Western Railroad Co. v. De Graff

• Decision Date: 12 July 1880
• Parties: WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY OF MINNESOTA <I>vs.</I> CHARLES A. DE GRAFF and others.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 1

27 Minn. 1

WESTERN RAILROAD COMPANY OF MINNESOTA vs. CHARLES A. DE GRAFF and others.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 12, 1880.

By various acts of congress, an extensive land grant was made to the territory and state of Minnesota to aid in the construction of a line of railroad from Watab to Brainerd and a line from St. Cloud to St. Vincent, the acts providing that the lands so granted should be earned by construction of such lines, and should be exclusively applied in the construction of the lines for which they were granted, and should be subject to the disposal of the legislature for that purpose and for no other. By various acts of the legislature of the state and proceedings thereunder, those land grants became vested in the St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Company, which was required, both by the acts of congress and of the legislature, to complete each line within a time specified, under penalty of forfeiture of the lands granted for such line. That company constructed a portion of the line from St. Cloud to St. Vincent, (known as the St. Vincent Extension,) and a very small portion of the line from Watab to Brainerd, (known as the Brainerd Branch,) and in the fall of 1872 suspended the work of construction, leaving a large amount due to various contractors and subcontractors for work and material, most of which had been furnished for the St. Vincent Extension. The company not having resumed the work of construction, and the time limited for completion of the lines having long since elapsed, the legislature passed an act, approved March 1, 1877, entitled "An act to provide for the completion of the lines of railroad, commonly known as the St. Paul & Pacific Extension Lines." Sp. Laws 1877, c. 201. By this act the rights, franchises, land grant, etc., of the St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., appertaining to the Brainerd Branch, were declared forfeited to the state, and regranted, "upon the terms and conditions as in this act provided," to any company, organized or to be organized, which should file with the governor a written notice of its desire and intention, under and subject to the provisions of the act, to complete, maintain and operate such uncompleted line. After providing that any such company, acting under and pursuant to the provisions of the act, should become entitled to and invested with all the rights, franchises, land and property of the St. Paul & Pacific Company, appertaining to the forfeited line, "subject however to the exceptions, limitations, terms and conditions hereinafter mentioned," the act proceeded, in section 9, (which is quoted at length in the opinion,) to set apart one-half of all the lands up to 200,000 acres which should be first acquired on account of the construction of the Brainerd Branch, and one-half of all the lands up to 400,000 acres which should be first acquired on account of that part of the uncompleted St. Vincent Extension between Crookston and St. Vincent, to be reserved and retained by the state to be used by it for the payment of the claims incurred for work and material already furnished in the construction of such lines, statements of which had been filed in the state auditor's office in accordance with previous legislation. The same section further provided that the governor, attorney general and railroad commissioner should examine into the claims so filed, and adjust and ascertain the amount owing and unpaid to each claimant, and that when such amounts should have been ascertained, and any of the lands reserved should have been conveyed by the United States to the state, such lands, or so much thereof as might be necessary, should be sold by the governor at public auction, and the net proceeds of such sales be forthwith distributed ratably, by the governor, among the claimants.

The plaintiff, having caused an examination to be made of the claims filed with the state auditor, and having learned that the claims for work and material furnished for the Brainerd Branch did not exceed $30,000, (the remainder of the claims being for work and material for the St. Vincent Extension,) undertook the construction of the Brainerd Branch, and completed it in October, 1877, within the time prescribed by the act of March 1, 1877, and thereby earned the lands granted to aid in its construction.

For various reasons, (set forth in the complaint,) the grant for the Brainerd Branch fell far short of the full grant of ten sections per mile, and did not exceed 300,000 acres, which were worth less than the amount of the claims allowed by the commission.

In their statement of claims allowed, bearing date March 1, 1878, the commission allowed claims to the amount of $493,228.10, by far the largest claim being that of the defendants De Graff & Co., which was allowed at $462,559.52. Although requested to do so, the commission made no separation or distinction between the claims for work and material for the Brainerd Branch, and those for the St. Vincent Extension, though they were requested to make such separation, and could easily have done so.

