Western Land Association of Minnesota v. Banks
| Decision Date | 26 June 1900 |
| Docket Number | 12,009 - (116) |
| Citation | 83 N.W. 192,80 Minn. 317 |
| Parties | WESTERN LAND ASSOCIATION OF MINNESOTA v. CHARLES A. BANKS and Others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action of ejectment in the district court for St. Louis county. The case was tried before Cant, J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of defendants. From a judgment entered pursuant to the verdict, plaintiff appealed. Reversed.
Estoppel in Pais.
An estoppel in pais arises when one, by his conduct or representations, induces another to believe certain facts with reference to a transaction between them to exist, and such other person, having the right to do so, relies and acts thereon, and in the belief that such representations are true, and to such an extent that to permit a denial of the truth of the facts would prejudice him.
Estoppel in Pais -- Knowledge of Opposite Party.
To constitute such an estoppel, such representations must be with reference to facts material to the transaction, and not within the knowledge of the opposite party. If the party to whom the representations are made has equal knowledge as to the truth thereof, he cannot rightfully rely thereon.
Estoppel -- When not Applicable.
The doctrine of estoppel has no application in cases where the representations which are claimed to give rise to it tend only to induce the party to do some act he is already legally bound to do.
Contract to Buy Land -- Signature of Vendee Unnecessary.
The vendee in a contract for the purchase of land need not sign the same to give it validity. Yeager v. Kelsey, 46 Minn. 402, overruled on this point.
Fryberger & Johanson, for appellant.
Roger S. Powell, for respondents.
Action in ejectment. Defendants had judgment in the court below, and plaintiff appeals.
The facts are, in brief, as follows: During the year 1874, and prior thereto, plaintiff was the owner of a tract of land in the city of Duluth, and on July 7 of that year caused the same to be platted and laid out into lots and blocks as Industrial Division of Duluth, which plat was in all things properly made and executed, and filed in the office of the register of deeds of St. Louis county. Prior to so platting said land, said plaintiff had duly conveyed to the Lake Superior & Mississippi Railroad Company a strip of land over and across the same for right of way purposes, and said company had constructed its railroad track thereon, and was in the actual and open possession thereof, at the time of the conveyance to defendant to be presently mentioned. Said plat was made and lots laid out with reference to said railroad right of way, the lot so conveyed to defendant being bounded thereby on the southeast. The railroad track was constructed upon and extended along St. Croix avenue until it reached said lot, when it diverged from a direct line, and passed upon what would have been included in the lot had the railroad track continued upon the avenue. By reason of this divergence of the road from the street to and upon the adjacent land, said railroad right of way was between said lot and the avenue.
In July, 1884, plaintiff and defendant Sarah H. Banks entered into a written contract by the terms of which plaintiff agreed to sell and convey to said defendant the south 50 feet of lot 16 of block 7 in said Industrial Division of Duluth the same being the tract of land so lying adjacent to, and northwesterly from, said railroad right of way. The description of said lot as contained in said contract is as follows: "All that part of lot 16 in block 7 in the Industrial Division of Duluth, according to the recorded plat thereof, that lies south," etc. Said defendant subsequently paid the purchase price as required by the terms of said contract, and said plaintiff duly conveyed the said lot to her, the deed of conveyance containing the description of the property as before set out and making the same reference to the recorded plat. In addition to this, defendant well knew and understood that said right of way was between said lot and said avenue. Since the conveyance of said lot to defendant the right of way of said railroad has been abandoned, the track taken up and removed therefrom, and the title thereto reconveyed to plaintiff. The tract of land involved in this action is the strip so conveyed to the railroad company as right of way, and so lying between said lot sold to defendant and said avenue.
Plaintiff claims the ownership thereof by purchase from the railroad company, and defendant Sarah H. Banks claims it upon the grounds of estoppel. She contends that as to her plaintiff is estopped from asserting title thereto. This claim arises out of the following facts: Some two months after making said contract for the purchase of the lot said defendant learned that some other person was laying claim thereto, and she called upon one Mendenhall, who was the agent of plaintiff, and with whom she had made the contract, to ascertain the facts with respect to such claim. It is her contention at this time that Mendenhall then represented to her, and induced her to believe, that the line of the lot so contracted to be sold to her would extend to the street or avenue as soon as the railroad track should be removed, and that it was then expected that the same would be removed within a year or two. She claims to have relied upon such representations in completing the purchase of the lot, and it is insisted in her behalf that plaintiff is now estopped from asserting title thereto as against her. Some other evidence and facts which she claims corroborate her contention are found in the record, but it is not necessary specially to refer thereto. We have stated all the controlling facts. That the plaintiff has the legal title to the land in question is not disputed, and it is conceded that plaintiff is entitled to judgment unless estopped from asserting such title as against this defendant. So the only question to determine is whether the evidence makes out a case of estoppel.
An estoppel in pais, in so far as applicable to this case, may be said to arise when one, by his conduct and representations, induces another to believe certain facts with reference to a transaction between them to exist, and...
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