Western Union Tel Co v. Seay

• Decision Date: 16 December 1889
• Citation: 132 U.S. 472,10 S.Ct. 161,33 L.Ed. 409
• Parties: WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. SEAY, Governor, et al. 1
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

132 U.S. 472

10 S.Ct. 161

33 L.Ed. 409

WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. SEAY, Governor, et al.¹

December 16, 1889.

Gaylord B. Clark and T. B. Jones, for plaintiff in error.

John T. Morgan, for defendants in error.

MILLER, J.

This case comes before us on a writ of error to the supreme court of the state of Alabama. The question on which the jurisdiction of this court depends has been decided in this court so frequently of late years, several of the decisions having been made since the judgment of the supreme court of Alabama was delivered, that but little remains to be said in the present case, except to show that it comes within the principles of the cases referred to. That principle is, in regard to telegraph companes which have accepted the provisions of the act of congress of July 24, 1866, sections 5263 to 5268 of the Revised Statutes of the United States,² that they shall not be taxed by the authorities of a state for any messages, or receipts arising from messages, from points within the state to points without, or from points without the state to points within, but that such taxes may be levied upon all messages carried and delivered exclusively within the state. The foundation of this principle is that messages of the former class are elements of commerce between the states, and not subject to legislative control of the states, while the latter class are elements of internal commerce, solely within the limits and jurisdiction of the state, and therefore subject to its taxing power. The following cases in this court have fully developed and established this proposition: Telegraph Co. v. Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. 1; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460; Telegraph Co. v. Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 961; Ratterman v. Telegraph Co., 127 U. S. 411, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1127; Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1380; Fargo v. Michigan, 121 U. S. 230, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; Steam-Ship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1118.

The plaintiff in error instituted its proceeding in the state court by a writ of certiorari, directed to E. A. O'Neal, governor, C. C. Langdon, secretary of state, M. C. Burke, auditor, and Frederick H. Smith, treasurer, composing the state board of assessment, for the purpose of correcting the error which they had made in an assessment for taxaton of the gross receipts of the company. This board was invested by the law of Alabama with authority to assess for taxation the items of property of railroad companies returned to the auditor of the state, (section 13 of the act approved February 17, 1885,) and, by section 15 of the same act, a sim- ilar authority is conferred upon it in reference to telegraph companies whose lines, or any part thereof, are within the state. By an act to levy taxes for the use of the state, and t e counties thereof, approved December 12, 1884, it is declared by subdivision 6, § 6, that a tax shall be levied 'on the gross amount of the receipts by any and every telegraph, telephone, electric light, and express company, derived from the business done by it in this state, at the rate of two dollars on the hundred dollars.' The telegraph company, in making its report of gross receipts to this board of assessment, included only those received from business transacted wholly within the state of Alabama. The board were not willing to accept this report, and required the company to make report of its receipts from all messages, whether carried wholly within or partly without the state, and, against the remonstrances of the company, decided that this sum should be the amount on which the tax of 2 per cent. should be paid. It was to correct the supposed error of this assessment that the writ of certiorari was issued by the circuit court of Montgomery county to the governor and others constituting that board of assessment. That court held the assessment valid, and made an order quashing the writ of certiorari and dismissing the proceeding. On appeal to the supreme court of the state this decision was affirmed; and the case is now before us on a writ of error to review that judgment of affirmance. In the opinion of the supreme court of Alabama, (80 Ala. 273,) which is found in the record, the point mainly discussed is the construction of the tax law, in regard to the meaning of the words, 'gross receipts derived from business done in this state,' and also whether, 'if that means all the receipts of the company for business having connection with lines within the state, it is consistent with the constitution of Alabama.' Of these questions this court has no jurisdiction; but, having decided that the statute, by fair interpretation, included all receipts derived from business done in the state, and actually received there, though the message may have been delivered at, or may have been sent for delivery from, some office out of the jurisdiction of the state, the court proceeds: 'Though thus con- strued, the statute is not an unauthorized interference with interestate commerce. This question is fully and ably considered and discussed in the following cases: Telegraph Co. v. Richmond, 26 Grat. 1; Telegraph Co. v. State, 5 Tex. 314; Telegraph Co. v. Mayer, 28 Ohio St. 521; and Port of Mobile v. Leloup, 76 Ala. 401, and is expressly decided in respect to a tax on the gross receipts of railroad companies, though consisting in part of freights received for transportation of merchandise from the state to another state, or into the state from another, in State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, and in Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Wall. 479.' It will be observed that the authorities relied on by the supreme court of Alabama to sustain its judgment in this case are mostly decisions of state courts. The case of Telegraph Co. v. State, 55 Tex. 314, and the case of Port of Mobile v. Leloup, 76 Ala. 401, have been reversed by the decisions of this court in the same cases on writ of error to the state courts. Of the cases already referred...