Westlake v. Willms, C058379 (Cal. App. 12/23/2009)

• Decision Date: 23 December 2009
• Docket Number: C059434.,C058379.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: LEWIS J. WESTLAKE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HENRY W. WILLMS et al., Defendants and Respondents. LEWIS J. WESTLAKE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HENRY W. WILLMS et al., Defendants and Respondents.

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LEWIS J. WESTLAKE et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. HENRY W. WILLMS et al., Defendants and Respondents.

LEWIS J. WESTLAKE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. HENRY W. WILLMS et al., Defendants and Respondents.

C058379.

C059434.

Court of Appeals of California, Third Appellate District, Shasta

December 23, 2009

Appeal from the Super.Ct.Nos. 153276, 161805.

Not to be Published

SCOTLAND, P. J.

Plaintiffs Lewis and Mary Westlake challenge the judgment in favor of defendants Henry and Dolly Willms, and various other defendants, in plaintiffs' action for forcible detainer, forcible entry, conversion, and elder abuse (Super. Ct. No. 153276; Ct.App. No. C058379); and plaintiff Lewis Westlake challenges the judgment in favor of defendant Henry Willms and Sugar Maple Holdings, LLC, in Westlake's subsequent action for forcible detainer (Super. Ct. No. 161805; Ct.App. No. C059434). We consolidated the appeals. For ease of reference, we will refer to the plaintiffs in both actions as "Westlake" and to the defendants in both actions as "Willms."

In appeal No. C058379, Westlake contends the trial court erred (1) by refusing to automatically stay the action due to pending appeals; (2) by refusing to grant a continuance; (3) by dismissing the action with prejudice; (4) by ruling certain causes of action were barred by collateral estoppel; and (5) by awarding attorney fees. In appeal No. C059434, Westlake claims the trial court wrongly held the action was barred on the ground of collateral estoppel and thus erred in sustaining Willms's demurrer without leave to amend. For the reasons that follow, we shall affirm the judgments.

FACTS

Due to the convoluted procedural posture of these cases and the fact that they were both disposed of on procedural grounds, it is necessary to resort to the parties' pleadings and to this court's unpublished opinion in a prior appeal arising from the same underlying facts (Willms v. Westlake (July 1, 2008, C056127) [nonpub. opn.]) in order to provide the requisite factual context.

According to Willms, Westlake filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy after defaulting on a loan from Willms, which was secured by a deed of trust encumbering property known as the Dry Creek Ranch. Willms purchased the property in a trustee's sale in 2001. The order authorizing the sale states that machinery and equipment located on the property had been claimed by Westlake as exempt assets and that Westlake "shall make arrangements directly with [Willms] for the removal of the equipment and machinery."

Willms leased the property to Westlake for grazing land from November 2001 through November 2002. After the lease expired, Willms leased the property to a third party and did not receive any further lease monies from Westlake. In March 2003, Willms gave Westlake a "Notice of Right to Reclaim Abandoned Property" by April 30, 2003; but Westlake did not remove any farm equipment and machinery from the ranch in response to the notice. Thus, Willms made arrangements to have the abandoned equipment and machinery removed.

Because Westlake interfered with the removal of the equipment and continually trespassed on the property, Willms filed a petition seeking a civil harassment injunction. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6; further section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.) He sought an order that Westlake be directed to stay away from the Dry Creek Ranch property (Super. Ct. No. 151870).

The trial court issued the injunction order on July 8, 2004, and Westlake appealed.

In December 2004, prior to the resolution of the injunction appeal, Westlake filed suit against Willms. By the time Westlake had filed his sixth amended complaint in December 2005, he alleged causes of action for forcible detainer, forcible entry, conversion, and elder abuse. (Super. Ct. No. 153276.) His complaint alleges that, from 2001 to 2004, Westlake was in lawful possession of Dry Creek Ranch; that he stored farm equipment there; and that in March 2004, Willms unlawfully entered the property and converted the farm equipment and machinery.

In his initial complaint, Westlake acknowledged that Willms had purchased the Dry Creek Ranch property in a trustee's sale in 2001 and that Westlake was leasing the Dry Creek Ranch property from Willms to store equipment and other personal property. He attached a copy of what he referred to as a "lease agreement" with Willms, which was for a term of one year expiring on November 1, 2002. The "lease agreement" appears to be a contract granting Westlake, as broker, the right to solicit and negotiate for the lease of the property until November 1, 2002.

