Westoak Indus., Inc. v. Deleon

• Decision Date: 14 March 2013
• Docket Number: Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 4.,No. 110,023.,110,023.
• Parties: WESTOAK INDUSTRIES, INC. and Ace Fire Underwriters, Petitioners, v. Debbie DeLEON and the Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

299 P.3d 878

WESTOAK INDUSTRIES, INC. and Ace Fire Underwriters, Petitioners,

v.Debbie DeLEON and the Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.

No. 110,023.Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 4.

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma,

Division No. 4.

March 14, 2013.

Held Unconstitutional

85 Okl.St.Ann. § 340(D)(4).

Proceeding to Review an Order of a Three–Judge Panel of the Workers' Compensation Court; Honorable Clarence Kent Eldridge, Trial Judge.

SUSTAINED.

Michael D. Antkowiak, Bullard & Associates, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Petitioners.

Fred L. Boettcher, Boettcher & Lee Law, Ponca City, Oklahoma, for Respondent.

KEITH RAPP, Judge.

¶ 1 WestOak Industries, Inc. (Employer) and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Ace Fire Underwriters, appeal a decision of the Three Judge Panel of the Workers' Compensation Court which affirmed the trial court's order finding Debbie DeLeon (Claimant) sustained a work-related injury. Based upon our review of the record and applicable law, this Court sustains the order under review.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 Claimant filed a Form 3 on January 18, 2011, alleging cumulative trauma to her lungs and upper respiratory system due to inhalation of fumes and vapors and exposure to chemicals while employed with Employer. At a trial held on July 14, 2011, Claimant testified she worked for Employer for approximately twenty-one years. Her tasks included soldering circuit boards and painting in an enclosed area. She did not have a mask for the former task. The mask for the painting assignments was standard issue and did not fit well. Claimant testified she began to have symptoms of difficulty of breathing and a voice change approximately two years prior to trial. Claimant stated her current problems included shortness of breath, constantfatigue, and trouble speaking.¹ She associated the problems with her work environment.

¶ 3 In 2010, Claimant sought treatment from her private physician. Claimant acknowledged she smoked approximately half a package of cigarettes daily. Non-cancerous nodes were found on her lung. An inhaler was prescribed for temporary relief.

¶ 4 Claimant was subsequently examined by another physician who determined she sustained a work-related injury to her pulmonary system, lungs, voice and larynx due to cumulative and repetitive exposures arising out of her employment with Employer and, more specifically, to two compounds identified in Claimant's work, Humiseal Aerosol and Humiseal Thinner.² The court admitted Claimant's medical report into evidence over Employer's probative value objection.³

¶ 5 In addition, the court admitted Employer's medical report over Claimant's probative value objection. The report indicated Claimant's condition was the direct result of over fifteen years of heavy smoking and exposure to second hand smoke. Employer also offered documentation from the Oklahoma Department of Labor concerning a Full Health Survey of Employer's workplace conducted on May 5, 2005, which showed the presence of hazardous materials was within regulatory limits on the date of the report. The court admitted the report, noting it had no information for the period preceding or following May 5, 2005.

¶ 6 By order dated July 25, 2011, the court held Claimant sustained a work-related injury to her lungs and larynx and that her work activities were the major cause of the injury. Employer appealed to the Three–Judge Panel, which affirmed the order. Employer appeals.

¶ 7 By show cause order entered on April 4, 2012, this Court directed the parties to submit briefs and appear for oral arguments on the issue whether 85 O.S.2011, § 340(D)(4) violates the “separation of powers” doctrine contained in Article 4, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution.⁴ The parties complied and oral arguments were held on May 7, 2012.

BACKGROUND

¶ 8 In 2011, the Legislature prescribed this Court's standard of review for factual issues in 85 O.S.2011, § 340(D). At issue is the meaning of the language in Section 340(D)(4) and whether it violates the separation of powers rule set forth in Article 4, Section 1 of the Oklahoma Constitution. The meaning of statutory language is a pure issue of law that stands before this Court for de novo review. Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, 989 P.2d 448.De novo review means plenary, independent and non-deferential review. Multiple Injury Trust Fund v. Pullum, 2001 OK 115, ¶ 8, 37 P.3d 899, 903–04.

