Western Union Tel. Co. v. Parks

• Decision Date: 28 February 1894
• Citation: 25 S.W. 813
• Parties: WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. PARKS.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

25 S.W. 813

WESTERN UNION TEL. CO. v. PARKS.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

February 28, 1894.

Appeal from district court, Bosque county; J. M. Hall, Judge.

Action by J. D. Parks against the Western Union Telegraph Company for damages for delay in service. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

Stanley, Spoonts & Meek, for appellant. J. A. Gillette, for appellee.

STEPHENS, J.

This appeal is from a judgment for $1,000, awarded appellee as damages for increased mental and physical suffering occasioned by the negligence of appellant in not promptly transmitting and delivering certain telegrams. Being dangerously sick at the residence of his father, W. H. Parks, in the town of Meridian, Tex., on the 27th day of December, 1890, he desired to procure the immediate attendance of Dr. Hatton, residing 12 miles distant, at Clifton, Tex.; and to this end his father, at his instance and for his benefit, caused a telegram to be sent, about 3 o'clock p. m. of that day, addressed to said Hatton at Clifton, in these words: "Jo [meaning appellee] is worse. Come at once. [Signed] W. H. Parks." This telegram was not delivered until about 8 o'clock. Owing to the sickness of Dr. Hatton's daughter, he was unable to come, and immediately answered by wire to that effect. This telegram was not delivered until about 2 p. m. of the following day. Appellee's disease was that of impaction of the colon, from which, during these 23 or 24 hours of delay, inflammation of the vermiform appendix and parts adjacent thereto resulted, attended with much pain and suffering, from the consequences of which affliction he had not, at the trial, entirely recovered. Aside from the expense of telegraphing, his claim for damages rests upon the contention that the delay in transmitting and delivering these messages held him in suspense, and prevented the calling of another physician in time to have arrested the disease before the inflammation had set in or made any material progress, thereby increasing his suffering, both mental and physical. The judgment, as indicated by the conclusions of law and fact, places the recovery upon both of these grounds. It is very clear from the testimony that appellant is not liable for any damage which may have resulted from the failure to procure the attendance of Dr. Hatton, because no amount of diligence on the part of appellant would have secured this result. The question, then, is whether its negligence in preventing another physician...