Westlake's second amended complaint omitted the written agreement and any reference to a lease.

In his sixth and final amended complaint, Westlake asserted that Willms retained him as a broker to lease the property and, in lieu of leasing the property to a third party, Westlake leased the property as an oral lessee. According to Westlake, the lease renewed annually at the termination of the lease period because the property was agricultural; in March 2004, Willms and others unlawfully took possession of the real property and effectively ousted him in spite of the existing lease agreement; and Willms and the other defendants then converted Westlake's personal property, which had been stored on the land.

Willms filed a cross-complaint for fraud, suppression of fact, constructive fraud, negligence, and declaratory relief.

On August 1, 2006, the court ruled on bifurcated issues, finding that (1) Willms's entitlement to possession of the property had been determined in Willms's civil harassment case in which the judge necessarily found Willms was entitled to exclusive possession of the ranch, and thus (2) Westlake was collaterally estopped from litigating the causes of action for forcible entry and forcible detainer, and from litigating in the remaining causes of action the issue of possession of the property.

Westlake appealed that ruling, but on December 20, 2007, this court dismissed the appeal as having been taken from a nonappealable order. (Westlake v. Willms (Dec. 20, 2007, C057552) [app. dism. by order].)

On July 1, 2008, this court dismissed as moot Westlake's appeal from the civil injunction because the term of the injunction had expired. (Willms v. Westlake (July 1, 2008, C056127) [nonpub. opn.].) Westlake argued that the appeal was not moot because there might be a recurrence of the legal controversy between the parties. He claimed that the legal effect of the injunction continued to haunt him in his forcible detainer action in light of the trial court's ruling on bifurcated issues, which determined that Westlake's right to possession of Dry Creek Ranch had been decided adversely to him in the injunction action. However, this court concluded the argument against mootness failed because the question of who possessed Dry Creek Ranch could not have been determined in the injunction proceeding. This was so because the special proceedings authorized by section 527.6 did not invest the court with authority to resolve real property disputes. (Citing Byers v. Cathcart (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 805, 810-811.) Accordingly, the statute could not be used as a substitute for the statutory remedies of unlawful detainer and eviction. Although the trial court could restrict Westlake's harassing conduct via an injunction, it could not determine Westlake's right to legal possession of the property. Thus, the appeal from the injunction was moot.

Meanwhile, Westlake's complaint filed in 2004 (Super. Ct. No. 153276) was proceeding slowly. Following multiple demurrers to Westlake's multiple amended complaints, the scheduled trial dates were continued on several occasions. Westlake, who had initially litigated the action in pro per, was successively represented by four different attorneys. He unsuccessfully requested a stay of proceedings based on his appeals from the injunction judgment and from the ruling on bifurcated issues.

On December 4, 2007, the last scheduled trial date, Westlake sought to discharge his fourth attorney, Mr. Omstead, based upon an alleged conflict of interest. He also asked for a continuance to obtain new counsel.

The trial court considered that the case had previously been continued on several occasions, observed that three or four days had been set aside for trial, and stated that it was time to get the case resolved. The court indicated that Westlake could either continue being represented by Omstead, or Westlake would have to proceed to trial in pro per.

Westlake claimed that he was not qualified to represent himself and had "been on a lot of drugs" and had "serious high blood pressure and carotid arteries that [he] just found out about within the last week." As for continuing to be represented by Omstead, Westlake said that counsel had been cooperative but could not be effective because of the short time he had been on the case.

The trial court replied that it had known Omstead for some time and Omstead would not have substituted in as counsel, with knowledge of the scheduled trial date, if he did not think that he could be prepared. The court explained that it had "tried to bend over backwards to give [Westlake his] day in court on numerous occasions. But we just can't simply tie up the whole court system because of problems, real or imaginary, that you have." Accordingly, the court ruled that Westlake would have to choose between proceeding with Omstead or proceeding in pro per, but there would be no continuance.

Westlake discharged Omstead but declined to proceed with trial in pro per because he was unprepared. The trial court then stated: "Well, if you aren't ready to go, I'm going to have to dismiss this with prejudice which means you can't re-file it." Willms's counsel also moved to dismiss the action with prejudice and dismiss Willms's counterclaim without prejudice. The court did so.

Thereafter, the...