Wetherell v. DeVine
| Decision Date | 27 March 1886 |
| Citation | 6 N.E. 24,116 Ill. 631 |
| Parties | WETHERELL v. DEVINE |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Cook.
H. B. Hurd, for appellant.
A. M. Pence and F. S. Winston, for appellee.
This is a bill in chancery filed by William G. Wetherell, a citizen and tax-payer of Chicago, against William M. Devine, the treasurer of that city. It alleges that the ‘election law,’ so called, which has been discussed in the case of People v. Hoffman, 5 N. E. Rep. 596, was adopted by the city of Chicago, by a majority of 17,000 votes, at an election held on November 3, 1885; that on November 24, 1885, three election commissioners were appointed by the county court, who have since qualified and organized as a board, in accordance with the terms of the law so adopted; that such commissioners are proceeding to incur, and have already incurred, large expenses for office rent, stationery, etc., for which they claim payment from the city treasury, and that the judge of the county court has drawn his warrant in their favor upon the city treasurer for the amount of such expenses; that the city treasurer is about to pay such amount to them, and threatens to do so, out of the moneys of the city in his hands; that the act in question is unconstitutional; that the board of election commissioners is an illegal body, and has no right to incur expenses to be paid for by the city; and that the warrant so issued is not for a corporate purpose, and is void and of no legal effect. The prayer of the bill is that the city treasurer may be enjoined from paying the said warrant, or any money, to said commissioners, on account of their expenditures as a board of election commissioners, and from paying any warrants, drawn by the county judge in their favor, for expenses incurred by them, and that the act may be declared void. The bill was demurred to by the defendant below, the demurrer was sustained, and the bill dismissed.
All other questions in regard to the constitutionality of the act concerning elections, passed in 1885, have been considered in the case of People v. Hoffman, supra. The only provisions of that act which are brought before us by this record are those relating to the payment of the expenses attendant upon its execution. Article 7, entitled ‘Compensation,’ of the which went into force July 1, 1885, (Rev. St. 1885, c. 46, p. 550,) provides that the salaries of the election commissioners and of their chief clerk shall be paid by the county; that all expenses incurred by the board of election commissioners shall be paid by the city; that ‘such salaries and expenditures are to be audited by the county judge, and such salaries shall be paid by the county treasurer, upon the warrant of such county judge, out of any money in the county treasury not otherwise appropriated; and such expenditures shall be paid by the city treasurer, upon the warrant of such county judge, out of any money in the city treasury not otherwise appropriated.’ These provisions of the act contained in article 7 are alleged to be repugnant to the ninth and tenth sections of article 9 of the constitution. Those sections are as follows:
These sections in the constitution of 1870, or a similar section in the constitution of 1848, have been frequently construed by this court, and by the supreme court of the United States. Updike v. Wright, 81 Ill. 49, and cases there cited; Weightman v. Clark, 103 U. S. 256;County of Livingston v. Darlington, 101 U. S. 407;Hackett v. Ottawa, 99 U. S. 86;Township of Elmwood v. Marcy, 92 U. S. 289;Cornell v. People, 107 Ill. 372. The decisions in these cases lay down three propositions as clearly deducible from the sections here quoted: First, the general assembly cannot grant the right to assess and collect taxes to any other than the corporate authorities of the municipalities or districts to be taxed; second, taxation by such municipal or corporate authorities must be for corporate purposes; third, such taxation cannot be imposed without the consent of the tax-payers to be affected.
The expenses incurred by the election commissioners, which the city is required to pay, are for office rent, clerk-hire, stationery, printing, books, registers, poll-lists, blanks, ballots, ballot-boxes, etc. These expenses are incurred by the election commissioners. They are audited by the county judge, and warrants for them are drawn by the county judge. But it is the ‘governing authority’ of the city which is intrusted with the duty of providing for their payment. Article 7, § 279. The assessment and collection of taxes for the payment of these expenses are not taken out of the hands of the corporate authorities of the city, but are expressly left with those authorities. But it may be said that the power to impose a tax, and the power to create a debt to be discharged by the levy of a tax, are substantially the same thing, and that therefore the election commissioners who incur these expenses, and thereby create the debt to be discharged by taxation, are the authorities who impose the tax. If this be so, then the question arises, who are the ‘corporate authorities' referred to in the constitution? We have defined them to be those authorities who are either directly elected by the population to be taxed, or appointed in some mode to which they have given their assent. Harward v. St. Clair, etc., Drainage Co., 51 Ill. 130;Hessler v. Drainage Com'rs, 53 Ill. 105;Cornell v. People, supra.
The bill in this case having been demurred to, its allegations are admitted to be true, and one of those allegations is that the election law has been adopted by the votes of the people of Chicago by a majority of 17,000. Although the commissioners have not been elected by the people of the city, yet by adopting the law the people have given their assent to the appointment of such commissioners by the county judge. Those commissioners have been appointed in a mode to which the population to be taxed have given their assent. They are therefore such ‘corporate authorities' as are contemplated by the above sections of the constitution, just as, in Cornell v. People, the South Park commissioners, though appointed by the circuit court, and not elected by the people, were held to be corporate authorities because the people to be affected by the park act had adopted it by their votes.
The next question is whether the taxes to be assessed and collected for the payment of the expenses in question are to be assessed and collected for a ‘corporate purpose.’ ‘A corporate purpose’ has been defined to be ‘some purpose which is germane to the general scope of the object for which the corporation was created,’ or such as has a legitimate connection with that object, and a manifest relation thereto. Weightman v. Clark, supra; People v. Dupuyt, 71 Ill. 651. ‘A tax for a corporate purpose’ has been defined to be ‘a tax to be expended in a manner which shall promote the general prosperity and welfare of the municipality which levies it.’ Hackett v. Ottawa, supra; Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9. In Taylor v. Thompson it was held that a tax levied upon the property of a township for the purpose of raising bounties to secure volunteers in the late war was a tax for ‘corporate purposes.’
The expenses mentioned in the bill in this case are incurred in the conduct of elections. Is the conduct of an election a corporate purpose? Are taxes imposed for the purpose of paying the expenses of conducting elections,-such taxes as are assessed and collected for corporate purposes? ‘Municipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate * * * established by law to share in the civil government of the country, but chiefly to regulate and administer the local or internal affairs of the city, town, or district which is incorporated.’ 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. § 9 b. A municipal corporation cannot share in the civil government of the country, nor regulate and administer its internal affairs, except through its officeres. Its chief officers are elected by the people. The cities in this state which have adopted the general act for the incorporation of cities and villages are under charters which provide for the election of aldermen, mayors, city clerks, city attorneys, and city treasurers. The conduct of elections is therefore a purpose which is germane to the object for which municipal corporations are created. Elections certainly have a legitimate connection with that object, and a manifest relation thereto; for the government of municipal corporations cannot be carried on except through the action of official agents, the chief of whom become such solely through the medium of elections. Nor can it be denied that the proper conduct of elections tends to ‘promote the general prosperity and welfare of the municipality.’ It...
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