Western Union Telegraph Company v. Braxtan
| Decision Date | 21 June 1905 |
| Docket Number | 20,615 |
| Citation | 74 N.E. 985,165 Ind. 165 |
| Parties | Western Union Telegraph Company v. Braxtan |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From Orange Circuit Court; William N. Paynter, Special Judge.
Action by Thomas N. Braxtan, Jr., against the Western Union Telegraph Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Transferred from Appellate Court under § 1337u Burns 1901, Acts 1901, p. 590.
Affirmed.
S. N Chambers, S. O. Pickens, C. W. Moores, R. F. Davidson, Owen Pickens, G. H. Fearons and S. R. Lambdin, for appellant.
Bayless Harvey, for appellee.
Action by appellee for the recovery of a penalty imposed by the statute of April 8, 1885, for default of statutory duty with respect to a message intrusted to appellant. The plaintiff filed the message with the defendant's agent at Indianapolis at 3 o'clock p. m. on June 18, 1903 addressed to E. C. Braxtan, Paoli, Indiana. It was received by the defendant's agent at Paoli at 4:05 o'clock p. m. of same day, but because of the negligence of defendant's agent at Paoli, was not delivered to the addressee till 7:30 o'clock a. m. the next day. The case went to trial by the court on the general denial. Special finding and judgment in favor of appellee for $ 100.
The single question for decision, and which arises upon the conclusions of law, is thus stated by the appellant: "The question presented by this appeal is whether, under the act of 1885, a penalty can be adjudged for negligence in the delivery of a telegram."
It is in effect conceded that the dispatch in controversy was not delivered in the order of time in which it was received at Paoli, and that the defendant was guilty of negligence in its delivery.
So much of the act referred to as is pertinent to this inquiry follows: Section two relates to telephone companies. Acts 1885, p. 151, §§ 5511, 5512 Burns 1901.
It is first contended that the title of the act does not warrant the imposition of the penalty provided by section three for a negligent failure to deliver dispatches, and that such penalty is limited to intended wrongdoing; that is, to acts of partiality and discrimination in rates and service between patrons. The construction contended for is clearly too narrow, and would strip the law of one of the most salutary features intended by the legislature. We must assume that, in the passage of the act, the legislature had in view the accomplishment of some beneficial purpose, and we must take a reasonable and liberal view of the act as a whole in ascertaining what that purpose really was. In the interpretation of the title we must look to the body of the act, and in construing the body we must look to the title; and if it appears from both that all the provisions of the act are fairly referable to one general subject, and that subject is clearly expressed in the title, the act is valid, though there may be more than the general subject expressed therein. 1 Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d ed.), § 131, and cases cited; Davis v. Woolnough (1859), 9 Iowa 104.
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that the general subject of the proposed legislation is all that properly belongs to the title of an act, and that the title's exclusive office is to apprise those who shall be called on to vote upon it as to what that subject is. The details and means by which it is proposed to make the law effective in accomplishing its purpose must be looked for, not in the title, but in the body of the bill. Constitution, Art. 4, § 19.
We realize that it is quite common with legislators in the framing of titles to bills, under promptings of extreme caution, to follow the general subject by a statement of particulars, or details--sometimes all, sometimes only in part. In such cases, if the subject is well stated, the specifications and details become surplusage, and of little consequence, for they neither invalidate the act, nor limit its application to any provision that is germane to the general subject expressed in the title, unless the language employed in the title clearly shows that it was the legislative intent to confine the act to the particulars specified. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. State, ex rel. (1899), 153 Ind. 134, 51 N.E. 924; 1 Lewis's Sutherland, Stat. Constr. (2d ed.), § 131; State, ex rel., v. Atherton (1886), 19 Nev. 332, 10 P. 901; In re Sugar Notch Borough (1899), 192 Pa. 349, 43 A. 985.
Considered in the light of these rules, the title under consideration...
To continue reading
Request your trial