U.S. 399, 27 S.Ct. 63, 51 L.Ed. 245 (1906), and section 66.082 of the Texas Transportation Code. We begin by explaining each source of immunity and then address which rule is relevant here.
In Guy v. Donald , the Supreme Court of the United States established a general rule that pilot associations and member pilots are immune from vicarious liability under federal maritime law for negligent acts or omissions by other member pilots. 203 U.S. at 404, 27 S.Ct. 63 ; see also Dampskibsselskabet Atalanta A/S v. United States , 31 F.2d 961, 962 (5th Cir. 1929). In Dampskibsselskabet Atalanta , the Fifth Circuit explained the rationale for this rule:
The fundamental principle underlying the exemption of pilots' associations from liability for negligence of their members in performing their duties as pilots is that the association exercises no control over the manner in which those duties are to be performed, and therefore a pilot cannot be said to be an agent of the association in that respect.
31 F.2d at 962. Courts have long applied the Guy rule to afford immunity from liability to pilot associations.5 Even if an association has the ability to select, discharge, and discipline its members, this general control over a pilot does not defeat the Guy rule. "To be liable, the association must control the pilot’s actions while [the pilot is] discharging his professional duties onboard the vessel." In re J.W. Westcott Co. , 333 F.Supp.2d 604, 606 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
The Texas Legislature has likewise provided immunity for claims relating to pilot services along the Houston Ship Channel, though the contours of this immunity differ from the Guy rule. The Houston Pilots Licensing and Regulatory Act provides:
Tex. Transp. Code § 66.082.6 The Act defines pilot services as "acts of a pilot in conducting a vessel through the navigable water in this state and the ports in which the pilot is licensed or...
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