Weston v. Board of Com'rs of Police Insurance and Annuity Fund

• Decision Date: 13 March 1941
• Docket Number: 15230.
• Citation: 13 S.E.2d 600,196 S.C. 491
• Parties: WESTON et al. v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF POLICE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY FUND.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

13 S.E.2d 600

196 S.C. 491

WESTON et al. v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF POLICE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY FUND.

No. 15230.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

March 13, 1941

McEachin & Townsend, of Florence, for appellants.

Heyward Brockinton and John W. Crews, both of Columbia, for respondent.

FISHBURNE Justice.

This appeal brings up for review a judgment of the Circuit Court which sustained the action of the Board of Commissioners of the Police Insurance and Annuity Fund in disallowing a claim for $1,000 made against it by the plaintiffs, as beneficiaries of Julian B. Weston, Sr., deceased. The appeal involves the construction of an Act passed by the Legislature which became effective April 17, 1937, Acts of 1937, Page 295. By this Act, the General Assembly created a Board of Commissioners of the Police Insurance and Annuity Fund of the State of South Carolina, which had for its purpose the payment of insurance and annuity benefits to the peace officers of the State.

Section 14 of the Act provides: "After a peace officer has served continuously as an active peace officer in South Carolina for a term of five (5) years, he will be issued a certificate whereby the Board will agree to pay the sum of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars to a designated beneficiary upon the death of said officer; Provided, That at the time of his death he is still in active service or is an annuitant as herein provided."

Julian B. Weston, Sr., while in active service as a magistrate in Richland County, became eligible for membership in the South Carolina Peace Officers' Association, an organization authorized by the Act, and upon his application was admitted as a member and paid to the Board, as required by the Act monthly dues from June 1, 1937, to November 1, 1937. He died on October 27, 1937, without having received from the Board the certificate for $1,000 referred to in Section 14.

The real issue concerns the interpretation of Section 16 of the Act, which is as follows: "Time pay benefits.--No benefits shall be payable under the provisions of this Act until and after One (1) year from the date of the passage of this Act and its approval by the Governor of the State of South Carolina."

It will be noted that Mr. Weston's death occurred prior to the expiration of the first year of the Act, and it is contended by the defendant that it is clearly shown by Section 16 that it was the intention of the lawmakers that no rights to benefits or cause of action should accrue to any peace officer until the 17th day of April, 1938, that is commencing with the second year of the operation of the Act. The plaintiffs argue that the usual and popular meaning of the word "payable" is, in effect "demandable," and that as so defined the payment of insurance was merely suspended and held in abeyance during the first year, and would become effective the second year.

A system of pensions and death benefits to police and other peace officers injured or disabled while on duty, or retiring after a term of service, has been in effect in several states for many years. In this State, however, this was an unexplored field until the passage of the Act of 1937. In accordance with settled principles of construction, the provisions of the Section under discussion are to be read and understood according to the natural and obvious meaning and import of the language, without resorting to subtle and forced construction for the purpose of either limiting or extending their operation. In keeping with familiar concepts the statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable and fair interpretation consonant with the purpose, design and policy of the lawmakers. If its terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense, unless it clearly appears from the context that the Legislature intended to use such terms in a technical or peculiar sense. It is only where the...