Western Pennsylvania R.R. Co.'s Appeal

• Decision Date: 02 January 1882
• Citation: 99 Pa. 155
• Parties: Appeal of the Western Pennsylvania Railroad Company.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

99 Pa. 155

Appeal of the Western Pennsylvania Railroad Company.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 10, 1881.

January 2, 1882.

November 10th 1881.

Before SHARSWOOD, C.J., MERCUR, PAXSON, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ. GORDON and GREEN, JJ., absent

APPEAL from the Court of Common Pleas No. 2, of Allegheny county: Of October and November Term 1881, No. 290.

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Hampton and Dalzell, for the appellant.—The appellee having accepted the provisions of the ordinance of 1877, the same constituted a contract between the appellee and the city, fixing and establishing the western terminus of the railroad at Sandusky street: Birmingham Pass. Ry. Co. v. Borough of Birmingham, 1 P. F. Smith 41.

Moreover, when the appellee entered into this contract, the same was complete and binding upon it, and its power to establish a new terminus was gone: Com. Dig. tit. Election, C. 2; Rol. Abr. 426, I. 15; State v. Norwalk & D. Turnpike Co., 10 Conn. 157; L. & N. B. Turnpike Co. 2 Swan (Tenn.) 282; Mason v. Brooklyn City &. N. R. Co., 35 Barb. 373.

A railroad company must accurately define in the first instance its termini. This is undoubtedly true in relation to roads: Road in Lower Merion, 8 P. F. Smith 66; Bean's Road, 11 Casey 280; Road in Lower Salford, 1 Casey 524.

The same principle applies with greater force to railroad companies that act independently of courts in locating their lines and establishing termini.

The proposed road could not be built as an extension of the old road. Although a railroad company may use some discretion in constructing its railroad, it cannot, after the road is located, make a relocation or abandon a route once adopted for a more eligible one, or use this power for making an extension: Peavey v. Calais R. R. Co., 30 Maine 498; Morris and Essex R. R. Co. v. Central Railroad Company, 2 Vroom 205; Moorehead v. Little Miami R. R. Co., 17 Ohio 340; Bruning v. N. O. C. and B. Co., 12 La. An. 541.

Nor can it be built as a branch or lateral road under the Acts of 1849 or 1868. Both of these acts clearly authorize branches from the main line between the termini, not prolongations of such main line beyond the termini.

The ordinance of 1880 cannot be claimed to authorize the proposed extension under the provisions of the Act of June 9th 1874, Pamph. L. 282. The intention of that Act was to authorize municipalities to contract with railroad companies as to the relocation of roads already within the city limits and not as to extensions or branches.

A. M. Brown, for the appellee.—The construction of the proposed road was clearly within the branching power conferred by the Act of April 4th 1868, § 9, Pamph. L. 62; Getz's Appeal, 10 W. N. C. 453; Mayor, etc., of Pittsburgh v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 12 Wright 355. But further, it is authorized by the ordinance of 1880. The Act of June 9th 1874, Pamph. L. 282, granted full authority to the municipality in the premises: Duncan v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 7 W. N. C. 551.

Railroad companies are incorporated, not for the promotion of mere private ends, but in view of the public good they may subserve: Marsh v. Fairbury R. R. Co., 14 A. L. Reg. 561. The location of a depot has much to do with the accommodation of the public, and a court of equity will not compel a railroad company to permanently locate its depot at a particular spot, in order to subserve the private advantage of an individual: Marsh v. F. P. & N. W. R'y Co., 12 A. L. Reg. 390. A charter fixing the terminus of a road at or near a certain point gives the company a large discretion, which will only be interfered with where it has clearly exceeded its limits or acted in bad faith: Fall River Iron Works Co. v. Old Colony R. R. Co., 2 A. L. Reg. 699; Parke's Appeal, 14 P. F. Smith 137.

A corporation, by its delegated power of eminent domain, may take the property of another corporation, upon making compensation: 1 Redfield on Railways, part III., § 61, par. 1, 4, 10; Vermont v. Boston, C. & M. Railroad, 25 Vermont 433; Phila. and Reading R. R. Co. v. Philadelphia, 11 Wright 329; Com. v. Pa. Canal Co., 16 P. F. Smith 47; In re Towanda Bridge Co., 10 Norris, 216; Constitution of Penn'a, art. 1, § 10, and art. 16, § 3; Illinois Central R'y Co. v. United States, 20 Law Rep. 630.

Mr. Justice STERRETT delivered the opinion of the court, January 2d 1882.

The right of the Pittsburgh and Western Railroad Company, under its charter and ordinances of the city of Allegheny, to locate and construct its railroad along the Allegheny and Ohio rivers, within said city, from the eastern to the western boundary thereof, has been so conclusively shown by the learned master in his able and exhaustive report, that it is unnecessary to add anything to the reasons given or authorities cited in support of that conclusion.

The Pittsburgh, New Castle and Lake Erie Railroad Company, which was succeeded in title by the appellee, was incorporated in September 1877, under the provisions of the act of April 4th 1868, and its supplements, with power to construct a narrow guage railroad from Allegheny city to the village of Wurtemburg, in Lawrence county, Pa. The company, immediately after its organization, commenced the work of construction, obtained from the city of Allegheny the right of way for a single or double tract "along the bank of the Allegheny river, or upon River avenue from the eastern terminus of the city to the east line of Sandusky street;" and in less than two years had completed the greater part of its road outside the city limits. In August 1879, all its property, rights, franchises, &c., were sold by the sheriff and duly conveyed to the purchasers, who associated themselves as the Pittsburgh and Western Railroad Company, by which name they were incorporated in October of that year. The new company, having thus succeeded to all the property, rights and franchises of the Pittsburgh, New Castle and Lake Erie Railroad Company, took possession of the road and proceeded to complete the same. In the early part of January 1880, that portion thereof between the eastern line of Sandusky street and the borough of Etna was opened for trade and travel.

The main contention of appellant was that the Pittsburgh and Western Railroad Company has no authority to extend its road west of the eastern line of Sandusky street, because its predecessor in title had located, marked and determined the route of the road, and by accepting the ordinance granting the right of way to the east line of Sandusky street had selected and finally fixed that point as its western terminus; and also, because the appellee, after acquiring title, had completed the road to that point, purchased property, and established its terminal depot there. On the other hand, it was contended that the western terminus of the road had never been definitely settled either by the original company or its successor; that it had always been the fixed purpose of both companies, while they respectively owned and controlled the road, to reach the western boundary of Allegheny city, as soon as the necessary consent thereto of the city councils could be obtained. After a careful consideration of the evidence bearing on this subject, the learned master found in favor of the appellee; and in this we think he was clearly right. Without referring specially to the grounds on which his conclusions are based, it is sufficient to say that they are entirely satisfactory. The power to locate and establish the western terminus of the road in Allegheny city had not been exhausted by any act of appellant or its predecessor;...