At the time of the commencement of this action, (in November, 1878,) the St. Vincent Extension being still uncompleted, the governor was proceeding to select and sell certain portions of the lands earned by the construction of the Brainerd Branch by plaintiff, and was about (as stated in the complaint) to sell one-half of all the lands so earned, to satisfy the claims allowed by the commission. Whereupon the plaintiff brought this suit, in the district court for Crow Wing county, against De Graff & Co., and various others of the claimants, and against John S. Pillsbury, governor of the state. In the complaint it set forth at length and in detail the matters of which the foregoing statement is a summary, and also alleged that the claim of De Graff & Co., as allowed, was largely in excess of the sum actually due, and that the claims of the other defendants were not properly chargeable against either of the lines, and alleged a corrupt agreement between De Graff & Co. and the persons interested in the St. Vincent Extension, as a result of which section 8 of the act of 1877 was amended in 1878 by exempting that line from its provisions. The plaintiff, in its complaint, also offered to pay all sums justly and equitably due any of the claimants mentioned in the act of 1877, for work and material furnished for the Brainerd Branch.

The relief demanded is (1) that the defendant claimants come to an accounting with the plaintiff as to what if anything is due them severally and respectively for work and material furnished for the Brainerd Branch, on claims filed with the auditor; (2) that the governor be enjoined preliminarily, and until plaintiff shall have paid into court or given satisfactory security to pay the sums found due on such accounting, and be thereafter perpetually enjoined, from selling any of such lands; and (3) that the amount due each claimant for work and material furnished for the Brainerd Branch be paid out of the money deposited in court, and that thereupon such defendants be adjudged to have no claim or lien on any of such lands.

The defendants De Graff & Co. and Morris demurred to the complaint, for want of jurisdiction in the court, and for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. The demurrers were sustained by Stearns, J., and the plaintiff appealed.

John B. Sanborn, for appellant.

Gilman & Clough, for respondents.

CORNELL, J.

Whether, under our constitution, any officer of the executive department of the state government can be subjected to judicial control and interference in the performance of an official duty, is a question which has been before this court in different forms and at different times for consideration and decision, and the holding has uniformly been against the existence of any such jurisdiction or power in the courts. Matter of the Application of the Senate, 10 Minn. 56 (78;) Rice v. Austin, 19 Minn. 104; County Treasurer of Mille Lacs County v. Dike, 20 Minn. 363; St. Paul & Chicago Ry. Co. v. Brown, 24 Minn. 517, 573, 574. The reasons for the holding are fully stated in Rice v. Austin, and County Treasurer v. Dike, supra, and need not be restated here. It rests upon the constitutional principle that each of these departments of government is entirely independent of the others, so that neither can be made amenable to any other for its action or judgment in discharging the duties imposed upon it, whatever their source or nature.

The principle applies to the performance of all official duties, whether imposed by the constitution, or by legislative enactment simply, or whether they are of a character strictly ministerial, or such as call for the exercise of discretion and judgment alone. It follows that every act done or attempted to be done by any officer of the executive department, in his official and not in his individual capacity, is shielded from all judicial interference or control, either by mandamus or injunction, even though such act may be founded in an error of judgment, or an entire misapprehension of official duty under the law. The acts complained of and sought to be enjoined in this action are clearly acts which the defendant Pillsbury is threatening to do in his official capacity as the governor of the state, and not as an individual. The court, therefore, as against him, can take no cognizance of this action, nor grant the preventive relief prayed for by the plaintiff. If the action is dismissed, as it must be as against this defendant, for want of any jurisdiction over the governor, whether it can still be maintained against the other defendants, who are the respondents herein, is the only question remaining for consideration and decision. To sustain it against them alone, it must appear that they have such an interest in the subject-matter of the action as makes them liable to the plaintiff in respect to the demand which constitutes the groundwork of...