Western Waste Industries, Inc. of Florida v. Achord, 93-2433

• Decision Date: 25 February 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-2433,93-2433
• Citation: 632 So.2d 680
• Parties: 19 Fla. L. Weekly D425 WESTERN WASTE INDUSTRIES, INC. OF FLORIDA and Clifford Charles Brown, Petitioners, v. Joyce ACHORD, an individual and Rory Maudlin, a minor, suing by and through his mother and next friend, Joyce Achord, Respondents.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 680

632 So.2d 680

19 Fla. L. Weekly D425

WESTERN WASTE INDUSTRIES, INC. OF FLORIDA and Clifford Charles Brown, Petitioners, v. Joyce ACHORD, an individual and Rory Maudlin, a minor, suing by and through his mother and next friend, Joyce Achord, Respondents.

No. 93-2433.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fifth District.

Feb. 25, 1994.

Lamar D. Oxford and F. Scott Pendley of Dean, Ringers, Morgan & Lawton, Orlando, for petitioners.

James H. Tipler, Fort Walton Beach, for respondents.

GRIFFIN, Judge.

Petitioners, Western Waste Industries, Inc. of Florida ["Western"] and Clifford Charles Brown seek certiorari review of an order of the lower court setting aside an agreement reached in mediation. The threshold question is whether there is a jurisdictional basis for review of the challenged order. Although the appealed order can be characterized in various ways, it appears most analogous to an order imposing sanctions against petitioners for failure to comply with the court's order scheduling mediation. The offense was the failure of Western to send someone to mediation with the requisite "full authority" to settle the case. The sanction imposed under the order was rescission of the settlement agreement. The effect of the order is to require petitioners to continue the litigation. Since the purpose of mediation is to avoid further litigation by reaching a settlement agreement, if the petitioners are required to continue litigating the case prior to appealing this order, they will have no adequate remedy on appeal because the sanction imposed already will have been suffered and cannot be undone.

Having concluded that the order in question is reviewable by certiorari, the second question is whether the order represents a material departure from the essential requirements of the law. We conclude that it does. See Avril v. Civilmar, 605 So.2d 988 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).

This lawsuit arose out of a collision between a truck owned by petitioner, Western, and a vehicle driven by the respondent, Joyce Achord, in which her son was a passenger. The respondents sought recovery of damages in negligence and demanded $1,000,000 to settle the case. Western filed an offer of settlement pursuant to section 768.79, Florida Statutes, offering a total of $15,002 to settle. The parties were then ordered to mediation by the trial court. As quoted by the lower court, the order provided:

3. THE GENERAL RULES GOVERNING SAID MEDIATION CONFERENCE SHALL BE AS FOLLOWS: A. THE APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL WHO WILL TRY THE CASE AND CLIENTS OR REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH PARTY WITH FULL AUTHORITY TO ENTER INTO A FULL AND COMPLETE COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT IS MANDATORY. ("Full Authority" as to the party claimed against shall mean settlement amount authority equalling the most recent settlement demand of the claimant....)

It appears from the court's order that the intent of the order is to conform to the mediation procedures in Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.720.

An agreement to settle the case in the amount of $50,000 was reached in mediation and reduced to writing on July 21, 1993. A settlement check was mailed to the respondents on August 12, 1993. On ...