Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. State Unemployment Compensation Commission
| Decision Date | 08 July 1959 |
| Docket Number | V,IWA-CI,IWA-C,No. 5,No. 5-40,5,5-40 |
| Citation | 342 P.2d 114,217 Or. 378 |
| Parties | WEYERHAEUSER TIMBER COMPANY, Respondent, v. STATE UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION COMMISSION, and Columbia River District Council'O, Local Unionerlin I. Kaufman, Glen Ross, and Joseph P. Powers, Appellants. |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
E. Nordyke, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause for appellant State Unemployment compensation Commission. With him on the briefs were Robert Y. Thornton, Atty. Gen., Roland V. Brown and Harry G. Spencer, Asst. Attys. Gen.
Harry George, Jr., Portland, argued the cause and filed briefs for appellants Columbia River District Council No. 5, IWA- CIO, Local Union No. 5-40, IWA-CIO, Verlin I. Kaufman, Glen Ross, and Joseph P. Powers.
Cleveland C. Cory, Portland, and Roger Henselman, Tacoma, Washington, argued the cause for respondent. With Cleveland C. Cory, Portland, on the brief were Hart, Spencer, McCulloch, Rockwood & Davies, Portland.
Before McALLISTER, C. J., and LUSK, WARNER, PERRY, SLOAN and CRAWFORD, JJ.
The defendants, Verlin I. Kaufman, Glen Ross, and Joseph P. Powers (hereinafter referred to as 'claimants') were in the employment of the Weyerhaeuser Timber Company (hereinafter referred to as 'petitioner'). They were members of the defendant Union (hereinafter referred to as the 'Union') and their employment was covered by a working agreement made and entered into on their behalf by the Union with the petitioner. This agreement, insofar as material, reads as follows:
'Article IX--Holidays
pay per holiday computed at the qualified employee's regular job rate of pay for his regular work schedule. Pay for qualified piece workers shall be eight (8) hours' pay at their straight time average daily earnings for the preceding ninety (90) days. Qualified employees working on a paid holiday shall be paid an additional one and one-half times the employee's regular rate of pay for the hours worked on the shift designated as the holiday shift. An employee who has not qualified for a paid holiday shall be paid one and one-half times his regular rate of pay for hours worked on the shift designated as the holiday shift.
'(b) An employee is qualified for holiday pay if (1) he has at least thirty-one (31) days' seniority prior to the holiday, and (2) works the last regularly scheduled work day before and the first regularly scheduled work day after the paid holiday. The second qualification shall not be required in the following instances:
'(1) Where an employee is absent because of an occupational injury for which he receives workmen's compensation, or would receive such compensation except for a statutory waiting period of disqualification, he shall be qualified for holiday pay for the paid holidays which occur during the first six (6) months of absence following the date of the injury resulting in such absence.
'(2) Where an employee is absent because of a non-occupational injury or illness and produces written evidence of such injury or illness, he shall be qualified for holiday pay for the paid holidays which occur during the first thirty (30) calendar days following the commencement of the non-occupational injury or illness resulting in such absence.
'(3) Lay-off for not more than thirty (30) days because of lack of work, or lay-off without time limitation due to weather conditions, and when an employee is absent for either of such reasons, he shall receive pay for paid holidays occurring during such lay-off, provided, the employee returns to work upon the termination of such lay-off.
'(4) In cases of written leaves of absence of one week or less authorized by the Company for compelling reasons beyond the control of the employee, or such leaves of absence while on Union business not to exceed thirty (30) calendar days; provided, the employee returns to work immediately following such leave of absence.
'Holiday pay payable to an employee under (1) or (2) above, shall be paid to the employee on the regular payday for the period in which such holiday occurs.'
The claimants each qualified for the holiday pay provided under Article IX.
The claimants were laid off by the petitioner for a period of three weeks, commencing December 21, 1956 and ending January 14, 1957. Each filed his claim for unemployment compensation benefits during this layoff period and a deputy of the State Unemployment Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 'Commission') determined the holiday day should be considered wages for both Christmas Day and New Year's Day. Therefore, each claimant was awarded unemployment compensation benefits in each week in amounts determined by deducting from his weekly benefit the amount by which his holiday pay exceeded one-third of his unemployment benefit.
The claimants filed their requests for a hearing before the Appeals Referee. At this hearing, the same issue of law being involved with other employes as to their respective employers, these claims of other claimants similarly situated were consolidated.
The Appeals Referee affirmed the decision of the deputy of the Commission and the claimants appealed to the Commission. The petitioner did not appear nor participate in the proceedings before the Appeals Referee or the Commission.
The Commission on review set aside and reversed the decision of the Referee and ordered that the claimants be paid their unemployment compensation benefits without consideration of the holiday pay for Christmas and New Year's. Thereupon petitioner filed its petition for a judicial review of the Commission's decision in the Circuit Court of the State of Oregon for Clackamas County.
The circuit court reversed the decision of the Commission, which in effect reinstated the decision of the Appeals Referee, and from this decision the defendants have appealed.
The claimants contend the trial court was without jurisdiction to review the decision of the Commission, (1) because the petitioner had not exhausted its administrative remedies as provided in ORS 657.265 to 657.275, and (2) that the petitioner failed to allege its petition was filed within the time required by statute.
The petitioner had exhausted its remedies. While it is true petitioner made no personal appearance at the hearing before the Referee or the Commission, it was a party to the proceedings had and was, as a contributor to the fund, bound thereby. After the hearing before the Commission, there are no further administrative steps required since an application for reconsideration before the Commission (ORS 657.290) is but an optional right, and is not a necessary step by an aggrieved party seeking judicial review. ORS 657.285(1).
The individual claimant's contention, that the petition does not show on its face that the trial court had jurisdiction to review the proceedings before the Commission, is based upon the allegation in the petition that 'Petitioner has been advised that a copy of the decision of the defendant Commission was mailed to petitioner on November 12, 1957.' It being claimants' contention that this is not a sufficient allegation of fact to disclose that the Commission's order was final. If this allegation is insufficient, the Commission by answer supplied this defect by admitting the date of mailing.
The claimants also contend the trial court was without jurisdiction because the petitioner failed to name all of the parties who were present at the hearing before the referee and at the review of such claims refore the Commission as defendants in its petition. There is no merit in this contention.
The basis of this contention lies in the fact that employes of other timber processors, operating under practically identical contracts, had filed for unemployment compensation, and the Referee and Commission for convenience thereupon consolidated all these cases for hearing; the Commission making findings of fact and conclusions of law applicable to all the parties. The portion of ORS 657.285(2) relied upon by claimants as applicable is as follows:
There is no question but that compliance with this portion of the Act is necessary to the jurisdiction of a circuit court to review the actions of the Commission. However, we cannot construe the terms 'party to the hearing' as including all who are present at a hearing where for the sake of convenience and because of similarity of issues the individual controversies between one employer and his employes and the controversies between another employer and his employes are heard and adjudicated. Just a reading of the Act discloses that the Act contemplates the allowance of benefits which accrue thereunder by reason of an employee-employer relationship. Therefore, the 'parties to the hearing' as contemplated by the statute are those between a particular employer and his own employes.
The principal contention of the claimants and the Commission is that the trial court...
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