Westmoreland v. Walgreen Co.
| Decision Date | 01 December 2021 |
| Docket Number | A21A1753 |
| Parties | WESTMORELAND v. WALGREEN CO. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
In this premises liability action, Nicole Westmoreland appeals the grant of summary judgment to Walgreen Co., which does business as Walgreens. Westmoreland has failed to point to admissible evidence creating a jury question on the issue of whether Walgreens had superior knowledge of the instrumentality that allegedly caused her injury. So we affirm.
A trial court may grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 (c). A defendant may demonstrate that it is entitled to summary judgment "by either presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiff's claims or establishing from the record an absence of evidence to support such claims." Cowart v. Widener, 287 Ga. 622 623 (1) (a) (697 S.E.2d 779) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted). Once the defendant has met this burden, the plaintiff "must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue" or suffer summary judgment. Id. (citation and punctuation omitted).
"We review the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo, and we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant." Pennington v. Gwinnett County 329 Ga.App. 255 (764 S.E.2d 860) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).
So viewed, the record shows that Westmoreland intended to purchase a six-pack of beer at a Walgreens store. As she was removing the package from the cooler, bottles of beer fell through the bottom of the package. Some of the bottles broke when they hit the floor, and glass from the broken bottles injured Westmoreland's feet and legs. The trial court granted Walgreens's motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.
Although "OCGA § 51-3-1 imposes upon an owner the duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises and approaches safe for invitees[, the] duty is not a duty to absolutely prevent injury as a proprietor is not an ensurer of the safety of its customers." Thomas v. Home Depot, U.S.A., 284 Ga.App. 699, 700 (644 S.E.2d 538) (2007).
Aubain-Gray v. Hobby Lobby Stores, 323 Ga.App. 672, 673 (1) (747 S.E.2d 684) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted).
In support of its motion for summary judgment, Walgreens argued that it lacked superior knowledge of the hazard that allegedly caused Westmoreland's injuries. It presented to the trial court the affidavit of the assistant store manager who testified that he had worked at the store for 16 or 18 months, and that prior to and after the incident involving Westmoreland, there had been no similar incidents.
To create a jury question on the issue of Walgreens's superior knowledge, Westmoreland relies on her own deposition testimony. At her deposition, Westmoreland testified that a Walgreens employee told her that a similar incident had happened just a week before and that the employee had informed Walgreens that the cooler was too high. Westmoreland also testified that she overheard a Walgreens employee tell another Walgreens employee that bottles fell out of the cooler "again."
As Walgreens argues on appeal (and argued in the trial court), this testimony was hearsay. OCGA § 24-8-801 (c). "All hearsay evidence, unsupported conclusions, and the like, must be stricken or eliminated from consideration in a motion for summary judgment." Goodhart v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 349 Ga.App. 65, 72 (2) (a) (825 S.E.2d 465) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also OCGA § 24-8802 (). This hearsay does not create a question of fact so as to support the reversal of the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Walgreens.
Westmoreland briefly argues that her deposition testimony could be admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. But she has not shown that the excited utterance exception could apply.
An excited utterance is "[a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition[.]" OCGA § 24-8-803 (2) (Rule 803). Westmoreland makes no argument and points to no evidence to support her contention that the testimony is subject to the excited utterance exception. Crucially, she points to no evidence "that show[s the speakers were] actually experiencing stress or excitement at the time of [their] statement[s] to [Westmoreland] so as to eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation and provide sufficient assurance that the statement[s were] trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous." Jenkins v. State, 303 Ga. 314, 318 (2) (812 S.E.2d 238) (2018) (citation and punctuation omitted).
Westmoreland asserts that the statements may be adverse to the interest of Walgreens, perhaps intending to invoke OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (2), which provides that admissions by a party-opponent shall not be excluded by the hearsay rule. But her brief contains no legal analysis or citation of authority supporting such a claim, which thus is deemed abandoned. See Hutchinson v. Whaley, 333 Ga.App. 773, 776-777 (2) (777 S.E.2d 251) (2015). See also Seabrooks v. State, 306 Ga. 670, 671 (2) (832 S.E.2d 847) (2019).
Westmoreland refers in her brief to res ipsa loquitur, seemingly to contend that the issue of Walgreens's negligence is a jury question because there is no other explanation for the incident. Res ipsa loquitur "is an evidentiary based rule which provides for an inference of negligence to arise from the occurrence of an injury-causing incident." Matthews v. Yoplait...
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