Westgate v. Century Indem. Co.
| Decision Date | 25 June 1941 |
| Citation | 309 Mass. 412,35 N.E.2d 218 |
| Parties | WESTGATE v. CENTURY INDEMNITY CO. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Suit in equity by Clayton Westgate and another against the Century Indemnity Company, for application of the proceeds of a motor vehicle liability insurance policy to satisfaction of judgments against insured for injuries to named plaintiff. Decree for plaintiffs, and defendant appeals.
Reversed, and entry of decree dismissing bill ordered.Appeal from Superior Court, Bristol County; Baker, Judge.
Argued before FIELD, C. J., and QUA, DOLAN, and COX, JJ.
E. Field and M. R. Bean, both of Boston, for defendant.
J. Lipsitt, of New Bedford, for plaintiff.
This case presents the question as to the meaning of the words ‘Guest occupant,’ or ‘guest occupant of such motor vehicle,’ as found in St. 1935, c. 459, G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 34A.
From the report of the material facts made by the trial judge, based upon findings made by agreement of the parties and constituting all the material facts, it appears that about January 1, 1939, the defendant issued a motor vehicle liability policy as defined in said section 34A, as amended, to one Barnes. This policy, in the form prescribed and approved by the commissioner of insurance, did not cover indemnity for, or protection to, the insured, or any person responsible for the operation of his motor vehicle with his express or implied consent, against loss by reason of liability to pay damages to any ‘guest occupant of such motor vehicle,’ as defined in said section 34A, as amended, On April 1, 1939, the motor vehicle in question was being operated by one with the express or implied consent of the insured, said policy being then in full force and effect. One of the plaintiffs in this suit, a boy eight years of age, was upon the running board of the automobile without the invitation of the operator, and, as it appears, clearly against his will. The operator started the automobile, and, as found by the judge of the District Court who tried the actions against the operator of the automobile brought by the father of the boy for consequential damages and in behalf of the boy, as a result of the operator's wanton and wilful act, the boy was injured. Judgment was entered in each action, both of which remain unsatisfied in whole or in part. This suit is brought to reach and apply the proceeds of the liability insurance policy in question. G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 175, § 113, and c. 214, § 3(10). The trial judge ruled that the boy was not a ‘guest occupant’ of the automobile and that the judgments obtained were covered by the motor vehicle liability policy in question. A final decree was entered establishing the indebtedness of the operator and ordering the defendant to pay the amount thereof. The defendant appealed.
The law relating to compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance, now appearing in G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, §§ 34A-34J, was first enacted by St.1925, c. 346. It was therein required, among other things, that the liability which must be insured against was that to pay damages to others for bodily injuries, including death, sustained by ‘any person,’ with certain exceptions which are not material to this case. Section 34A. See St.1930, c. 340, § 1. In this respect the law was unchanged until the passage of St.1935, c. 459. In July of that year, the Governor sent a message to the Legislature in which he recommended the adoption of a law making provision for the repeal of the ‘guest clause’ in motor vehicle liability policies. The bill that was reported as a result of this recommendation (House 2279) provided for the insertion, after the paragraph defining the word ‘certificate,’ the following new paragraph: “Guest', any person, other than an employee of the owner of a motor vehicle or of a person responsible for its operation with the owner's express or implied consent, being in or upon, entering or leaving the same, except a passenger for hire in the case of a motor vehicle registered as a taxicab or otherwise for carrying passengers for hire.' Further provision was made for the insertion of the above quoted words in the paragraphs of said section 34A defining ‘Motor vehicle liability bond’ and ‘Motor vehicle liability policy,’ and also in section 34D. It is unnecessary to trace the course of this bill in its passage by the Legislature. But it is to be observed that at some time the word ‘Guest’ was changed to read ‘Guest occupant,’ so that when St.1935, c. 459, ‘An Act eliminating compulsory motor vehicle insurance for the benefit of guests of persons whose liability is covered thereby,’ was passed and declared to be an emergency law, it contained the words ‘Guest occupant’ or ‘guest occupant of such motor vehicle.’ It was thereby enacted that those words shall have the following meaning: ‘* * * any person, other than an employee of the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or of a person responsible for its operation with the owner's or registrant's express or implied consent, being in or upon, entering or leaving the same, except a passenger for hire in the case of a motor vehicle registered as a taxicab or otherwise for carrying passengers for hire.’
It is apparent that the Legislature has defined the words ‘guest occupant’ and ‘guest occupant of such motor vehicle’ in language unmistakably plain, not only as to words, but also as to their meaning. At the time of the passage of the act in question, we think it was generally understood that the relationship of host and guest depended upon the existence of some invitation, express or implied, see Massaletti v. Fitzroy, 228 Mass. 487, 118 N.E. 168, L.R.A.1918C, 264, Ann.Cas.1918B, 1088, and that it did not involve the payment of any compensation by the so-called guest. This, of course, has no reference to the use of the word guest in connection with innkeepers, where the relationship is regulated...
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...definition of guest occupant. Joyce v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co., 312 Mass. 354, 357, 44 N.E.2d 776, citing Westgate v. Century Indemn., 309 Mass. 412, 35 N.E.2d 218 (1941). "The `guest occupant' whose injury is excluded from the policy is any person not `an employee' or a `passenger f......
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...be considered as guests. This amendment has been strictly construed in order to effectuate its aim and object. Westgate v. Century Indemnity Co., 309 Mass. 412, 35 N.E.2d 218.Joyce v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 312 Mass. 354, 44 N.E.2d 776.1 This amending provision indicates that it......
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