¶ 9 Until the Legislature adopted Section 340(D)(4) in 2011, the settled standard of review by an appellate court for findings of fact was the traditional test set forth in Parks v. Norman Mun. Hosp., 1984 OK 53, 684 P.2d 548.⁵ Pursuant to this standard, findings of fact made by the Workers' Compensation Court are conclusive and binding upon an appellate court where there is any competent evidence reasonably tending to support such findings. Id. at ¶ 2, 684 P.2d at 549.⁶ Parks did not alter the distinctions between standards of review for fact determinations and conclusions of law.⁷Yocum v. Greenbriar Nursing Home, 2005 OK 27, ¶ 9, 130 P.3d 213, 219 (citing Parks, 1984 OK 53 at ¶ 12 n. 8, 684 P.2d at 552 n. 8).⁸

¶ 10 In 2010, the Legislature enacted 85 O.S.2001 and Supp. 2010, § 3.6(C). Section 3.6(C) changed the standard of review for factual determinations to “against the clear weight of the evidence.” However, it was unclear whether Section 3.6(C) applied retrospectively or only prospectively. The Oklahoma Supreme Court resolved this issue in Dunlap v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2011 OK 14, 249 P.3d 951, wherein the Court held the date of injury applied so that causes involving injuries predating the statute were to be reviewed under the Parks standard of review. The Court specifically ruled the amendment applied only prospectively.

¶ 11 On August 26, 2011, the Legislature enacted 85 O.S.2011, § 340(D)(4), providing for the “against the clear weight of the evidence” standard, “after the effective date of the act and regardless of the date of injury.” However, on May 8, 2012, the Oklahoma Supreme Court applied Dunlap in Nomac Drilling LLC v. Mowdy, 2012 OK 45, 277 P.3d 1282. The Court held that because the claimant's injury preceded the effective date of the amendments to the Workers' Compensation Act, the law at the time of claimant's injury governed. Id. at ¶ 8, 277 P.3d at 1284. Thus, the any competent evidence standard of review from Parks applied. Id. The Court did not cite or address Section 340(D)(4).

¶ 12 Subsequently, however, the Court addressed Section 340(D) in Williams Cos. v. Dunkelgod, 2012 OK 96, 295 P.3d 1107 (rehearing denied Jan. 23, 2012), and deemed the statute unconstitutional as applied to that case, holding that it impermissibly abrogated a substantive right belonging to the claimant that accrued on the date of her injury. Id. at ¶¶ 16–18, 32, 295 P.3d 1107. Oklahoma appellate courts have since then relied on Dunkelgod and Nomac in several opinions where an improper standard of review was applied in reliance on the “regardless of date of injury” language of Section 340(D)(4). See, e.g., Prince v. Brake Rebuilders & Friction Products, Inc., 2012 OK 104, 298 P.3d 529;Controls Components, Ltd. v. Weaver, 2013 OK 8, 301 P.3d 405, 2013 WL 433120;City of Okla. City v. Johnson, 2013 OK CIV APP 6, 294 P.3d 470. None of these cases addressed whether the statute was unconstitutional on its face because it violated the “separation of powers” provision of Article 4 of the Oklahoma Constitution. ⁹ This is the issue addressed here.

DISCUSSION

¶ 13 The primary goal of any inquiry into the meaning of the terms of a statute is to ascertain legislative intent. Yocum, 2005 OK 27 at ¶ 9, 130 P.3d at 219. Legislative intent will be ascertained from the plain meaning of the statute's terms whenever possible. Id. In the present case, through Section 340(D)(4), the Legislature clearly intended an appellate court to review a workers' compensation court or three judge panel's final findings of fact under the standard of review “against the clear weight of the evidence,” regardless of when the date of injury occurred. The question before this Court is whether Section 340(D)(4) impermissibly infringes on the power of the court by exercising judicial power in violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

¶ 14 The Oklahoma Constitution, Article 4, § 1, divides the powers of state government into three separate branches—Legislative, Executive, and Judicial—and prohibits the departments from exercising powers belonging to the others. Conaghan v. Riverfield Country Day Sch., 2007 OK 60, ¶ 20, 163 P.3d 557, 564. The framers of the Constitution clearly intended a separation of power among the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Dank v. Benson, 2000 OK 40, ¶ 6, 5 P.3d 1088, 1091. General constitutional order is offended when one department of government usurps power expressly delegated to another. Id. Although each branch may exercise some control over another branch in the form of checks and balances, the power to interfere is a limited one. 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 260 (2012). A branch may not interfere where doing so will threaten the independence or integrity or invade the prerogatives of another branch. Id. A branch may not interfere with the functions and powers of another branch so as to usurp those functions and powers.

It is the constitutional obligation of the judiciary to protect its own proper constitutional authority by upholding the independence of the judiciary. Intrinsic within state sovereignty is an interest protecting the credibility of the state judiciary. In a general way, the courts possess the entire body of judicial power, and the judiciary may not assign its powers to either of the other branches of government. The other departments cannot, as a general rule, properly assume to exercise any part of the judicial power, nor can the constitutional courts be hampered or...